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Abstract 
The ‘Cat’s Paw of Dictatorship’: State Security and Self-Rule in the Gold Coast, 1948 to 1957 
by 
Chase Andrew Arnold 
Doctor of Philosophy in History 
University of California, Berkeley 
Professor Tabitha Kanogo, Chair 
On February 28th, 1948, a deadly police shooting at a veteran’s demonstration in the Gold Coast 
sparked three days of rioting in the capital city of Accra and surrounding communities.  It was 
the first crisis of its kind for the British colony and a clear indication of the shifting political 
realities of the post-war era.  Though colonial rule had been in place for several generations, the 
people of the Gold Coast would increasingly balk at an imperial system that denied them a voice 
in their own government.  The following nine years would witness the Gold Coast’s 
extraordinary transition from British colony, to self-ruled territory, and eventually an independent 
state that renamed itself the Republic of Ghana. 
In the more than sixty years since Ghana’s independence in 1957, scholars and commentators 
alike have recognized the February riots as a turning point in Ghanaian and imperial history, 
signaling the new wave of decolonization that would sweep across sub-Saharan Africa in the 
years to follow.  What has remained unknown and relatively unstudied is the fact that the riots 
also compelled the development of a government intelligence network in the Gold Coast.  Before 
British officials accepted that colonial rule was as its end in West Africa, they sought to 
safeguard the state by providing it a domestic intelligence organization.  This organization 
operated throughout the terminal years of British rule in the Gold Coast and succeeded in both 
altering the nature of the colonial state and the process of decolonization in unexpected ways. 
This dissertation interrogates the role of government intelligence in the Gold Coast between the 
years of 1948 and 1957.  By examining police superintendents, Security Service officers, and 
colonial administrators, it reconstructs the establishment and application of intelligence resources 
to better understand the process and politics of decolonization in the Britain’s West African 
empire. 
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Introduction: Colonial Rule and Intelligence Work 
 In December 1942, the Omega Psi Phi fraternity of the University of Philadelphia held its 
annual Achievement Week program at Houston Hall.  As a predominantly African American 
fraternity, Omega Psi Phi used Achievement Week to highlight the accomplishments of African 
American men and women in the hopes of inspiring similar greatness in the generation to follow.  
1942’s program was no different and the organizers hoped to highlight the strides made by 
members of the Black community and to emphasize their role in answering the pressing issues of 
the day.  In 1942, the chief concern for the university’s students (if not all Americans) was the 
United States’ position in the Second World War.  Reading the times, the fraternity invited four 
distinguished speakers to address the “Role of the Negro in the War Effort”.  They included 
William H. Hastie, the first African American to sit as a federal judge and a civilian aide to the 
Secretary of War; William J. Thompkins, the Recorder of Deeds for the District of Columbia; 
and Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., a charismatic Harlem pastor and the first African American 
elected to the New York City Council.  The fourth panelist, by comparison, was an unusual 
choice.  He was a local lecturer in “Negro Studies” from British West Africa; presumably some 
in the fraternity were his students and appreciated his capacity to expand Black issues beyond 
American contexts. 
 Despite its seemingly innocuous topic, this panel and its presenters became the subject of 
an intelligence report distributed between American and British officials in the weeks before 
New Year’s Eve.  It expressed some apprehension with Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., erroneously 
labeling him a Communist leader, but it was primarily focused on the West African scholar.  As 
might have been expected, he challenged the panel’s limited scope of the war, the United States, 
and the African American community.  Instead his comments focused on how the war itself was 
changing the youth of Africa and what that change might mean for the future of European 
imperialism.  “He declared that a change was necessary,” read the report, “that the youth of 
Africa refuses to be exploited by outsiders, and that they will not sit by after the war and allow 
territories to be allocated [without] the natives being permitted a share in government.”  The U.S. 
Army deemed this a “very anti-British speech” and sought to warn their counterparts in the 
United Kingdom by sharing a copy of this report.  It was an act of good faith and prudent 
precaution - this lecturer might become a problem for British authorities but for the time being, 
he was actively engaged in American circles.  This report was eventually delivered to the 
Security Service, Britain’s domestic intelligence agency also known as MI5.  They likely had no 
information to provide the US Army but they still properly categorized and filed away the report 
for future reference.  Though his name meant nothing to American or British authorities in 1942, 
this West African lecturer was Kwame Nkrumah, one of the icons of African nationalism in the 
post-war era and the future president of an independent Ghana.  1
 The National Archives of the United Kingdom [TNA] KV 2/1847, 1a.1
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 This document was likely the first intelligence report ever prepared on Nkrumah and it 
would not be the last.  The American report on Nkrumah’s speech in fact became the first 
document in his personal MI5 file, an expansive set of folders that traced his personal and 
political lives from 1942 until 1953.   These records were declassified in 2005 and moved to the 2
public holdings of the British National Archives.  They were released alongside a set of similar, 
security files prepared by the Security Service on several African nationalists during the post-war 
era.   In most cases, these reports had been closed for more than fifty years due to considerations 3
of national security and the obvious reticence of any intelligence organization to disclosure its 
records, and yet their release provided a unique resource for historical scholarship.  In the first 
place, intelligence documents contained in these folders provided an additional portrait of the 
leading nationalist figures of the late colonial era.  In Nkrumah’s case, his file contains a record 
of his international correspondences, ranging from his romantic endeavors to his political 
musings with trusted friends and confidantes.  These documents, selected and preserved by 
cautious authorities defending a state facing the untold consequences at empire’s end, may not 
entirely reorient our understanding of these men and their politics but they still provide new 
windows into the thoughts and objectives of some of the most influential figures in twentieth 
century African history, showing the cautious consideration and debates that preceded their 
political actions. 
 These records also present an untold component to colonial histories - the role of 
intelligence institutions in the post-war empire.  Again in the case of Nkrumah’s file, the bulk of 
the Security Service’s reporting comes from the period between 1947 and 1953.  These were the 
years immediately following Nkrumah’s return to the Gold Coast and the launching of his 
political career as a critic of the colonial administration.  Although the Security Service was 
expectedly focused on the British Isles, these records show that MI5 was also intimately engaged 
with affairs in West Africa and the larger empire.  Not only did MI5 maintain several channels 
for collecting information from the Gold Coast but they indeed had one or even several of their 
own officers stationed in Accra as advisors to the local administration.  MI5’s involvement with 
West African affairs aligns perfectly with the first challenges to colonial rule in the post-war era 
and continues through the Gold Coast’s first steps toward self-rule and independence.  In this 
way, the Security Service played a role in the maintenance (and dissolution) of British rule in the 
Gold Coast, a role that by the early 2000s had not yet been exposed or examined. 
 While the disclosure of Security Service records on African nationalists had presented 
new questions for considering the late colonial empire, they did little else.  The security files on 
selected individuals did not sufficiently describe British intelligence channels in West Africa 
 The abrupt ending of this file in 1953 is not explained by the files themselves and seems an unusual date for the 2
Security Service to cease reporting on Nkrumah.  The Gold Coast was four years from independence and Nkrumah 
had served as the colony’s de facto Prime Minister since 1951.  It seems likely that investigations did continue but 
the Security Service has not released their later files on Nkrumah.
 There is clear evidence among these records that several files dealing with other anti-colonial activists have still 3
been withheld.  One clear example is George Padmore, a Trinidadian activist who collaborated frequently with 
Nkrumah throughout the 1940’s and 1950’s and relocated to Accra to help him realize his vision for an independent 
African state.  Nkrumah’s file show that Padmore was also under MI5 investigation and yet his file has not been 
released.  This may simply require time - MI5’s records on Padmore’s wife (Dorothy Pizer Padmore) were released 
in 2014.
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beyond indicating that they existed.  For example, the records prepared on activists in the Gold 
Coast indicated that the Security Service received the bulk of their intelligence in the colony 
through the local administration and its police force.  Specifically, the Security Service relied on 
the Special Branch unit of the Gold Coast Police Force for regular intelligence reporting.  This 
Special Branch was responsible for developing intelligence sources and analyzing the material 
they collected; Security Service officers in Accra merely offered their occasional perspective on 
these sources to the local administration and forwarded select information to their superiors in 
London.  In other words, the foundation of the colonial intelligence work in the Gold Coast was 
not the Security Service but the local Special Branch.  MI5’s records on Nkrumah and other 
leaders, based on Special Branch’s reporting, could only provide glimpses into that organization.  
More importantly, while the Security Service sampled from and preserved elements of Special 
Branch’s reporting, their files did not include records of Special Branch’s interactions with the 
administration in Accra.  They revealed nothing of how local officials directed Special Branch, 
what value was placed on the intelligence it produced, and what influence (if any) intelligence 
reporting had on the administration’s approach to the challenges raised by nationalist politics.  
Understanding the role of intelligence work in the late-colonial empire would require a dedicated 
focus on Special Branch, something Security Service files alone could simply not provide. 
 Colonial records would prove equally unhelpful in studying Special Branch.  In 2005, 
when MI5 released its files on Nkrumah, there were no substantive records on Special Branch in 
colonial archives in either the United Kingdom or Ghana.  Special Branch was mentioned in 
documents reviewing or detailing the larger police force, but these references were consistently 
vague.   There was also no indication that Special Branch’s own records had been preserved.  As 4
an intelligence institution, partially overseen by the Security Service, Special Branch would have 
developed their institutional value by building up and maintaining their own catalog of records 
from which to reference and inform additional information.  None of these records seemed to 
have been preserved, although the Security Service frequently referenced them in their own files.   
 An explanation for this absence became available in 2007.  Following the Security 
Service’s example, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office released a number of security and 
intelligence files from its Colonial Office holdings.  These records were taken from the 
Intelligence and Security Department, the bureaucratic link between the Colonial Office and the 
Security Service that was also responsible for overseeing civil security projects, such as Police 
Special Branch units, throughout the empire.  These files, once again, had little concrete 
information on these individual projects, but they did allude to the fate of their records.  For 
example, from a report prepared on the Gold Coast in 1955, an advisor from the Intelligence and 
Security Department observed that “it is clear that Special Branch records will have to be 
‘weeded’ before the achievement of full self-government”.  He mentioned that similar work had 
been done in India before its independence in 1947 and the experience had shown that “many 
files will inevitably have to be destroyed” although some could be transferred to the Security 
Service.   It appeared then that the Gold Coast Special Branch had been purposefully erased from 5
the colonial archive and that this had been a general policy for each territory approaching 
 See Sir Colonel Arthur Young’s report of the Gold Coast Police Force made in 1951, Public Records and Archives 4
Department of Ghana [PRAAD] ADM 5/3/84.
 TNA CO 1035/95,  A.M. McDonald’s Report on the Gold Coast.5
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independence.  Whatever research could be done on colonial intelligence networks, it seemed, 
would have to rely on fragments, and there was simply not enough of them to understand this 
peculiar aspect of the colonial state. 
 This situation drastically changed in 2011.  In connection to a lawsuit brought against the 
government, the Foreign and Commonwealth was forced to disclose the existence of an 
enormous collection of archival records inherited from the Colonial Office.  This lawsuit had 
been launched by a group of elderly Kenyans, all survivors of the British detention program 
implemented to break the Mau Mau Emergency among the Kikuyu.  The plaintiffs claimed that 
they had suffered brutal atrocities at the hand of colonial officials and while there was no direct 
evidence in British or Kenyan archives to validate these charges, there was sufficient proof 
indicating that the records had once existed and been meticulously removed but such documents 
from Kenya and withheld from the British National Archives.  These claims were all proven true 
and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office acknowledged that colonial archives had indeed been 
purged of all records that might later “embarrass” Her Majesty’s Government.  Those files that 
had not been destroyed in individual territories had been removed to a facility operated by 
Britain’s three chief intelligence agencies at Hanslope Park in Milton Keynes.  They had 
effectively been buried there in direct contravention of the Public Records Act of 1960.  This 
revelation ultimately moved the lawsuit in the plaintiffs’ favor and compelled the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to begin the lengthy process of reviewing and declassifying 
approximately 8,800 records.    6
 Hanslope Park would prove to be the final destination of the many security and 
intelligence documents that had been “weeded” from colonial territories more than a half century 
earlier.  In the case of the Gold Coast, these disclosed records provided the necessary archival 
material for studying the operation of intelligence work in the post-war era.  They included 
Special Branch’s monthly intelligence reports, security assessment from the administration’s 
Local Intelligence Committee, and the reams of correspondences produced between the various 
agencies and individuals responsible for state security in the Gold Coast.   
In connection with the other security files declassified in the previous decade, it was finally 
possible to study colonial intelligence networks at every level of local and metropolitan 
government. 
 This dissertation is the first study of its kind, directed towards reconstructing the role of 
intelligence work in late colonial Ghana through these declassified records.  These security and 
intelligence institutions played an unusual role in the terminal years of British rule in the Gold 
Coast.  They were established to protect a colonial system that was already well on its way to 
obsolescence.  Later, as the colony was on the cusp of independence, these organizations were 
expected to transform into national institutions, providing the Ghanaian state the protections 
deemed essential for modern governments faced with the uncertainties of the Cold War.  
Securing colonial rule in the Gold Coast was undeniably a political project that elicited all of the 
conflicting expectations for the future of British rule and an independent Ghanaian state.  In 
 Anthony Cary, “Cary Report on release of the colonial administration files,” 24 February 2011, https://6
www.gov.uk/government/publications/cary-report-on-release-of-the-colonial-administration-files
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other words, government intelligence is not just an oddity of the late-colonial state but an avenue 
for studying the complex processes of decolonization in the Gold Coast. 
 This approach was the framing adopted by Richard Rathbone, the only scholar to 
previously study the history of police intelligence in colonial Ghana.  In 1966, he located the last 
surviving cache of Special Branch records.  They were in a pitiable state but provided enough 
context to understand Special Branch’s opinion of the colony’s nationalist movement and some 
of the intelligence sources they developed.  Rathbone notes that Special Branch could be 
interpreted as the administration’s attempt to maintain a degree of hegemony while the colony 
increasingly adopted self-rule.  The fact that Special Branch remained a secret to elected 
Ghanaian officials and the blatant antagonism for nationalist politicians that suffused their 
reports both support this argument.  But more importantly, Rathbone argues that police 
intelligence had the peculiar quality of eliciting the diverging views within the colonial 
administration over the implementation of self-rule and the process of decolonization generally.  
In other words, as much as Special Branch could be understood as an attempt to maintain British 
authority, it also reveals the stark divisions between colonial officials.   He wrote, “data of this 
kind contribute to the destruction of any persistent, simple mythology of monolithic colonial 
attitudes and establishments.  Special Branch were, not least, playing institutional politics within 
a profoundly divided service.”   7
 Though no additional Special Branch papers have been located in Ghana, similar 
arguments have been made about colonial intelligence institutions in Britain’s other African 
territories.  Notably, Philip Murphy has repeatedly examined police intelligence matters in the 
Central African Federation in the 1950’s and 60’s.  Like Rathbone, Murphy’s work highlights 
how police intelligence became a site of confrontation for the various political questions that 
faced the federation, especially where the concerns of colonial rule were further complicated by 
the priorities of a white minority government intent on protecting the political and economic 
privileges of European settlers.  The chief contributions of Murphy’s work, particularly evident 
because of his focus on central Arica, is to show how police intelligence served as an avenue for 
metropolitan officials to question and challenges the objectives of the Rhodesian state.  Local 
Special Branch units in the Federation, as throughout the empire, were expected to collaborate 
with the Security Service in London, and metropolitan officials used these channels of security 
liaison to dispute characterization of local affairs offered by government officials in Salisbury.  
Officials in the Rhodesian government would likewise influence intelligence reporting in 
deliberate ways so as to validate their policies to metropolitan critics.  As Murphy shows, the 
value of intelligence history is its ability to reveal political conflicts within the colonial state at 
its several levels.  8
 This dissertation will replicate this approach to colonial intelligence history but challenge 
it in several ways.  In both Rathbone and Murphy’s studies, there was not sufficient 
documentation to examine the shifting political perspectives informing intelligence work across 
 Richard Rathbone, “Police Intelligence in Ghana in the Late 1940s and 1950s,” The Journal of Imperial and 7
Commonwealth History 21, no. 3 (September 1993): 125.
 Philip Murphy, “Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture: The View from Central Africa 1945-1965,” 8
Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 3 (2002): 131–62; Phillip Murphy, “A Police State?  The Nyasaland 
Emergency and Colonial Intelligence,” Journal of Southern African Studies 36, no. 4 (December 2010): 765–80.
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a protracted period of time.  The ‘Hanslope Disclosure’ however provides Special Branch reports 
and intelligence documents from the Gold Coast administration between 1948 and 1957.  These 
nine years had distinct phases in the colony’s progression towards independence as the 
expectations of British policymakers increasingly shifted in response to continued nationalist 
pressure.  Those shifts can likewise be traced in security documents, showing how Special 
Branch and the Gold Coast’s intelligence apparatus was expected to change its outlook and 
operations to match evolving political realities.  By examine police intelligence across this 
extended period, we can better see not only the competing opinions of British officials over the 
process of decolonization, but we can also see when and how those opinions shifted.   
 The extended frame of these crucial nine years also allows this research to challenge the 
confines of colonial history.  The final years of British rule in the Gold Coast were dedicated to 
“Africanising” the state - ensuring that colonial institutions were altered to fit the demands of a 
modern, independent, and African government.  This project increasingly involved Ghanaian 
statesman and even in the realm of government intelligence, elected ministers collaborated with 
colonial officials to envision the security structures of the future Ghanian state.  By studying 
police intelligence through to 1957, we therefore examine the foundations of civil security 
structures in independent Ghana, noting the competing visions between colonial and elected 
authorities over the function of security organizations in the future state.  These discussions 
provide invaluable insight into Ghana’s First Republic were security institutions occupy a pivotal 
place in debates over the leadership and legacy of Kwame Nkrumah. 
 Beyond this specific literature on Special Branch and decolonization in the post-war era, 
there is of course a wide array of research addressing imperialism and intelligence with which 
this dissertation broadly engages.  Of particular note is Christopher Bayly’s Empire and 
Information.  This landmark study of colonial rule in eighteenth and nineteenth century India 
demonstrates how intelligence work was fundamental to the establishment of British domination.  
By co-opting or circumventing existing channels for information-gathering throughout local 
societies, British authorities were able to magnify their political and military presence to realize 
an imperial state.  These intelligence networks predated the era of European imperialism yet 
British administrators frequently succeeded in integrating themselves and their own objectives 
into these networks, controlling the flow of information as a precursor to transmitting political 
and economic power over the subcontinent.   By comparison, colonial authorities in sub-Saharan 9
Africa did not encounter similarly extensive, local intelligence-gathering networks as had existed 
in India.  They also approached the partition of Africa in the late nineteenth century after 
significant technological advances in areas of firearms, transportation, and communication had 
produced considerable military imbalances that allowed European rule and “effective 
occupation” to be imposed without the assistance of intelligence work as a force multiplier.  
Despite these dramatic differences in context, Bayly’s study establishes that intelligence was a 
fundamental resource for British imperialism, one which was deployed when the authority of the 
state met considerable opposition.  
 C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 9
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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 Whereas Bayly demonstrates that intelligence was vital to the imposition of colonial rule 
in India during the eighteenth century, other scholars have explored how intelligence programs 
were infused into colonial statecraft due to increased internal opposition during the twentieth 
century.  This argument is made especially clear by Martin Thomas in Empires of Intelligence: 
Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914.  This study is focused on colonial territories 
in North Africa and the Middle East, unified by the common theme of European imperial rule 
imposed over predominantly Muslim communities.  Comparing British and French examples 
from these regions, Thomas explores how intelligence work was organized and mobilized in 
colonial contexts that were increasingly recognized as being fundamentally unstable after the 
First World War.  He argues that “colonial sates relied on intelligence gathering to survive” after 
recognizing “the limits of colonial state power in societies governed through systems of uneasy 
clientage and elite cooption.”   These arguments for North Africa and the Middle East find 10
obvious corollaries south of the Sahara where similar crises unfolded, albeit only after the 
Second World War. 
 There is also significant number of studies that have examined British intelligence 
generally through its engagement with the larger empire.  This is the guiding focus of Rory 
Cormac’s Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency, Calder 
Walton’s Empire of Secrets: Intelligence, Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire, and even the 
Security Service’s centennial history, Defend the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5, by 
Christopher Andrew.  Each of these studies considers how British intelligence organizations 
adapted to the demands of the empire, both shaping and in turn being shaped by colonial affairs.  
More importantly to the direction of this dissertation and the literature already discussed, they 
demonstrate how British authorities clung to intelligence work as a means of preserving the UK’s 
increasingly fragile position as a world power.  With the precipitous decline of her political and 
economic authority during the contest of the Cold War, intelligence work remained one area 
where the UK believed they held significant footing alongside either superpower.  These studies 
provide invaluable context for understanding the operation of British intelligence at the 
metropolitan level and they in turn show how the retreat to intelligence work in colonial 
territories was part of a larger strategy employed by the UK to meet its particular crises during 
the Cold War.  11
 These several studies provide invaluable context for the research at hand and likewise 
demonstrate some of the unique qualities of the Gold Coast as a case study for colonial 
intelligence.  Most scholarship on the intersection of colonial rule and intelligence work has been 
centered on large-scale crises and insurgencies.  In these examples, intelligence work had a clear 
role in supporting military operations and shoring up the foundations of an increasingly 
challenged colonial state.  The Gold Coast is peculiar in this regard because it did not witness a 
comparable, protracted crises as examined by other scholars.  Outside of the three days of rioting 
 Thomas, Martin, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (Berkeley: 10
University of California Press, 2008), pp. 294 -5.
 Andrew, Christopher, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (New York: Vintage Books, 2009); Rory 11
Cormac, Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013); Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire (London: 
Harper Press, 2013).
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in February 1948, the anti-colonial movement in the Gold Coast hardly approached the scale of 
insurgency.  There were protests, strikes, and national political movements, but the colonial 
question in the Gold Coast never became a military matter.  Furthermore, the intelligence 
projects that have occupied previous scholars were directly solely to the maintenance of colonial 
rule.  The Gold Coast, on the other hand, operated a large-scale intelligence program for nearly 
six years after it had been accepted by British policymakers that colonial rule was at its end.  The 
Gold Coast Police Special Branch thus had a far more complicated mandate necessitated by the 
process of decolonization.  It had to secure vestiges of colonial authority, protect a transitional 
government, prepare resources for an independent state, and safeguard Britain’s interests in post-
colonial liaison with the Republic of Ghana.  These complex and often competing objectives 
make the Gold Coast a singular example that can highlight the intricacies of intelligence work 
against the fraught processes of decolonization. 
 This dissertation examines these intricacies by approaching colonial intelligence and civil  
security in the Gold Coast in four distinct eras, each the subject of a singular chapter.  The first 
chapter begins in 1941 and examines the intelligence and civil security resources developed in 
British West Africa during the Second World War.  These resources provided the foundation for 
police intelligence structures in the Gold Coast between 1948 and 1957.  This wartime portrait 
reveals the priorities of local officials towards intelligence matters when colonial rule appeared 
secure and the threat of external subversion was believed to be negligible or non-existent.  In 
other words, this chapter provides a baseline for British perceptions of intelligence work in West 
Africa before the fundamental challenges created by post-war nationalism.  The second chapter 
continues the narrative from 1948 to 1951, covering the implementation of Special Branch in the 
Gold Coast between the two most significant events in its progress toward decolonization - the 
Accra Riots and the first Legislative Assembly Elections.  The former was the first major 
challenge to colonial rule in the post-war era that succeeded both in questioning the future of the 
British empire in West Africa and launching the Gold Coast’s intelligence program.  The latter 
was the first step toward implementing self-rule in the Gold Coast.  This chapter utilizes Special 
Branch to examine how British perceptions of the nationalist movement changed during these 
three years, allowing for the acceptance of colonial rule’s end.  The questions of this era are 
continued in the third chapter, that follows the history of Special Branch through to the second 
Legislative Assembly Elections of 1954.  The fourth and final chapter considers Special Branch 
on the eve of Ghanaian independence.  In the three years before 1957, intelligence work was 
chiefly focused on the future needs of the Ghanaian state and Britain’s post-colonial interests.  
These years would provide the lasting legacy of intelligence work under British rule and 
establish the foundation for civil security institutions in independent Ghana. 
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Chapter One: Wartime Intelligence in British West Africa, 
1941-1945 
  
 The Second World War had a profound impact on British Intelligence.  Intelligence work 
had an equally profound impact on the war itself. Today it is difficult to find a single history of 
the Second World War that does not factor the contributions of British Intelligence into the Allied 
victory.  Whether praising the ingenuity of British codebreakers in solving the Enigma cypher, 
the intricate counter-intelligence campaign that preceded the Normandy invasion, or Britain’s 
success in turning Axis’ agents as part of the Double Cross System - Intelligence enjoys a 
privileged position in popular and scholarly narrative of the Second World War.  1
Beyond these narratives, the Second World War also sparked civil security operations 
throughout the British Empire.  The British Security Service was tasked with handling all 
security matters within three miles of British borders, whether they belonged to the British isles 
or one of the many colonial domains in the larger empire.  This responsibility was largely 
ignored throughout the empire however.  For the majority of the twentieth century, the colonies 
were not closely aligned to the central security of Great Britain, nor did they face extraordinary 
threats that seemed to warrant the attention of the Security Service.  The colonies and their 
security could best be left to colonial officials  The Second World War, however briefly, 
challenged that passive indifference.   
Axis victories and staggering Allied defeats in 1940 and 1941 made the empire critical to 
the defense of the United Kingdom and its hope for winning the war.  In particular, Britain’s four 
West African colonies - the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria - supplied critical 
wartime resources and continued access to the Middle East and Pacific after the Axis powers had 
secured the Mediterranean.  The newfound, strategic relevance of West Africa meant that the 
Security Service began to fulfill responsibility of securing this corner of the empire.  These 
wartime efforts laid the foundations for civil security and intelligence structures in West Africa 
that persisted through the final decade of colonial rule.  Thus, to understand how these 
government intelligence influenced the end of empire or the independent African states that 
followed, we must begin with the Second World War.   
West Africa’s strategic value fluctuated in direct opposition to Allied strength in Europe.  
As the tide on the continent turned, Britain came to rely on West Africa to balance its losses.  
This shift began and accelerated precipitously in the summer of 1940.  The first key event was 
the Fall of France in June.  Germany’s blitzkrieg campaign had felled the largest standing army 
in Europe in only six weeks, leaving Britain vulnerable across the channel and limiting its access 
to Eastern Europe and the Middle East.  Emboldened by Germany’s stunning success, Italy 
joined the Axis powers a few days later.  Their opening salvo in the war consisted of nine air 
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raids on the island of Malta, a British stronghold that served as headquarters for her 
Mediterranean fleet.  Without Malta, Great Britain lost a vital link across the Mediterranean and 
the men and war material she had deployed across the globe. 
Together, the Fall of France and the closing of the Mediterranean severely threatened 
Great Britain’s chances at surviving the Second World War.  They also awakened colonial 
authorities to the proximity of the war. From its outset in September 1939 until the Summer of 
1940, the war had minimally disrupted affairs in the four West African colonies.  Wartime 
rationing had been implemented, exports of certain minerals had been increased, and recruitment 
of African soldiers was underway, yet for nearly its first year the Second World War changed 
little for administrators in their daily affairs and concerns.   The war simply seemed too distant.  
The Fall of France dispelled that illusion overnight. France was now under a German-controlled 
government and it was unclear whether the French colonies of West and Equatorial Africa would 
follow the Vichy government, potentially carrying Europe’s war into its colonies, or demonstrate 
their solidarity with the Free French Forces.  The only reasonable recourse to this disquieting 2
uncertainty was to presume the worst.   In the concise words of a Security Service officer, “the 
four colonies are all separated from each other by Vichy territory which is, for all practical 
purpose, precisely the same as enemy territory.”   British officials in West Africa could no longer 3
ignore the war. 
These fears were compounded by the bizarre logic behind colonial borders in West 
Africa.  The product of political bartering at the Berlin Conference in 1884, these borders 
reflected Britain and France’s ambitious economic and political aspirations against one another.  
They did not represent reasonable political, social, or even geographic boundaries that either 
power could effectively monitor, let alone control.  This bizarre logic was best reflected in the 
Gambia, where Great Britain claimed a narrow stretch of land on either side of the Gambia 
River.  The resulting colony was nearly three hundred miles long, little more than twenty miles 
wide, and entirely surrounded by the French colony of Senegal.  While more balanced in their 
size and scale, the other West African colonies were similarly surrounded by French territory.  
Before the Fall of France, there had been little reason to control these borders or for colonial 
administrations to have significant presence outside of the coastal centers of each colony.  We 
know now that French officials in the colonies were reticent to support the German cause and 
equally confused by the political uncertainty created by the fall of France.  Yet even the 
possibility of invasion was enough to disrupt British administrators in Africa to the reality that 
the entire Empire was at war. 
Along with creating the near-threat of invasion, the summer of 1940 also saw West Africa 
achieve an unexpected strategic value to Britain’s larger war aims.  With the Axis powers 
severely curtailing the movement of ships and aircraft across the Mediterranean, Great Britain 
needed alternative routes to the Middle East and Indian Ocean.  The only reasonable solution 
was for British vessels from the North Atlantic to circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope in 
South Africa and for Allied aircraft to relay across the Sahara.  In addition to linking the North 
 The armistice treaty between France and Germany in 1940 left the fate of the colonies undecided, meaning that 2
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Atlantic to the Indian ocean, the West African colonies also afforded critical connections to 
North America.  Despite her neutrality at the outbreak of the war, by the summer of 1940, the 
United States had firmly placed herself in support of the Allies as the “Arsenal of Democracy”.  
American supplies including aircraft, weaponry, and other equipment were sent across the 
Atlantic and leased to Allied forces in Europe.  By the summer of 1940, the North Atlantic was a 
dangerous option for vessels carrying these supplies and American war-aid was progressively 
shipped to West Africa, via Brazil.   And later, as the UK lost valuable resources from colonies in 4
the Indian Ocean, West Africa provided the only secure source for minerals critical to wartime 
manufacturing including tin, bauxite, and manganese.  Ironically, the very same sea routes and 
African economies that had propelled the British Empire to world dominance in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries had become instrumental to its survival during the Second World War.   
These conditions also made West Africa a new target for Axis intelligence, a point not 
missed by the Security Service.  According to R.D. Gibbs, a senior officer in MI5’s OS or 
‘overseas department’, “The flow of American supplies to the Middle East and the 
accompanying flow of aircraft, personnel and weapons of war, are revealed to us as occupying 
one of the foremost places in the enemies’ grading of intelligence required.”   No doubt Germany 5
intended to disrupt shipping in the South Atlantic and limit America’s capacity to support Great 
Britain.  Gibbs continued, “what was a relatively unimpressive area those eleven months ago, 
[West Africa] is now, jointly with the Brazilian shoulder, the principal potential field for 
espionage, and perhaps sabotage, directed against America’s war contribution to the Middle 
Eastern theatre”.   While Germany and Britain would not wage war in West Africa, the region 6
instead became an intelligence battlefield where each success or failure could determine the fate 
of physical battles elsewhere. 
West Africa’s newfound strategic value demanded immediate improvements in its 
security protocols, structures, and resources.  This was answered by a variety of initiatives 
undertaken by the Admiralty, the Royal Air Force, the Armed Forces, and the Colonial Office.  
However, the ultimate burden for the security of the colonies still rested with the Security 
Service, for which they were entirely unprepared.  At the outbreak of the war, the Security 
Service had a single officer posted in only six overseas territories - Gibraltar, Malta, Cairo, Aden, 
Singapore and Hong Kong.  Their focus was clearly towards the Middle East and Asia, and these 
six locations corresponded with British naval or army bases.  The Security Service was not 
concerned with local affairs within these territories; their officers were only stationed overseas to 
protect members of the armed services and their equipment.   In other imperial domains, MI5 7
had found creative solutions that meant they had minimal (approaching non-existent) presence in 
the colonies while still executing their mandate to secure the empire 
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In place of direct representation, the Security Service relied on a system of ‘honouray 
correspondents’ to fulfill their obligations to civil security throughout the Empire.  The system 
relied on local officials in each colony or dominion to select an officer to coordinate with the 
Security Service in London.  Through these correspondents, MI5 could provide security 
recommendations and forward intelligence material while in turn receiving reports on local 
matters.  It was a system of security consulting where local administrations could receive as 
much or as little direction as they required and the Security Service could focus their efforts 
elsewhere.  Even into the first months of the Second World War, most colonial administrations in 
West Africa made little use of their honorary correspondents.  For example, in the case of the 
four West African colonies, three of the honorary correspondents were also serving as their 
colony’s Commissioner of Police.  The demands of a colonial police force, often critically 
underfunded and understaffed, would be enough work for any officer, let alone the added duties 
of coordinating with the Security Service.  The exception to this arrangement was the Gambia, 
however their selection of honorary correspondent was even less reasonable.  The governor 
assumed the responsibility himself.  This system had saved precious resources before the war 
when the Security Service’s budget had been austerely starved by Whitehall.  In fact, the 
responsibility of communicating with the entirety of the Empire’s honourary correspondents only 
required the attention of a single officer, part-time.   During the war, however, this frugal system 8
meant that Security Service had no knowledge of West Africa and local officials had no 
experience or interest in supporting their work.  Both would prove disastrous to wartime 
initiatives. 
For ten ineffective months, MI5 tried to revitalize the ‘honourary correspondent’ system 
in West Africa.  If the correspondents had not been active before, it was hope that the war might 
perhaps motivate them to implement civil security precautions recommended by the Security 
Service.  Despite the pressure of the war, this system consistently failed to improve local 
security.  In the instances where the correspondent was active to their responsibility, they had 
other, immediate concerns that often took priority - such as running the colony’s police force.  If 
the correspondents somehow found the means to respond to the Security Service requests, they 
were met by the apathy of local administrators  who were unwilling to loosen the government’s 
purse strings for these new initiatives.  Finally in March 1941,  Security Service realized they 
would need to assign their own officer to directly oversee security in West Africa.   They hoped a 
full-time representative, titled as a Defence Security Officer [DSO], might be more effective in 
“[stirring] up the Civil Authorities, as they are ultimately responsible’ for security in the region.    9
The first of these officers, Lt. Col. H.M. Haigh-Wood, was posted to Lagos in August 1941. 
DSO Haigh-Wood’s instructions from the Director General of the Security Service were 
simple and staggering.  His instructions read: 
 As the representative of the Security Service, you should understand that your presence 
in the West African zone is not intended in any way to interfere with the respective 
responsibility of the various executive authorities with regard to security in each of the 
above mentioned colonies; but you are charged with the task of providing information, 
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together with reasoned advice whenever possible in each case as your assistance is 
invited, or whenever you consider that improvement or strengthening of any particular 
aspect of security is desirable.  10
In short, Haigh-Wood’s task was to supervise and advise security work throughout the region; he 
had no direct authority or resources to implement any security procedures of his own accord.  
Despite this enormous limitation, the Security Service expected him to cover an impossible 
mandate.  Haigh-Wood was instructed to ensure that each of the West African colonies 
provisions for the control of all ports, monitoring of illicit entries into the territories, detection of 
enemy spies deployed by parachute, protection of important places (aerodrome, munitions 
dumps, factories, and mines), safeguarding against enemy agents gathering information on Allied 
shipping and aircraft, censorship of foreign correspondence, monitoring of illicit wireless 
transmissions, and control of aliens.  If the impossibility of Haigh-Wood’s assignment was not 
immediately obvious, it must be remembered that he was expected as a single officer without 
executive authority or supporting staff to instigate or advise all of these security programs in an 
area more than five times the size of Great Britain and divided between four unique 
administrations.  Either the Director General placed extraordinary confidence in Haigh-Wood’s 
capabilities or the preceding ten months had disarmed the alarmist fears of Axis subversion in 
West Africa.  
Haigh-Wood began his assignment as DSO by arranging a tour of all four colonies.  
Haigh-Wood kept the aims and itinerary of his tour limited, intending only to meet each 
territory’s governor and chief of police, and to accomplish preliminary observations of 
strategically relevant locations - ports, aerodromes, and military bases.  Even with these limited 
objectives, it would still take four months for the him to complete his tour.  As Haigh-Wood 
would discover, travel in West Africa was not easy and the war had done nothing to improve 
conditions.  Travel by boat was the only regular means of transport but was counterproductively 
slow. Air travel was faster but near impossible to secure.  In the colorful words of one of Haigh-
Wood’s colleagues, R.D. Gibbs, who would attempt a similar tour in 1942, the “only real chance 
[of securing a flight] is by making love to R.A.F. station commanders but the hazards and 
discomfort can be very high and the ultimate destination uncertain.”   The logistics of his tour 11
introduced Haigh-Wood to the inescapable difficulties that would define his entire posting to the 
region, including the apathy of civil authorities, lack of infrastructure, and the enormity of his 
tasks relative to his limited resources. 
While Haigh-Wood was still completing his tour, British intelligence acquired its first 
concrete evidence of German espionage in West Africa.  This evidence came from MI5’s sister-
organization, the Secret Intelligence Service [SIS].  SIS had been working to penetrate German 
intelligence operations in Lisbon and had successfully positioned one of their own agents to be 
recruited by an Abwehr officer, a Mr. Egetmeyer, in October 1941.  Egetmeyer’s assignment had 
been to recruit and deploy agents from Portugal to west and southern Africa, allowing German 
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intelligence to begin monitoring Allied shipping along Africa’s Atlantic coast. Inadvertently, SIS 
had stumbled upon Germany’s West African intelligence network at the beginning of its 
construction.   
Soon after discovering Egetmeyer’s role in German intelligence, SIS learned that he had 
recently recruited a Belgian businessman, Roger Henri Marie Lannoy, to oversee all of 
Germany’s intelligence resources in West Africa.  Lannoy had departed for the Congo aboard a 
Portuguese vessel not three weeks earlier.  SIS immediately informed the Security Service and 
the admiralty, requesting the British Navy to intercept Lannoy and take him into custody.  Within 
hours, the British Navy stopped the SS Angola, removed Lannoy and a second Belgian 
passenger, and delivered them to colonial authorities in Freetown to await MI5’s 
recommendation.    12
Lannoy’s interception was a stunning success for British intelligence.  They had acquired 
evidence that Germany was indeed directing espionage in West Africa, established a source that 
could continue to surveil these efforts from Lisbon, and intercepted the agent intended to oversee 
Axis resources in the region.  While this one success would not end the threat to West Africa, it 
was a stunning example that could potentially motivate civil authorities to seriously consider 
Haigh-Wood’s posting and implement his recommendations.  In its immediate impact, however, 
the Lannoy affair demonstrated how relatively simple security matters were unexpectedly 
difficult to resolve in colonial contexts and would instead place a greater wedge between West 
African officials and the Security Service. 
The Lannoy affair quickly became a diplomatic and legal quandary.  Lannoy and the 
second Belgian removed by the British Navy had not been charged when deposited in Sierra 
Leone.  Yet, the Security Service’s brief instructions had made clear that both men were to be 
detained with the assurance that future instructions would direct the governor and chief of police 
how to handle their detention.  Yet when the Security Service called on the admiralty to 
intervene, thus beginning this entire fair, they had not yet confronted each problem this action 
would create.  First, they had to coordinate with SIS to determine the credibility of the evidence 
that Lannoy truly was a German agent and if that evidence could be used without threatening 
their new source in Lisbon.  Second, they had to decide where Lannoy would be ultimately 
detained and interrogated, whether in Nigeria (under Haigh-Wood’s direction) or the UK.  Third, 
they had to establish the legality for these extraordinary actions, including Lannoy’s removal 
from a neutral vessel, his detention without charge, and his eventual expulsion from Sierra Leone 
to be detained and interrogated by British officials elsewhere.  While the Security Service was 
solving these questions with SIS and the Home Office, they failed to communicate with 
authorities in Sierra Leone, despite the latter’s repeated and anxious telegrams requesting 
instruction of any kind of instruction.   
The Security Service’s silence placed the governor of Sierra Leone in a difficult position.  
Shortly after their removal from the SS Angola, the Belgian consul in Freetown learned that two 
of his countrymen were being detained without charge by local authorities.  When pressed by the 
Consul to account for this situation, authorities in Freetown were unable to explain, let alone 
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justify, the situation.   This affair equally peeved the Colonial Office in London, who were 13
annoyed that SIS and the Security Service had created this situation without consulting them first 
and were now seemingly abandoning colonial authorities to deal with the diplomatic 
consequences.   Finally, after two weeks with no reply, the Security Service telegrammed the 14
Commissioner of Police in Sierra Leone to have both Belgians placed on the first available ship 
to the United Kingdom.   Local officials were relieved to have the matter out of their hands but 15
the Security Service had done irreconcilable damage to their reputation with colonial authorities.  
They may have caught a spy but had forced civil authorities in Sierra Leone to deal with the 
immediate consequences. 
By all accounts, the Lannoy affair is a minor episode in the drama of wartime espionage, 
even in the limited field of West Africa.  Lannoy’s career as a spy ended before it even began and 
he in turn did not provide any information to British authorities, maintaining his innocence and 
ignorance for the entirety of his interrogation, though these protestations did not stop British 
authorities from ensuring he spent the rest of the war in prison.   Yet Lannoy’s detection and 16
detention highlights the shortcomings of MI5’s organization in West Africa.  To begin, MI5 was 
not responsible for acquiring the intelligence that led to Lannoy’s capture.  DSO Haigh-Wood 
oversaw all four colonies and was prohibited from developing his own intelligence resources.  It 
was beyond impossible for the Security Service to ever make comparable discoveries.  Instead, 
the security of West Africa would have to rely on the support of intelligence resources elsewhere.  
The Lannoy affair also highlighted the shortcoming of assigning a single officer to the entire 
region of West Africa.  Even if Haigh-Wood had not been engaged with his regional tour, his 
regular posting was in Lagos.  This meant that the practical security procedures that could have 
benefitted from Haigh-Wood’s oversight and direction, including Lannoy’s removal from the SS 
Angola, the search of his bunk and belongings, and his interrogation were left to inexperienced 
military and colonial officials.  Posting a single DSO to the entire region would never allow for 
valuable intelligence material or security advising. 
If the Lannoy affair questioned the structure behind security work in West Africa, it did 
succeeded in proving such a structure was necessary.  It was in this context that DSO Haigh-
Wood completed his tour of the four colonies and submitted his recommendations for regional 
security.  Haigh-Wood arrived at the obvious conclusion that the conditions of West Africa and 
the limited reach of colonial governments meant that conventional security practices would not 
work there.  In particular, Haigh-Wood argued that preventative security measures would be 
impossible to implement in West Africa.  Through a combination of underfunding and 
understaffing, Haigh-Wood argued the four colonies would never succeed in contravening an act 
of espionage or sabotage that was already set into motion.  The most obvious example being the 
control of colonial borders.  The colonies at no time exercised complete control over their distant 
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borders.  Even after the fall of France, when these boundaries potentially represented enemy 
territory, there was still nothing British officials could do to control the hundreds of miles of bush 
they represented.  In this and countless other ways, the colonies could never be fully secured 
against foreign espionage. 
In this context, Haigh-Wood argued the only reasonable approach to securing West Africa 
laid in effective intelligence measures.  Cheaper to implement and broader in their scope, 
intelligence measures could allow British officials to detect and preempt German activity.  If they 
could not stop German agents from entering the colonies, Haigh-Wood reasoned, they could 
identify and arrest them before they accomplished any real harm.  Haigh-Wood proposed that 
West Africa required a “first class officer experienced in C/E [Counter-Espionage] work 
stationed in each colony.”   They should be fluent in French, given convincing cover stories that 17
furnished them access to commercial (i.e. expatriate) communities, and finally operate in 
complete independence from the civil authorities, with even local governors being uninformed of 
their identities and assignment.  
Anticipating the resistance to implementing this proposal, Haigh-Wood offered a 
dramatic alternative for West Africa’s security.  Without a counter-espionage network, the only 
remaining solution would be to “intern all aliens who might conceivably be working for the 
enemy”.   Non-British residents, both Allied and not, who raised a shred of suspicion, even in 18
the absence of evidence, should be immediately interned.  Haigh-Wood defended this radical 
proposal with several unfounded suspicions garnered in his brief tour.  Haigh-Wood was first 
convinced that there Axis agents already at work in each of the colonies.  He contended there 
was at least “one good European agent” in Freetown (given the importance of the port to Allied 
shipping), and likely others for the same reason in Accra, Takoradi, Lagos, and Bathurst.  Haigh-
Wood further defended his proposal with a critical dismissal of the colonial police forces.  He 
wrote, “the Police Forces have reasonably efficient C.I.D.’s [Criminal Investigation 
Departments] to deal with Africans, but are almost helpless when it comes to Europeans.”  He 
elaborated, “[the fact] that there is no evidence of nefarious activities against any of these people 
[expatriates] may be because the colonial police forces, composed of Africans, with a few white 
officers, are incapable of any proper investigation or observation of Europeans.”   Among the 19
colonies’ countless handicaps, Haigh-Wood numbered African police officers. 
Haigh-Wood submitted his report directly to the Director General of the Security Service, 
Sir David Petrie, who received his recommendations with something approaching 
embarrassment.  He forwarded the report to several branch directors for their opinions before 
composing his reply. Apologetically, he told them that “I do not wish to ‘mark down’ anything 
Colonel Haigh-Wood has written, as he is evidently making an earnest attempt to see his 
problems aright,” yet the report remained painfully unreasonable.  Both of Haigh-Wood’s 
proposals, a large-scale, counter espionage organization or blanket internment would yield larger 
problems than he was asked to address.  The Security Service could not justify the men or 
resources for Haigh-Wood’s first proposal, while the second would scuttle Britain’s diplomatic 
relations to say nothing of the colony’s commercial industries.  Rather than an astute security 
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assessment, the Director General and the branch directors interpreted Haigh-Wood’s report as 
evidence of an earnest officer overwhelmed by the enormity of his assignment.  The discussion 
at MI5 headquarters shifted towards identifying a suitable assistant officer that could assist the 
DSO.     20
In the following months, the proposition of posting an Assistant Defense Security Officer 
[ADSO] to West Africa defined most communications between Haigh-Wood and the Security 
Service. Even after an ADSO was appointed and sent to Lagos in May 1942, Haigh-Wood was 
adamant that the Security Service still needed an additional officer to cover Freetown alone.   In 21
a telegram to a fellow MI5 officer in July 1942, Haigh-Wood wrote, “You will have seen from 
other letters of mine that I am again screaming for a man at Freetown.”   On the same issue with 22
the Director General, Haigh-Wood struck a more controlled tone: “I make no apologies for 
returning to the charge on the vexed question of personnel for this office.  Nevertheless I hope 
you will not think me tiresome.”   Specialized coverage for Freetown would pester Haigh-Wood 23
for the entirety of his posting and would not be realized for him or any DSO who followed in 
West Africa.  Their work was to advise civil authorities in the entire region and as long as 
colonial governments coordinated in Lagos (due to the West African Governor’s Conference), 
MI5 officers would be posted to Nigeria, regardless of the special importance and vulnerability 
of Freetown. 
Aside from these additional officers, Haigh-Wood’s initial report would have little lasting 
impact on the security of West Africa.  The Security Service’s reticence to his proposals would 
ultimately prove prescient as Haigh-Wood’s arguments rested on baseless suspicion.  Every 
recommendation in the his report operated from a single assumption - that the colonies were 
already targets of enemy espionage directed by European agents operating within the territories.  
The case of Roger Lannoy questioned these assumption at the same time Haigh-Wood was 
formulating his recommendations.  SIS’s intelligence from Lisbon suggested that Lannoy was 
the first German agent to undertake the task of overseeing their West African operations; he was 
not replacing an agent already in the field.  British Intelligence further knew that the German 
officer who had recruited Lannoy, Egetmeyer, had only recently begun recruiting agents for work 
in Africa.  All of these facts pointed to the conclusion that German resources in West Africa were 
nascent and incomplete, a great distance from having a skilled, European provocateur in place at 
every port city.  Finally, there was the fact that Lannoy was directed to establish himself in the 
Belgian Congo.    As future discoveries would demonstrate, German intelligence established 
their agents in Belgian or Portuguese territories.  The chief target remained Allied shipping but 
the situation in West African ports and shipping lanes did not make this information difficult to 
acquire.   
Rather than infiltrate British territory, German intelligence relied on agents aboard 
Portuguese vessels and wireless operators in Portuguese Guinea to collect the information they 
sought from British West Africa.  In 1942, the Secret Intelligence Service had detected and 
deciphered coded, wireless communications between Lisbon and Portuguese Guinea.  Seven of 
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these transmissions had been intercepted between February and May 1942, and even from this 
brief sample, British Intelligence was able to identify the objective of their German counterparts 
and trace the network they were using.  Each of the seven reports dealt with the affairs of 
Freetown Harbor, noting the arrival and departure of Allied vessels, their cargo, and the 
composition (if any) of a protective convoy.  As British intelligence expected, Germany’s 
concern in West Africa rested on its relation to the Battle in the Atlantic; in other words, the 
colonies themselves were negligible to the battleships and supplies they routed to other theaters 
of the war.   These seven reports also clearly indicated this intelligence was acquired by sailors 
aboard neutral vessels that traveled between Freetown and Bissau.  The wireless operators 
themselves demonstrated this fact.  Their reports on Freetown Harbor were often out of date, to 
the chagrin of German intelligence.  The average delays was usually three or four days, though 
one report was over two weeks old by the time it was relayed by wireless.  The operators in 
Portuguese Guinea explained the cause of this out-of-date intelligence by pointing to delayed 
ships that kept their informants’ observations from reaching them in a timely manner.   24
Ironically, the irregularities of West African shipping meant that German Intelligence needed 
little effort to acquire the information they sought but those same irregularities meant they could 
not dependably receive that information within a useful window of time.  25
In addition to these Portuguese sailors and wireless operators, German Intelligence did 
attempt to place a number of European agents in West Africa.  Yet none of these agents were 
deployed to British territory.  Three captured agents who were subsequently held at Camp 020 
(the wartime prison used to interrogate and turn German operatives) confessed they had been 
expected to operate from the Belgian Congo.  According to their own confessions, they had been 
assigned to gather information on commercial and economic matters.  To the Security Service, 
this amounted to an “intense German interest” in the larger region but suggested the British 
colonies themselves were not being targeted.   There was no evidence that the Abwehr intended 26
any degree of sabotage or clandestine warfare, save for the peculiar story of Jean Marie Lallart. 
On January 22nd, 1943, a sentry at Port Etienne in Mauritania witnessed a most peculiar 
parade.  By the dim light of morning, three exhausted men trudged out of the desert.  One was 
missing his boots and trousers, clad only in a shirt and holstered revolver.  The others were in 
less pitiable garb.  All were suffering from the early stages of dehydration.   The leader of this 
sad group explained to the sentry that he was a Frenchman and a spy, that his two companions 
were Germans and recent castaways of a U-boat, and that he formally surrendered himself to the 
custody of French officials.  He gave his name as Jean Marie Lallart.  For the next twenty-four 
hours Lallart enjoyed the full hospitality of the commanding officer in Port Etienne, while his 
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German companions were placed into cells.  The following morning, directives arrived from 
more cautious officials in Dakar who ordered that Lallart be immediately detained.  He was 
indeed a spy but not for France.  
By his own confession, Lallart had been landed in Mauritania under orders of German 
intelligence.  He had been told that he would be “an instructor and instigator for Arab radicals”, 
providing the expertise to spark an insurgency campaign against the Allies in North Africa.  
Lallart was not given any of the specifics of this operation, only the assurance that other German 
agents posted in Atar (a town in Northwestern Mauritania) would collect him at the shore and 
provide further directions.  To his French interrogators, Lallart claimed that it was his intention 
from the start to defect to the Free French immediately upon his arrival on the continent.  The 
two Germans who accompanied him were merely the product of a maritime accident.  When 
attempting to transport Lallart from the German submarine to the shore, their dingy had been 
capsized by unexpectedly difficult surf, throwing Lallart and the three other Germans aboard into 
the waves.  One of the Germans drowned and the three survivors realized they could not return to 
the u-boat and would likely not survive long on the desert shore.  Lallart had been provided with 
5 litres of water to await the arrival of the Atar agents. Yet the day before their failed landing, the 
submarine had received an uncoded message, in French, from Atar, instructing the commander to 
delay putting Lallart ashore by “11J”.  Lallart told his interrogators that the commander did not 
understand French and had misinterpreted the message to mean delaying Lallart’s departure by a 
few hours until 11 p.m. when the proper interpretation likely was to delay by onze journée, 
eleven days.  Relaying this predicament to the surviving sailors, Lallart convinced them that their 
only recourse was to march directly to the nearest port.  Adding to the German’s fears of death 
by thirst and capitalizing on their ignorance of North Africa, Lallart added that they were at risk 
of “marauding Arabs who would soon make short work of them”.  The sailors promptly 
submitted to his leadership and Lallart did not correct their assumption that the Vichy 
government controlled Mauritania.   Thirty-six hours later, the three had arrived at Port Etienne. 27
Lallart spent the following months under French detention, repeatedly being interrogated 
to discover any discrepancies in his accounts.  French authorities notified the British government 
that they had acquired a German agent and soon British Intelligence was negotiating to have 
their own opportunity to interview and interrogate this unsuccessful spy or sincere defector.  In 
April 1943, Lallart was handed over to British officials and taken to Camp 020.  British 
intelligence was given one month to interrogate him before he was returned to French officials, 
when Lallart would either be executed as a traitor or celebrated as a patriot. 
Lallart was an intriguing figure for British Intelligence because he was an entirely 
different quality of enemy agent.  Lallart’s confessed assignment for German Intelligence 
represented the far extreme of espionage -  to compromise the British Empire in North Africa by 
sparking colonial insurgency.  No other German agent known to British intelligence had even 
approached such activities.  Individuals like Lannoy or the network operating from Portuguese 
Guinea focused on the collection of intelligence.  There had been no known effort by the 
Germans to foment indigenous rebellion anywhere in Africa.  If British officials suspected 
foreign espionage in the colonies, Lallart’s assignment would have been the sum of their fears.  
 TNA KV 2/1462, 45, “Camp 020 Report on the case of Lallart”, 10 May 1943.27
!20
Lallart’s only benefit was his professed willingness to share everything he had observed about 
his handlers, their procedures, and the larger German intelligence network.  In the end, Lallart’s 
interrogators developed an honest admiration for him.  They wrote of his testimony, noting that 
while he feared reprisals by the Germans against his family for his betrayal, “withal he tells his 
story with candour.  It is his only chance, for unless he is believed, he will be shot by the French.  
When he left he had no illusions and, oddly, no bitterness.  He told me he had acted for France 
and that his fiancee would wish it so.  Lastly if the truth of his case remains undetermined, at 
least one thing is certain, LALLART has not been without courage at this establishment.”    28
Lallart was returned to Free French officials on 2 May, 1943. 
The Lallart affair demonstrates the extreme of what German intelligence was capable of 
in their African designs; for the same reason, he also represented the deepest fears of local 
security officials in West Africa.  Yet, it is important to note that Lallart was not intended for 
West Africa.  Despite the vague hints provided by his German handlers, it is almost certain that 
Lallart was intended to disrupt Allied control of North Africa.  In November 1942, a combined 
force of Anglo-American troops invaded Morocco and Algeria as part of Operation Torch.  
French resistance was unprepared for such an invasion and hampered by the fact that numerous 
French officers and soldiers favored the Allies over the Vichy Government by that time.  The 
operation secured control of the South-Western Mediterranean and would later allow for Allied 
invasions of Southern Europe in 1943.  Given the timing of his training and deployment, coupled 
with the suggestion that his efforts would protect French territory against British aggression, 
there is little doubt Lallart would have been smuggled out of West Africa, through Atar, into 
either Morocco or Algeria.  By comparison, we can see the strategic value of West Africa, 
relative to North Africa to Germany at this time.  Though some in the security Service feared that 
men like Lallart had infiltrated Sierra Leone and the other West African colonies, it seems 
unlikely Germany would have spared the effort or attention.  Finally, as the DSO’s repeated 
warnings demonstrated - if Germany truly had any designs for sabotage in any of the West 
African colonies or aerodromes, there was little to impede their success.  West Africa then was 
only a secondary intelligence target for the Axis powers, meriting little investment and no 
immediate threat to colonial stability. 
As the collective portrait of Axis clandestine activities in West Africa demonstrates, the 
moderate concern of the Security Service in the region was both appropriate and prescient.  
Despite Haigh-Wood’s concerns, his superiors in London did not support radical measures 
intended to protect the four colonies from a dramatic Axis threat.  Instead, the Security Service 
encouraged Haigh-Wood to continue advising colonial officials on the basic measures.  
Incrementally, Haigh-Wood did convince his superiors that this task alone required more than a 
single officer, and additional DSO’s and assistants were sent to West Africa in 1942 and 1943.  
At its peak, there were two DSO’s appointed to West Africa (one in Accra and Lagos), two 
Assistant District Security Officers, and a small secretarial staff  coordinating with local 
officials.   Much of what they accomplished appears to have been mundane work, of which little 29
required reporting back to Security Service Headquarters and therefore went unpreserved in 
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Security Service records.  Yet small details suggest the breadth of activities these officers were 
engaged in.  For example, nearly a year after Haigh-Wood’s posting to West Africa, an expert on 
port security, T.A. Robertson from MI5 headquarters was sent to make a review of conditions in 
the harbors and also to collect the DSO’s opinion of his work so far.  Robertson praised Haigh-
Wood’s efforts in the colonies, giving special note to his coordination with RAF and Pan 
American Airways personnel to improve aerodrome security across the region and to a sabotage 
exercise he organized for officials in Lagos that “was so good that it frightened them into setting 
up an anti-sabotage squad for patrolling the harbour.”   Additionally, the DSO’s also provided a 30
much needed review review of colonial Police Forces, identifying officers who by temperament 
or age had become unfit for duty.  Of particular note was Captain P.T. Brodie, the Police Chief of 
Sierra Leone, who had avidly supported the appointment of a DSO to West Africa.  Once in the 
field and in regular communication with Captain Brodie, however, Security Service personnel 
concluded that he had been serving in the colony for too long to adequately meet the demands of 
his post.  Haigh-Wood observed of Brodie, shortly after arriving in West Africa, that “he is 
getting on in years and has been in Sierra Leone some twenty years and can hardly be expected 
to be a very live wire.”   When R.D. Gibbs made a special tour of West Africa for MI5 in 31
November 1942, he came to similar conclusions, adding that the colonial administration “have in 
the past shut their eyes to Brodie’s needs and felt very little responsibility towards him and no 
concern for his health.”   When local officials challenged Gibbs’ portrait of the Police Chief and 32
their apathy, he offered a less polite appraisal of Brodie’s condition.  He wrote to the Director 
General, “What the Minister does not know is in fact that Brodie, due largely to overstrain, is 
subject to recurrent spells of mental abnormality so violent that I was impelled very delicately to 
report the situation to H.E. [His Excellency, the Governor].”   Gibbs was quick to add that 33
Brodie was indeed a fine officer but had been brought to his present condition by years of 
overwork brought on by the administration’s failure to provide adequate officers to support him.  
In this and other minor cases, the Security Service worked to challenge the standards of civil 
authorities towards personnel and operation of their Police Forces. 
Yet undoubtedly, the greatest, lasting impact of the Security Service wartime efforts was 
the creation of a particular security-ethos, viewed as uniquely required and suited to West 
Africa’s condition.  Put simply, the Security Service argued that security and intelligence work in 
West Africa could only be conceptualized along racial terms.  Returning to Haigh-Wood’s first 
security assessment of West Africa, he argued that the chief security threat to colonial 
governments would originate from the European community.  He further contended that colonial 
police forces could never meet that threat because of their racial composition.  Haigh-Wood 
wrote, “That there is no evidence of nefarious activities against any of these people [non-
Africans] may be because the colonial police forces, composed of Africans, with a few white 
officers, are incapable of any proper investigation or observation of Europeans.”   Haigh-34
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Wood’s paradigm, in brief, was that the security of West Africa could only be threatened and 
protected by Europeans; Africans were of no concern and no help.  
The racial security paradigm was echoed and expanded several months later by R.D. 
Gibbs.  Gibbs had been sent to West Africa late in 1942 to review Haigh-Wood’s work thus far 
and recommend how he and his predecessors might better fulfill their responsibility to colonial 
security.  Although the Security Service generally did not support the fears that enemy European 
agents had penetrated the colonies, Gibbs recommendations focused on how security work 
should be organized to prevent such a situation.  In a key passage in his report, he divided all 
security information available within the colonies according to race.  He referred to this division 
as between ‘White Lines’ and ‘black lines’ of intelligence.  ‘White Lines’ would be the 
responsibility of the Security Service personnel while ‘black lines’ would be relegated to the 
C.I.D. [Criminal Investigations Department] of the Police.  The unstated assumption was that 
trained security and intelligence officers could only find valuable information from among the 
colony’s European inhabitants, despite their relatively small population, while the Police would 
gather what minor information would be available from the African population of the colonies.  
To reinforce the perceived value of these two channels of intelligence, every reference to ‘White 
Lines’ and ‘black lines’ of intelligence, from Gibbs’ original report to succeeding Security 
Service documents, would capitalize the former and lowercase the latter, as has been done here.  35
The impact of this racial paradigm is perfectly preserved in the DSO’s records.  After Lt. 
Col. Haigh-Wood, the Security Service had four full-time officers assigned to West Africa 
between 1941 and the first months of 1945.  In more than three years of records, there is never 
any detailed description or discussion of the colonies’ indigenous populations.  At best, the 
DSO’s made occasional, disparaging remarks regarding Africans’ and their capacities.  For 
example, one of Haigh-Wood’s successors as DSO made a casual investigation of conditions in 
Fernando Po.  The officer noted that authorities on the island were pro-Axis and it was possible 
that they used the frequent canoe traffic between Fernando Po and Calabar to acquire 
information from Nigeria.  He dismissed this possibility, observing that since “the agents 
employed are Africans, it is doubtful if information of any real value finds its way there.”   36
Similar sentiments also found their way into officials documents produced by officials at MI5 
headquarters in London.  In the Security Service’s own historical report on the work of DSO’s in 
overseas territories during the Second World War, the section for West Africa makes the 
following note on port security: “local conditions and the use of coloured personnel presented 
difficulties, which though easily surmountable in the United Kingdom were without practical 
solution on the West African coast.”   In a similar section on the security of mines, the report 37
observes, with clear surprise, that “it was found possible to utilise coloured local personnel”.   38
No representative of the Security Service for the entirety of the war would devote any reasonable 
thought to Africans or their societies apart from reductionist racial narratives. 
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The Security Service’s racial paradigm would have long-lasting impact on West African 
security, even as the rest of their wartime structures and resources were dismantled after 1945.  
By the time the Allies had won the war in Europe and the Pacific, West Africa’s brief spell as a 
strategically important region had faded and passed.  The colonies would play an important role 
in plans to recover Great Britain’s economy and pay-off her substantial war debts, but these plans 
did not require the full-time attention of the Security Service.  As the British Armed forces exited 
West Africa, MI5’s regional representatives were likewise reassigned.  By the end of the war, the 
Security Service again had only one officer in Accra, who was shortly removed for a more 
pressing posting to the Middle East.  Colonial Officials were given the assurance that the office 
would not be closed, only left vacant “and the way left clear for the despatch of another officer 
should the security situation in the area require any expert assistance in the future.”  39
However, before completely removing themselves from West Africa, the Security Service 
imprinted their radicalized paradigm of security work into colonial institutions.  This began in 
April 1943, as the colonial office and the Security Service prepared to reimplement the 
honourary correspondent system in all but name, using the new title of Colonial Security 
Officers [CSO].  An enterprising officer in the Criminal Investigation Department of the Nigeria 
Police Force actively requested this assignment and appealed directly to Security Service, 
contending that his unique position with the police afforded relevant experience in intelligence 
work in colonial contexts.  The Security Service was intrigued by this proposition and presented 40
the idea to Lt. Col. Haigh-Wood, he having become the resident expert on West Africa after 
returning from Lagos.  Haigh-Wood agreed that a senior Police Officer, connected with CID, was 
the ideal candidate for MI5’s Civil Security Officers.  Yet he felt that colonial CID’s would not 
provide a perfect fit for intelligence and security work.  Instead he argued that selected officers 
from among the police should be separated into a distinct unit, modeled after Police Special 
Branches in the UK.  These officers would undertake intelligence activities in the colony and 
their commanding officer would be the local CSO.  The explanation for this bureaucratic division 
returns to his conception on race and security work expressed in his first report as DSO.  He 
explained, “Civil Security or Special Branch work is very closely linked with C.I.D. work in 
West Africa particularly.  Any arrangements such as that suggested would probably result in the 
Special Branch dealing largely with the white population, and the C.I.D. dealing largely with the 
‘blacks’”.   In other words, all civil security efforts in the colonies should focus entirely on the 41
European community.  Africans, on the other hand, would require only the occasional 
investigation following a crime or accident, undertaken by CID. 
The four West African colonies, to varying degrees, would follow the Security Service’s 
recommendation to establish Special Branch departments within their police forces, continuing 
the civil security and intelligence work that the DSO’s had attempted to direct and instigate 
during the war.  And like the DSO’s, these Special Branches limited their scope to their colony’s 
European, White population.  The result of this organization was to leave administrations blind to 
the possibility that Africans could become potential sources of disorder.  By developing a 
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security structure devoting its work solely to Europeans, colonial Special Branches were 
woefully unprepared for the political and security realities that faced the Empire in the decade to 
follow.  Following the war, colonial officials would not be concerned with expatriate 
communities but instead the very real demands of African communities, intent on realizing an 
independent, nationalist future for the continent.   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Chapter Two: Police Intelligence and the Nationalist Threat 
after the Riots, 1948-1951 
 In the mounting afternoon heat of February 28th, 1948, a crowd of two-thousand African 
demonstrators marched out from the streets of Accra and approached Christiansbourg Castle.  
The castle served as the seat of government for the British colonial administration and as the 
governor’s personal residence.  The demonstrators intended to continue straight to the castle and 
there present a petition prepared by the Ex-Servicemen’s Union.  The petition outlined a number 
of grievances unique to veterans of the Second World War, such as inadequate war bonuses and 
the slow disbursement of pensions, yet chiefly spoke to the larger challenges faced by everyday 
Africans attempting to survive in Accra’s urban economy.  It was simply too difficult, and the 
veterans, market women, young men, and activists who thronged in the march were adamant that 
government must do more on their behalf.  Before reaching the Castle however, the crowd was 
met by a small line of police constables, all Africans save for their European officer, 
Superintendent Colin Imray.  Imray and his men had been hastily despatched to the crossroads 
with orders to prevent the crowd from reaching the castle and potentially threatening the castle’s 
offices and staff.  They were woefully undermanned from the task, armed only with a handful of 
tea gas canisters and a dozen or so rifles, expected to turn back a passionate crowd numbering in 
the thousands.  It was the perfect context for catastrophe. 
 Expectedly, tensions quickly escalated between the crowd and the police.  The Police 
ordered the crowd to halt but were shouted down by cheers, chanting, and a hail of loose stones 
gathered from the roadside.  The police responded with tear gas but strong winds dissipated the 
fumes, only aggravating the crowd instead of dispersing them. As the crowd continued forward, 
narrowing the empty road between them and the police to forty, thirty, and twenty feet, 
Superintendent Imray, ordered his men to open fire.  None of his men responded, reticent to fire 
on their countrymen.  In a fit that must have mixed fear with frustration, Imray seized one of his 
men’s rifles and personally fired six times in the crowd.  The demonstrators fled, retreating from 
the crossroads back into the city, leaving two dead men in their wake.  Rather than snuff-out the 
afternoon’s protest, Imray’s actions lit the flames on a powderkeg.  For the next three days, the 
Gold Coast witnessed the most destructive rioting in its history.  The demonstrators who fled the 
crossroads joined crowds in the market centers and looted European importing firms, shut down 
streets with burning cars, and even stormed Ussher Fort Prison.  When peace was finally restored 
three days later under a formal emergency and martial law, the entire colony was in shock.  In the 
words of Dennis Austin, “it was if the entire political scene was suddenly distorted by an 
unexpected and violent eruption, with the result that when the dust settled and the lava cooled, a 
new landscape appeared.”  1
 For the last seventy years, the shooting at the Osu Crossroads and the Accra Riots have 
sat as pivotal moments in Ghanaian history, making the turning point of colonial rule in the Gold 
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Coast.  Before February 1948, imperial rule in the Gold Coast seemed certain, prosperous, and 
immovable.  Afterwards, British authorities considered and prepared for a transition towards self-
rule while nationalist parties confidently advocated on the newly realized strength of African 
popular action.  Though guilty of oversimplification, it is not incorrect to say the Accra Riots 
started a chain reaction, beginning with the Watson Commission, that resulted in self-rule after 
the Legislative Elections in 1951 and later in independence in 1957, setting Ghana as an 
independent standard for all other African nationalist struggles.  In short, colonial rule in the 
Gold Coast, and even European imperialist across the whole of continent, was forever changed 
by the Accra Riots.  2
 And yet, the revelations of February 1948 were not limited to politics alone.  The Accra 
Riots precipitated another crucial shift in the nature of the colonial state, leveraged on concerns 
for its security.  Before the Watson Commission finished their inquiry into the 
‘disturbances’ (arriving at their radical conclusions on the necessity of political reform), British 
officials understood the  riots as indisputable proof that the Gold Coast Police Force was 
incapable of providing for the security of the colony.  At every point possible, the events of 
February 28th had demonstrated the ineptitude of the Gold Coast Police Force.  To begin, the 
Commissioner of Police himself had authorized the Ex-Servicemen’s demonstration, approving a 
parade route that kept them far from Christiansbourg Castle but he had not prepared for the 
possibility the demonstrators could ignore the established route or threaten security in the capital.   
As a result, only Superintendent Imray and a small contingent of constables were available to 
respond when the crowd turned toward the Castle.  Furthermore, after the riots had exploded on 
Saturday afternoon, the police had proved incapable of clearing the streets and restoring order 
over the next three days.  Without the intervention of the Royal West African Frontier Force, the 
rioting could have spread farther and endured much longer.   Thus, before the Accra Riots 
prompted dramatic political transformation, policymakers were considering how best to secure 
the Gold Coast (and colonial rule) against future crises.  In other words, before the Accra Riots 
fostered uncertainty regarding the future of colonial rule in West Africa, it created an 
unprecedented commitment to ensuring for the security of the imperial state. 
 The campaign to improve the Gold Coast Police Force followed several logical avenues.  
It began by recruiting twenty four additional (European) officers, the formation of a rapid mobile 
response unit, and the establishment of a new police wireless network.   All of these responses 3
answered deficiencies that had been revealed during the course of the riots, notably the police 
force’s inability to coordinate, communicate, and respond to the rapidly deteriorating crisis 
precipitated by the veterans’ demonstration.  Yet these initiatives also included, peculiarly, the 
establishment of security-intelligence resources in the Gold Coast with the conviction that 
intelligence-gathering, as executed by the British Security Service in the United Kingdom, was a 
necessary component to the continued security and prosperity of the state in the Gold Coast.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, such initiatives had been implemented, however tentatively, 
during the Second World War, only to be abandoned by both colonial officials and the Security 
Service by 1943.  For local administrators, security intelligence was an unnecessary distraction 
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which could not be justified under the shoestring limits of colonial budgets.  Likewise, MI5 had 
concluded that intelligence-work among Africans was impractical, if not impossible, and only 
made sense in colonial contexts with large European, expatriate communities.  How then did the 
Accra Riots reverse such entrenched prejudices?  And similarly, what were the consequences of 
establishing and operating a security-intelligence regime designed to counter anti-colonial 
demonstration after self-rule was the accepted future of the Gold Coast? 
 This chapter traces the development of security intelligence in the Gold Coast between 
1948 and 1951.  Much like the previous chapter, it will demonstrate how intelligence institutions 
were developed, challenged, tested and refined.  However, there will be a number of important 
divergences between these two periods.  The previous chapter dealt with a system that was 
ultimately abandoned, a short-lived experiment that was never fully justified by the war itself or 
accepted by colonial administrators, resulting in a minimal institutional legacy to be carried up 
here.  Instead, this chapter (and all to follow) will deal with a system that became an enduring 
element to government in the Gold Coast and later Ghana.  Placed alongside the political reforms 
directed towards self-rule, the state in the Gold Coast found itself in a strange bind between 
efforts to alleviate the exclusionary politics of colonial rule against a newfound security regime 
designed precisely to protect it.  In other words, the implementation of security intelligence in 
the Gold Coast would prove a stumbling block to the political future of the Gold Coast as it 
approached self-rule and independence.  Such contradictions will be explored here, primarily as 
they revealed both the limits of political aspirations and the accepted costs for securing the Gold 
Coast.   
 Before examining the intelligence-initiatives that followed the Accra Riots, we must must 
first explain how such initiatives were even accepted as necessary.   After the Second World War, 
colonial administrators and the Security Service had both concluded that security-intelligence 
had little value in a West African contexts.  Colonial officials viewed the efforts of the Security 
Service as unnecessary and were unwilling to stretch their meagre budgets at the cost of 
development and economic programs.  Intelligence-work, they believed, was a distraction to the 
larger concerns of the state.  The Security Service itself had likewise dismissed the utility of 
intelligence work in West Africa, despite having tried in vain to convince colonial officials 
otherwise for several years during the war.  By its end, though, MI5 concluded that their 
expertise lay among intelligence activities among and by Europeans; the little that could be 
learned through Africans and by Africans did not require the state’s attention.  If anything could 
be learned, they argued, the police could passively acquire it in the execution of their other 
responsibilities.   
 It is remarkable that the riots overcame these convictions, especially when the riots 
resulted from fundamental failures in the organization of the police force, not from a lack of 
information.  The riots had demonstrated that the police lacked trained officers, equipment, and 
insightful leadership.  This point was particularly clear during the Watson Commission’s 
investigations.  J.B. Danquah, leader of the United Gold Coast Convention, testified to the 
commission that he witnessed members of the Police Force joining in, rather than impeding, the 
looting that followed the shooting.  Likewise, the commanding officer of the West African 
Frontier Force, which had ultimately restrained the rioting, testified that he had placed his men 
on standby on the morning of February 28th.  He recognized the tense atmosphere in Accra and 
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reasoned that the Ex-Servicemen’s demonstration could escalate.  The Commissioner of the Gold 
Coast Police, who had himself authorized the march, had lacked such insight and made no 
precautionary provisions.  At no point, could it seem that intelligence-work might have been the 
key to anticipating, preventing, or restraining the riots.   Nevertheless, alongside recruiting 28 4
additional officers for the police force, organizing a mobile response unit, and planning a new 
police wireless network, the Gold Coast prepared to develop the Police Special Branch into a 
modern intelligence-gathering unit. 
 Neither the riots nor conditions in the colony can provide adequate explanation for the 
state’s commitment to intelligence-gathering in 1948.  Instead, we must look to how the riots 
were understood, perhaps more accurately, how the riots were misunderstood by policymakers.  
The riots were not immediately seen as an popular protest or a failure of the Gold Coast Police 
Force.  It was originally feared to be evidence for something far more sensational and sinister.  
These fears were expressed by the under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, David Rees-
Williams, two days after the riots had ended.  Rees-Williams had been called to answer 
parliament’s questions on the disturbances and though their inquiries were diverse and exacting, 
in all cases, Rees-Williams kept to the same assurances - order had been restored in Accra, a 
formal inquiry would determine the cause of the riots, and the report would be presented to 
Parliament.  It was the sort of calculated presentation meant to encourage calm and resist 
unfounded speculation.  At the end of his testimony, however, Rees-Williams dropped his 
prudent script.  He was asked if the future report would answer “whether or not [the disturbance 
in the Gold Coast] is due to the Communist dupes of the Third International, including the 
Communist Party in this country?”  The under-Secretary replied, “there was almost certainly 
Communist incitement in this case”.   The riots were not initially seen as the spontaneous 5
combustion of local political and economic troubles in the Gold Coast, instead, policymakers in 
London assumed the keystone of their West African empire had suffered its first stroke from a 
subversive, communist campaign.  This was the problem that Accra’s reformed intelligence 
network was intended to answer. 
 The specter of communist subversion was the crucial spur for establishing intelligence-
gathering in the Gold Coast.  Five weeks after the riots, the Commissioner of the Gold Coast 
Police wrote directly to the Colonial Secretary requesting to expand his Special Branch with a 
Superintendent, five Senior Assistant Superintendents, and 3 European (female) stenographers.  6
A month later, the Commissioner sent his initial budget for Special Branch, including £5400 for 
new personnel, £740 for supplying their new offices, and £2000 for their general budget.  
Adjusted for inflation, the proposed budget for Special Branch was slightly more than a quarter-
million pounds.   Alongside this enormous investment into Special Branch, the Security Service 7
prepared to assign another officer to resume the post of Security Liaison Officer [SLO] for West 
Africa, with his central office in Accra.  The officer selected was Robin ‘Tin Eye’ Stephens who 
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had earned a considerable reputation in the Security Service for managing Camp 020 during the 
Second World War,  a detention camp designed specifically for interning and turning suspected 
German agents.   MI5 had not grabbed a fresh-faced officer, as they had done with Lt. Col. 8
Haigh-Wood in 1938. 
 Concerns with ‘the Communist threat’ had recently spiked in the UK, and the Accra Riots 
were unintentionally folded into them by consequence of timing.  Three days before the riots, 
Czechoslovakia experienced a communist coup that ended the last democracy in Eastern Europe.  
From that point forward, anxieties over the British Communist Party [BCP] and the influence of 
the Soviet Union would continue to rise over the following decade.  In fact, in 1947, a Security 
Service officer mockingly observed that the Foreign Office  “literally saw a Communist behind 
every gooseberry bush”.   While there was no existing link between Czechoslovakia and the 9
Gold Coast to suggest that the two events were related, British officials were prepared to accept 
the explanation of communist subversion instead of facing the stark reality that colonial rule had 
become untenable for the people of the Gold Coast.  But how could that suspicion remain, 
especially given the several investigations that explained the riots as. Product of a failed colonial 
state? 
 The answer to this question lies, in part, with a brief letter authored by the Director-
General of the Security Service, Sir Percy Sillitoe in July1947.  Addressed to the Commissioner 
of the Gold Coast Police, with copies undoubtedly prepared for the Colonial Secretary, Sillitoe’s 
letter reported that a West African student politician, with the possibility of soon returning to the 
Gold Coast, had “recently come to our notice as contacting members of the British Communist 
Party.”   Across three short pages, this letter relates this individual’s education in the United 10
States and the United Kingdom, his activism for African nationalism, and lastly his associations 
with members of the British Communist Party.  This individual’s name did not yet have any 
special significance to the Security Service or the Gold Coast Police but the report in fact dealt 
with Kwame Nkrumah. 
 Nkrumah had first come to the attention of the Security Service in 1942 while still a 
student in the United States though they did not begin investigating him, or his political activities 
until well after his return to London in 1945.  Instead the Security Service received to varied 
scraps of information about Nkrumah and his activities from the Metropolitan Police Special 
Branch which had taken a concerned interest in Pan-African and anti-colonial organizations 
operating in the capitol.  Yet even as he spoke out loudly and repeatedly against imperial rule, 
there was nothing in Nkrumah’s activities that drew MI5’s attention or concern.   That changed 11
as Nkrumah increasingly connected with the British Communist Party. 
 Beginning in the summer of 1947, Nkrumah developed a number of associates within the 
British Communist Party.  Although Nkrumah was not under investigation, the Security Service 
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maintained constant surveillance on the party and its members.  This included wiretapping the 
telephone lines at the party’s headquarters and maintaining Home Office Warrants on its senior 
members that allowed for the censorship of their mail.  Thus, the Security Service was aware any 
time Nkrumah placed or received a call from BCP headquarters or corresponded by mail with 
any of its members.  Through such channels, the Security Service was aware that by June 1947, 
Nkrumah had meet with William Rust, the editor of the ‘Daily Worker’; Michael Carritt, a 
former colonial official who had secretly worked with the communist underground in India; and 
Maud Rodgerson, the secretary for  the BCP’s African sub committee.  Rodgerson particularly 
became an important member of Nkrumah’s political circle.  As MI5 records show, during June 
and July of 1947, it was not uncommon for them to meet in person or speak on the phone several 
times a week, with Nkrumah often seeking her advice.   
 Nkrumah’s collaboration with Rodgerson, and the British Communist Party generally, 
appears to have been motivated by the financial needs of Nkrumah’s recently formed West 
African National Secretariat [WANS].  Nkrumah and other activists from the Gold Coast had 
launched WANS in the preceding year as a way of mobilizing and unifying nationalist 
movements across the region and the British Communist Party was intrigued by the 
ambitiousness of the organization and its leadership.  In May of 1947, Rodgerson called Denis 
Goodwin, a colleague from the party, from her office at BCP headquarters to explain (and for 
MI5 to overhear) that she had recently been approached by “a body in this country which called 
itself the West African National Secretariat,” looking for a part-time secretary to manage their 
office.  Rodgerson had wanted to ignore this request and the Secretariat generally, concluding 
that they were “completely unbusineeslike” and likely unable guarantee consistent wages for this 
office worker, yet the prospect of their West African national congress was too tempting a 
possibility.  It would be a “tremendous event”, she supposed, and well-worth the cost to support.  
In a matter of weeks, the matter of a secretary entirely forgotten but Rodgerson and the other 
members of the BCP were assisting Nkrumah in drafting the structure of the Congress, lining up 
potential donors to fund it, and holding fortnightly classes to instruct West African students 
(nominated by the Secretariat) on a communism.  In little over a month, the West African 
National Secretariat and Kwame Nkrumah had gone from complete obscurity to a pressing 
matter for both the Communist Party and the Security Service.   
 Given Nkrumah’s ambitious political aims and his recent associates, it was a critical 
question for the Security Service to determine the strength of his ideological convictions.  Was 
Nkrumah truly a communist or had he simply allowed the BCP to adopt the WANS to further his 
political aims against imperial rule in West Africa?  This would be a difficult question to answer, 
first for the limited amount of time before Nkrumah departed for West Africa and second for the 
nature of MI5’s intelligence sources.  Everything that Security Service had learned of Nkrumah 
in recent months had been produced by their Home Office Warrants on the BCP.  These sources 
would of course disproportionately emphasize Nkrumah’s communist associations, and without 
other avenues into his larger political circle and activities, it was impossible to effectively ‘sound 
the depths’ of his political character.  These limitations had been suggested by the Security 
Service when they first contacted West African authorities about Nkrumah; Sir Percy Sillitoe’s 
report had clearly limited itself to identifying the contacts Nkrumah had with members of the 
Communist party, it did not venture any conclusions or suppositions about his personal ideology.  
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The Director General had shared only a concerning possibility, yet colonial authorities in West 
Africa were unprepared to parse the distinction between  “nationalist activist with communist 
associates” and  “nationalist politician with avowed communist politics ”.  Colonial officials thus 
expected and prepared for the worst upon Nkrumah’s return. 
 Even before Nkrumah’s return to the Gold Coast, officials in Accra were forecasting 
ominous political trouble from his influence.  In an enclosure to their monthly secret despatch. 
Accra’s Government House reasoned that Nkrumah would dramatically alter the character of the 
leading nationalist party in the colony, the United Gold Coast Convention [UGCC], “[seeking] 
for it the the support of certain communist organizations in the United Kingdom with which he 
seems to have been actively associated for some time past.”  The same despatch mentioned 
Nkrumah’s “extreme political views” and concluded that “his political associations [in London] 
seem to have been mostly with communist and other extremist groups.”   It would be 12
inappropriate to dismiss official concerns at that time with the British Communist Party and 
Communism generally, captured here with the label of “extremist”.  Beyond that however, these 
documents reflected a dangerous degree of exaggeration fostered by casual inaccuracy.  Rather 
than qualify that Nkrumah’s association with the BCP as only months old, the despatch identified 
“some time past”.  Similarly, the despatch concluded that the communist party and other, 
unnamed ‘extremist groups’  represented the majority of Nkrumah’s political affiliation.  In all 
cases, this language was unqualified in careless ways that suggested a situation far worse than 
the truth, especially as this information was repeated and distributed among colonial officials in 
secondary reports.  In fact, the Acting Commissioner of Police for Sierra Leone, on receiving 
indirect warnings regarding Nkrumah through the Gold Coast Police, inquired of the Security 
Service if Nkrumah’s return to the region and intention to hold a nationalist conference 
“foreshadow increased Communist activities in West Africa.”   The Security Service would 13
attempt to mediate these suspicions among colonial officials; between December 1947 and 
January 1948, the Director-General would directly write the Police authorities in all four West 
African colonies.  Each of these letters repeated the same precise caution present in Sir Sillitoe’s 
first letter to the the Gold Coast in July 1947.  These letters explained Nkrumah’s involvement 
with the WANS; the secretariat’s larger aims to achieve an independent West African state 
comprised of all British, French, and Belgian colonies; and lastly that the British Communist 
Parties supported this endeavor.  Speaking directly to communist suspicions, the Director 
General added, “we have, however, no information to suggest at present that the Communist 
Party is likely to intervene directly in West Africa itself, and we think it is likely that they 
consider that the West Africans must first of all achieve greater unity among themselves before 
any outside support could be either effective or worth while.”   Despite these mediating efforts 14
however, officials in West Africa did not parse the Security Service’s distinctions.  They would 
prove unable to distinguish Nkrumah’s nationalist politics from their fears of communism. 
 With this ominous expectation, Nkrumah finally reached the Gold Coast in late 
December 1947, immediately setting to work with the United Gold Coast Convention.  Yet far 
beyond his own initiatives, or even those of the UGCC, events were rapidly accelerating towards 
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the Accra Riots. In January, an Accra businessman and local chief, Nii Kwabena Bonne III, 
organized a national boycott against foreign importing firms and the extraordinary prices they 
raised against a variety of products, ranging from cotton prints, matches, soap, and spirits.  
Without assistance from the UGCC or any other political group, Bonne established local 
committees throughout the colony, ensuring that all African consumers were aware of the boycott 
and developing enormous popular support for it.  The boycott was extraordinarily effective and 
the Gold Coast government arranged to mediate a settlement between the importing firms and 
the boycott committee.  By the third week in February, the terms for ending the boycott had been 
settled - the European importing firms had agreed to cut their profit margins on selected goods 
by half for a trial period of three months.  The new goods were set to take effect on February 
28th, the same day scheduled for the Ex-Servicemen’s demonstration.   This boycott played a 
critical role in producing the riots, as market-goers expected to see dramatic reductions for the 
negotiated goods.  However, popular expectations had far exceeded reality.  The one-half 
reduction on profit margins agreed to would have little impact on the real price of such goods, 
while they would still fall, the final reduction would be closer to one-sixth.  As was later reported 
to the Watson Commission, crowds of shoppers, angrily interpreting the new prices as a 
deception by the importing firms and by government, had met the news of the shooting at the 
crossroads with the outrage that would drive the riots for the next three days. 
 Kwame Nkrumah had no direct role in either the national boycott or the Ex-Servciemen’s 
Demonstration.  In fact, he was not even in Accra on the 28th.  He had instead been campaigning 
in Saltpond with other UGCC leaders.  Yet the explosion of the riots, barely two months after his 
arrival in the colony was too obvious a coincidence, fostering the false assumption that he had 
instigated the disturbances as part of a communist campaign now under way to subvert British 
colonial rule.  This brought renewed scrutiny on Nkrumah from officials in Accra, who arrested 
him and five other leaders of the UGCC for culpability in the riots.  Popularly titled “the Big 
Six”, the governor signed their removal order on March 12th, with the police moving swiftly to 
apprehend and detain them all within twenty-four hours.   
 With these arrests, colonial officials discovered additional evidence to fuel the 
exaggerated fears in Nkrumah’s political ideology.  In addition to correspondences with three 
other members of the WANS still in London, Nkrumah was arrested with a number of typescript 
copies for an organization called The Circle.    The stated aims of The Circle were to first, 15
“maintain ourselves and The Circle as the Revolutionary Vanguard of the struggles for West 
African Unity and National Independence” and second, “to support the ideas and claims of the 
All West African National Congress in its struggle to create and maintain a Union of African 
Socialist Republics.”  Far from a traditional political body, The Circle had a number of peculiar 
requirements that unnerved colonial officials.  To begin, members of The Circle were expected to 
swear loyalty to the organization itself, and “at all time be ready to go on any mission that I may 
be called upon to perform.”  Members were instructed to keep the identify of fellow members 
private, along with any of the Circle’s “secrets, plans, or movements”.  They were even taught a 
secret handshake in order to recognize one another privately (“ordinary handshake with thumb 
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pressure”).  Any member that violated these injunctions, or any of the The Circle’s other laws, 
did so at their “own risk and peril”.  They also swore loyalty to The Circle and Kwame Nkrumah 
as its leader. 
 Beyond from these peculiarities, The Circle was a reflection of Nkrumah’s aspirations 
and the diverse revolutionary ideologies he hoped to synthesize in West Africa.  The stated aims 
of The Circle were a natural extension of the political program he had envisioned for the WANS, 
in both pursuing national independence and regional unity throughout West Africa, instead of 
focusing on a limited nationalist struggle in a single colony.  It also synthesized the perspective 
of other successful anti-colonial movements of the time, principally Mahatma Gandhi’s anti-
colonial efforts in India.  The document maintained that all Circle members should commit 
themselves to non-violence, except as a last resort, and should fast monthly and meditate daily 
on “the cause THE CIRCLE stands for”.  It was an unusual political vision that captured much of 
Nkrumah’s future efforts, including his argument that nationalism required not simply political 
independence but also a refashioning of African culture and African men and women to create 
new culture capable of sustaining an African state.   Yet less than three weeks from the Accra 16
riots, British officials could only see the communist influences and subversive possibilities that 
The Circle could embody.  In fact, officials in Accra suffered from an unparalleled paranoias 
towards communism in the first months after the riots, leading to critical errors of interpretation 
that confirmed their worst fears at the cost of an accurate understanding of Nkrumah, the GCCP, 
and the state of affairs in the colony. 
 The general hysteria of officials in the Gold Coast after the Accra Riots is preserved in a 
top secret telegram from the Governor to the Colonial secretary on April 3rd, 1948.  The purpose 
of the telegram was to discuss the recent activities of a British man, only identified as “Burt”, 
who had relocated to Accra to serve as a ground engineer for the British Overseas Airways 
Corporation in 1947.  MI5 had informed local officials that the engineer was a member of the 
British Communist Party and he had been subsequently investigated after the Accra Riots.  His 
papers proved that he was indeed a member of the party and that he had served as a unofficial 
courier to Nkrumah for the BCP and Maud Rodgerson, helping pass along various papers 
including an “open letter” by “a British democrat” that Nkrumah had forwarded and arranged for 
publications to a number of Gold Coast newspapers.   After Burt had departed from the Gold 
Coast (whether by his ow volition or by an expulsion order from the Governor remains unclear), 
the administration continued to intercept his mail, which included several letters from 
Rodgerson.  In the governor’s secret despatch, they noted that Rodgerson had written that “we 
are doing all we can to assist [Nkrumah]”, including the receipt of money and “deliveries of the 
dynamite ordered”.  The Security Service’s own records of this telegram record a certain 
skepticism with this final line, suggesting there was corrupt group in the telegram or that officials 
in Accra had misread Rodgerson’s original letter.  MI5 later corrected that Rodgerson’s letter had 
not spoken of “the dynamite ordered” but instead, “the staff you ordered” (emphasis mine).  In 
addition to this explosive typo, the secret telegram made another significant error when 
summarizing Burt’s connections with Nkrumah and The Circle.   The telegram repeated for the 
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Colonial Secretary that “[The Circle] aims at setting up ‘the revolutionary Soviet vanguard of the 
struggle for West African national independence.’”  The original documents in Nkrumah’s 
possession, confiscated by the Criminal Investigation Department and copied to the Security 
Service for review, has the exact same line save for one word.  Nkrumah’s papers only describe 
The Circle a “revolutionary vanguard”.  The governor’s office had inserted the ‘Soviet’ modifier, 
and then, either from oversight or blind conviction, neglected to inform the colonial secretary of 
their alteration to the original text.   The implications of this conviction are made even clearer 17
by the Commissioner of the Gold Coast Police.  In a letter to the colonial secretary, he pithily 
concluded, “the emergence of organized subversion inside the Colony and the probability of its 
stimulation by outside agencies raises a clear and immediate need for widening the scope and 
activities of the Special Branch” through “a systematic and long term penetration of all 
organization and persons potentially dangerous to Government is commenced now, and accorded 
a high degree of operational priority.”   The commissioner may have reflected some caution in 18
mentioning the “probability”, rather than the “certainty”, of stimulation of by “outside agencies”, 
yet such caution is rendered moot with his assertion organized subversion having emerged in the 
colony. 
 By May of 1948, Special Branch was well on its way to implementing its new 
institutional vision.  It was then they published their first monthly intelligence report, a five page 
general summary of political affairs in the colony followed by four pages of background 
information on selected individuals labeled as personality notes.  Special Branch would continue 
to produce such reports until December 1952, and yet, as the colony’s first security intelligent 
product, the May 1948 report deserves special examination because it demonstrates how Special 
Branch conceived and implemented their work following the riots.  In short, we can see the 
means by which Special Branch collected their information and what issues they primarily 
pursued.  More importantly, this report also captures Special Branch’s opinion of the nationalist 
politicians that primarily occupied their reports.  In these instances, it would be difficult to argue 
that Special Branch provided unbiased reporting of collected facts. 
 Special Branch’s first report opened with a detailed analysis of nationalist politics, 
focusing chiefly on the UGCC’s response to the riots.  Here, Special Branch gave considerable 
attention to the internal politics of the convention and a brief analysis of how these matters might 
influence the UGCC. They reported that a rift had formed between two camps, the first led by 
George (Paa) Grant, the UGCC’s president and principal financier, and Kwame Nkrumah, who 
they labeled as the leader of the convention’s ‘hooligan element’.  Special Branch forecasted the 
division between these two camps would only deepen, but that Grant would have little room to 
challenge Nkrumah’s popular support.  They went so far as to claim that Grant feared for his life 
if he made any attempt to remove Nkrumah from the UGCC.  Special Branch claimed this 
intelligence originated from “a well placed” source in whom Grant confided, though its unclear 
if this source purposefully or unwittingly passed these revelations on to Special Branch.  
References to such informants, and questions of their identities and intents, would persists in all 
future reports.  Maddeningly, it does not seem to possible to identify these individuals or their 
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motives.   Nevertheless, Richard Rathbone has confirmed that the information Special Branch 
reported from such informants, particularly of internal politics within the leadership of Ghanaian 
political parties, was both accurate and likely not recorded in any form.  The most reasonable 
explanation is that Special Branch succeeded, within the first months following the riots and 
continuing for the next several years, to cultivate human sources of intelligence, at the highest 
levels of nationalist parties.  To some extent, this was made possible by the ideological and 
generational divisions that Nkrumah precipitated.  Just as Special Branch reported that Grant had 
reservations with Nkrumah’s politics and tactics, other senior members of the UGCC opposed 
Nkrumah’s ascending place in the party and influence over the movement.   This resentment 
provided opportunities for Special Branch to develop human sources who were opposed to 
Nkrumah’s leadership in the UGCC.  In a future intelligence summary, Special Branch reported 
that J.B. Danquah, one of the founders of the UGCC and arguably the second most important 
political figure in the Gold Coast, made a statement to “a representative of this Branch that 
‘Nkrumah is a bloody ass’”.   Here there was no veiled intermediary - the senior political figure 19
in the Gold Coast vented his frustrations directly to a member of Special Branch.  Just as 
Nkrumah has become a deeply divisive figure in Ghanaian history, his polarizing aspirations 
facilitated intelligence-gathering.  20
 Despite the extraordinary access Special Branch enjoyed to nationalist politics, they made 
little effort to objectively appreciate the individuals they researched.  Even from their first 
intelligence summary, Special Branch leveled an extraordinary collection of diverse invectives 
against nationalist politicians, most clearly displayed in the individual personality notes that 
followed the body of each report.  In Special Branch’s first summary from May 1948 for 
example, the attached personality notes dealt with three individuals nominally associated with 
the UGCC.  These notes each begin with relevant background information, including their date 
and place of birth, education, career, and finish with a brief sketch of their character and Special 
Branch’s general impressions.  These three Ghanaian politicians were alternatively described as 
“a deceitful character”, “an unscrupulous crook”, and an activist who is “prompted more by 
hopes of personal financial gain than by any deep seated nationalism”.   In all the reports that 21
followed, Special Branch similarly demeaned every anti-colonial activist, citing ignoble 
intentions, pettiness, and any other imaginable weakness of character or intellect to dismiss these 
men and the campaigns they led. For these and countless others opposed to the colonial state, 
Special Branch was unable to make an unbiased assessment of their character or intentions.  
Instead, Special Branch used their regular summaries to construct a portrait of anti-colonial 
politics as a theatre of the disingenuous, the unstable, and the mentally deranged.  
 Kwame Nkrumah did not escape similar treatment, though Special Branch was not 
prepared to dismiss him through sarcastic invective.  They wished to delegitimize him and 
convince policy makers of their conclusion that he was the most influential, and therefore most 
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dangerous, politician in the colony.  These two demands led Special Branch to make wildly 
divergent descriptions of his character.  In their summary from July 1949, for example, Special 
Branch off-handedly referenced Nkrumah as a “tub thumping demagogue”.   Some months 22
earlier they presented him as a leader of “consequence and forcefulness”.  Continuing at length: 
“NKRUMAH is something of an ascetic, and gifted with fixity of purpose and resolution, 
unfettered apparently by tribal caste, he believes with fanatical fervor in the justice and 
practicability of his cause.”  Before anyone reading the report could mistake this description for 
praise, the summary continued, “Any one of these attributes is sufficiently rare in this Colony to 
make their combination in one man a matter of wonder and admiration to most of the semi-
educated”.   Highlighting Nkrumah’s strengths only served to level a general criticism against 23
the rest of his political rivals and popular supporters. 
 It is not necessary to include more of Special Branch’s vituperation but an important 
point must be made before continuing further.  As shown above, Nkrumah sparked incredible 
anxiety in the last months of 1947 due to his communist associations, and those associations 
were used by policy makers to overlook the reality of the February riots as a spontaneous 
expression of popular discontent.  The explanation of communist subversion minimized the 
failings of the colonial state and delegitimized the popular outrage they had engendered.  Special 
Branch had taken such logic a step farther.  As their repeated intelligence summaries and 
personality notes affirmed, Special Branch viewed the diverse anti-colonial campaigns in the 
Gold Coast as illegitimate.  That illegitimacy was only due in small part to communist 
associates, which could only be applied to Nkrumah and a small number of his colleagues from 
WANS, including Kojo Botsio and Bankole Awoonor-Renner.  For all other politicians, Special 
Branch argued that none were pursuing independence in the Gold Coast due to their convictions.  
They were instead driven by the possibility of fame, wealth, and prestige, while the people who 
supported them were semi-literate, impressionable, and ignorant.  None of Special Branch’s 
summaries made the overt claim that these failings were a product of race, but the totalizing 
nature of their descriptions of all African politicians and the colony’s populace can only be read 
as a racial ideology that dismissed the entirety of anti-colonial politics in the Gold Coast because 
it was African.  This would lead a dangerous corollary, assumed by more than Special Branch 
officers, that all Africans should be suspected first as adversaries of the state.  24
 Despite the biases in their reporting, there is no doubt that Special Branch had, in the 
matter of a few months, established a remarkable, human intelligence network in the Gold Coast  
That network permeated anti-colonial politics, allowing the administration in Accra to critically 
evaluate suspicions of Communist subversion and appreciate the personal, internal struggles that 
drove nationalist politics in the Gold Coast.  These successes ensured that police intelligence 
would be a continuing feature of Government, especially as the transition to the self-rule and 
independence began.  But the realization of police intelligence in the Gold Coast would not 
simply create new tools for Government alone.  Instead, Special Branch and police intelligence 
created a new arena for anti-colonial politics in which both British policy-makers and Ghanaian 
activists would take part.  Ghanaian politicians were not simply subjects of police surveillance or 
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informants but quickly learned to use Special Branch as an avenue for indirectly communicating 
with and influencing the administration.  In this way, Government’s intelligence-gathering 
activities began to exert an appreciable force on affairs in the Gold Coast that anti-colonial 
activists, in part, hoped to influence.  This unique relationship is best captured by the events 
surrounding Nkrumah’s dismissal from the UGCC’s working committee in the summer of 1948. 
 After the release of the ‘Big Six’ from detention in April (under the spurious suspicion 
that they had compelled the riots) the majority of the UGCC’s working committee had found 
themselves at odds with their recently appointed General Secretary.  While they hoped to assure 
Government they had no role in the riots, Nkrumah urged the Working Committee to claim the 
disturbances and thereby capture popular support for the Convention.  Nkrumah’s strategy was 
dismissed, but in the weeks that followed, the subsequent inquiries of the Watson Commission 
publicly continued to uncover details of Nkrumah’s past and personal ideologies that continued 
to embarrass the Working Committee.  These revelations included the particulars of Nkrumah’s 
‘Circle’ organization, his connections to the British Communist Party through the WANS, and a 
proposal he had prepared for the Working Committee before the riots on how to inspire and 
harness popular discontent in the colony.  Throughout the hearings, the Working Committee was 
forced to repeatedly distance themselves from the impression that Nkrumah had created - of the 
UGCC as a radical, communist organization pursuing the violent overthrow of the state.   This 25
would be the beginning of Nkrumah’s separation from the UGCC and the eventual formation of 
his own political party, the Convention People’s Party. 
 Unsurprisingly, Special Branch paid special attention to the growing rift in the UGCC’s 
executive.  In their summaries throughout the rest of 1948, they noted that George Grant had 
tried to limit Nkrumah’s capacity to damage the reputation of the UGCC. This included limiting 
Nkrumah’s public addresses and instructing him to sever all ties to the WANS.  However, 
Nkrumah had not followed all of these strictures.  Throughout May and June, Nkrumah had 
drafted and distributed a letter to over fifty individuals from across West Africa and Europe, 
inviting them to attend the WANS nationalist conference later that year.  These documents were 
discovered by the Working Committee in July, and a few weeks later, Nkrumah was removed 
from his position as General Secretary.  To prevent a public backlash (Nkrumah had already 
cultivated the popular support that would eventual sweep him into the role of Prime Minister), 
the Working Committee did not publicly disown Nkrumah. Instead, they appointed him to the 
hollow title of honorary treasurer, preserving, if even feebly, the illusion of unity among the 
convention’s leadership. 
 Special Branch reported on these events repeatedly, beginning with a short “appreciation” 
made on the UGCC in September.  In addition to the details noted above, they added that the 
Working Committee had learned of Nkrumah’s letter thanks to “an inspired leakage”.  They also 
added that the Working Committee had initially attempted to withhold Nkrumah’s removal 
entirely from the public until “an inspired newspaper rumor” had “brought forth an apologetic 
explanation that NKRUMAH had been promoted to the sinecure post of Assistant Treasurer”.   26
In the report itself, both of the passages referencing these leaks are sidelined, meaning that they 
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represent sensitive information that Special Branch wanted other officials to avoid reproducing, 
unless given special permission.  From reviewing this and previous reports, Special Branch only 
took such precaution with passages relating to their own activities or that could potentially 
compromise one of their sources.  The sidelining of these two passages thus suggests that these 
“inspired leaks” were either the work of Special Branch or one of their sources. 
 For Special Branch to have acquired and released these documents, presumably to widen 
the fractures in the UGCC’s leadership, is an extraordinary claim.  It would mean that Special 
Branch had intentionally acted to disrupt a nationalist party, moving them far beyond the 
institutional scope of a law enforcement or an intelligence-gathering organization.  It is difficult 
not to suspect such extremes, especially given the unique provenance of Special Branch’s records 
since the end of colonial rule.  However, the truth is likely far milder.  According to the Acting 
Commissioner of Police, Captain P. Eckel, the Gold Coast Police did not learn of Nkrumah’s 
letters until after his dismissal from the working committee.  In a letter to the Director General of 
the Security Service, Captain Eckel informed MI5 of the latest developments in the colony, 
especially regarding their collaborative investigation of the suspected communist ties between 
Nkrumah, the WANS, and the UGCC.  Eckel’s letter repeated Special Branch’s report of 
Nkrumah’s removal from the working committee, and added in passing that “it is only recently 
that a copy of these documents came into our hands”.  Taken at its word, the police force 
acquired these documents weeks after the UGCC Working Committee had used them as grounds 
to remove Nkrumah.  Furthermore, Eckel also informed the Security Service that Nkrumah had 
used the UGCC’s own P.O. Box for mailing these documents.  These additional details tip the 
balance towards concluding that a member of the UGCC’s Working Committee discovered these 
documents on their own, shared them with the party’s executive, and then later shared them with 
Special Branch.  Special Branch’s circumspection on reporting about this document was likely to 
protect that informant. 
 Unfortunately, neither Eckel’s letter or any other report from Special Branch casts any 
light on the source of the “inspired newspaper rumor” that had embarrassed the UGCC’s 
leadership and forced the announcement of Nkrumah’s relegation to a paper title.  But 
understanding the discovery and leak of Nkrumah’s letter for the conference has important 
implications for rethinking the Working Committee’s relationship with Special Branch, and 
vicariously, the rest of government.  It recasts them from simple subjects of Special Branch 
surveillance or compromised informants into astute politicians, utilizing the Government’s secret 
collection of intelligence to further their own motives.  The release of Nkrumah’s papers to 
Special Branch benefited the UGCC on multiple fronts.  As discussed previously, since the Accra 
Riots, the party had been overshadowed with the suspicions raised by Nkrumah’s membership in 
the Working Committee.  Had the convention conspired to incite the riots?  Did the convention 
share Nkrumah’s radical, communist views?  The discovery of Nkrumah’s efforts to continue 
organizing the national congress had the potential to harden those suspicions, further damaging 
the convention’s image.  Furthermore, if the Convention had disclosed these papers publicly, in a 
bid to appease the government’s suspicions and discredit their General Secretary, they would 
have ignited a public debate over Nkrumah and his ideology that could have damaged the 
Convention’s popular support.  For better or worse, the UGCC was not prepared to drop 
Nkrumah yet they could not accept the possibility that his actions could have the entire 
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convention and its leadership labeled again as communist provocateurs.  In this context, their 
connection with Special Branch would have been a boon to the Working Committee.  Through 
Special Branch, the UGCC could share Nkrumah’s papers, ensuring that government was 
informed of his ongoing ‘communist activities’ while exonerating the larger Working Committee 
of complicity in his schemes without forcing a public confrontation in which Nkrumah would 
have only gained greater appeal.  Read in this way, the UGCC used Special Branch to serve their 
own political aims, astutely turning the government’s efforts for secret intelligence gathering into 
a mutually negotiated arena for communication and dialogue.  And their efforts were not without 
success.  In Captain Eckel’s letter to MI5 discussed above, he clearly stated that “the whole idea 
of holding the Congress is NKRUMAH’s own.”   By providing information to Special Branch, 27
the conservative elements of the UGCC were able to maintain their relationship with government 
and gained unlikely allies in the Gold Coast Police Force. 
 The unique relationship between Special Branch and the UGCC would prove short-lived.  
The necessary elements to maintaining their relationship rested on mutual distrust of Nkrumah 
and the UGCC’s position as the pre-eminent political organization in the Gold Coast.  By the 
summer of 1949, Nkrumah had successfully used his internal exile within the UGCC to establish 
the Committee on Youth Organization [CYO], the convention’s youth wing.  The CYO itself had 
little connection with the Working Committee and was, more accurately, the institutional 
framework for Nkrumah’s own political vision.  By the Fall of 1949, Nkrumah had formally 
broken all illusionary ties with the UGCC and reshaped the CYO into his own Convention 
People’s Party [CPP].  From then until independence, the CPP would be the dominant Ghanaian 
political party, against which the UGCC would vainly struggle to reclaim relevance.  As a result 
of this dramatic political shift, the Working Committee likewise lost their connection to Special 
Branch.  They no longer possessed insider information on Nkrumah or any restraint, symbolic or 
real, on his actions.  In brief, there was little they could offer to Special Branch and police 
intelligence had shifted their attention from the UGCC to the CPP. 
 In the short-term, Nkrumah’s break from the CPP also had an appreciable impact on 
Special Branch’s reporting.  Nkrumah’s departure severely limited Special Branch’s access to 
confidential political intelligence.  They could no longer rely on the animosities within the 
UGCC’s Working Committee to provide regular updates on Nkrumah’s political activities.  In the 
immediate months that followed Nkrumah’s departure, Special Branch summaries rarely include 
mention of “well-place sources”; while these sources did not disappear entirely, their sudden 
absence signaled how productive Nkrumah’s disruptive position in the UGCC had been for 
police intelligence.  As if quietly affirming this fact, in the fall of 1949, Special Branch’s 
monthly summaries stopped carrying special warnings against reproducing side-lined 
information that dealt with confidential sources.  There were simply not enough such references 
to justify such caution.  In the absence of confidential informants, Special Branch expanded their 
collection of all publicly available information, noting and reporting the particulars of every 
speech at all political rallies, the highlights from the month’s national presses, and the entire 
bureaucratic minutia that attended the CPP’s growing organization across Cold Coast.  It was not 
long before Special Branch’s monthly reports were straining the limits of what constituted an 
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intelligence ‘summary’.  Whereas the first reports of 1948 had often run to ten pages with a few 
additional pages for personality notes, summaries following Nkrumah’s departure in 1949 and 
into 1950 often ran beyond twenty or even thirty pages.  These bloated reports might have been 
Special Branch’s attempt to compensate for the precipitous loss of confidential sources in 1949, 
however, they certainly evidenced that the nature of police intelligence work had shifted.  Instead 
of devoting their efforts to presenting insights from confidential informants, Special Branch 
sought and offered a comprehensive view of Gold Coast politics, established largely through 
publicly accessible and relatively mundane sources.  Special Branch’s early informants in the 
UGCC’s Working Committee resulted in reports that were undeniably sensational, but the 
information they contained rarely rose above invectives directed at Nkrumah by his political 
peers.  To some degree, it was little more than the gossip of Ghanaian politics.  Once they had 
lost such sources however, Special Branch began meticulously cataloguing the progress of anti-
colonial activism through mundane sources. 
 In little more than a year, police intelligence had become an active resources in the 
colonial government of the Gold Coast.  Despite the number of sources they cultivated and the 
reams of reports they produced each month, Special Branch was not without its problems or 
critics.  On the one hand, Special Branch entered a colonial system with a pre-existing 
informational regime.  Departments and regional commissioners had previously been solely for 
supplying Accra with detailed information on matters ranging from local affairs to labour 
matters.  Special Branch’s investigation into anti-colonial politics paralleled this older network, 
which invariably produced conflicting outlooks between the police and other departments.  
Additionally, Special Branch’s mandate blurred the distinctions between security and politics in 
the Gold Coast.  For many in Special Branch, anti-colonial activism was read only as an 
impediment or threat to Government, a view that would become increasingly unacceptable in an 
administration that progressively accepted the necessity of ‘Africanisation’, self-rule, and 
independence.  These contrasts would be laid bare especially after 1951 when the Gold Coast 
formally launched the experiment of self-rule with general elections with universal suffrage, 
creating both an African-led Legislative Assembly and Ghanaian Ministers serving alongside 
colonial officials in directing Government business.  Yet even as early as 1949, Special Branch 
was beginning to irritate the larger administration, presuming its efforts to further the security of 
the colony included offer direction on government policy.  
 These divisions were first demonstrated by a handwritten memorandum that passed 
between the Secretariat and Governor’s office in June of 1949.  The root of the memorandum’s 
complaints was Special Branch’s assumption of an advisory role on political matters.  This 
advice was conveyed largely through personal discussions and private memorandums, records of 
which have not survived in the archival record.  Yet Special Branch’s monthly intelligence 
summaries would suggest that such advice encouraged Government to take an antagonistic 
stance toward the anti-colonial movement, returning to the critical perspectives from the first 
months of 1948 when the UGCC, Nkrumah, and all other Ghanaian politics were understood as 
subversive elements. The memorandum labels both such counsel and Special Branch’s adoption 
of an advisory role a “dangerous delusion”.  It explains, “The Special Branch is a fact finding 
and sifting machine whose assistance may be sought in the interpretation of these facts.  The 
interpretation, however, remains with the Secretariat.”  Adding to its criticisms, the 
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memorandum further accuses Special Branch of having “become very dogmatic and to have 
vague illusions of omniscience”, encouraging a “tendency to fit facts to a given theory”.  In other 
words, this memorandum suggested Special Branch was both exceeding its institutional bounds 
and supplying poor intelligence material that only confirmed their expectations.  28
 In the following days after receiving this memorandum, the Governor met personally 
with the head of Special Branch.  He was joined by a member of the Secretariat and future head 
of the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs [MDEA], G.E. Sinclair.  The meeting seemed to 
have the desired effect of correcting Special Branch , ensuring that both it and the Secretariat 
were, in Sinclair’s words, “working on the same lines”.   After which, it seems, that Special 29
Branch fell into an expectant pattern of bureaucratic repetition.  They provided their monthly 
intelligence summaries, building their reports chiefly on public information, and restrained from 
trying to direct how government should act on this information.  Special Branch had reached a 
kind of institutional equilibrium, having established the extent of their network of intelligence 
sources and restricted mandate as solely an intelligence-gathering organization.  But that 
equilibrium could not be maintained given the changing affairs of the colony and the political 
parties championing the cause of immediate self-government.   In October 1949, the 
government’s inquiry into constitutional reform, the Coussey Report, was published and it called 
for an African-led Legislative Assembly, decided by a general election consisting of all adults 
above the age of twenty-five.  For the CPP and their rallying cry of “Self-Government Now!”, 
the Coussey Report was a tepid step designed to maintain British authority by placating 
nationalist demands.  Conservative proponents of empire, however, saw it a wild experiment 
unable to succeed at little more than disrupting government.  Nevertheless, plans soon 
commenced for organizing the Gold Coast’s first general elections and, after several uncertain 
months for the nationalist parties, candidates began canvassing for support and votes.  This 
created a wealth of material for Special Branch to study and posed a new set of questions on how 
police intelligence should operate in diarchal government.  Could the branch continue to surveil 
nationalist politicians as elected representatives?  Would African ministers be entitled to receive 
Special Branch reports, and if so, how would they be forced to alter their intelligence efforts?  
 The Gold Coast Police Force responded to these questions with expected apprehension.  
On November 1st, 1950, only three months short of the Gold Coast’s first General Election, the 
Commissioner of the Gold Coast Police recommended that Special Branch take peculiar 
precautions after the formation of the Legislative Assembly.  He wrote,  “[African] Ministers are 
well aware of the existance [sp] and functions of the Special Branch and will consider it queer if 
they see nothing of its activities.  I therefore suggest that Special Branch reports should be 
divided into two parts, namely, Part 1 - Top secret matter confined to the Ministry of Defence, 
and Part 2 - Stale news and matters of low security value published in a general report to which 
Ministers would have access.”  This arrangement would have allowed Special Branch to 30
continue their extensive and invasive inquiries into nationalist politics, an arrangement that 
reflected the Police’s ongoing suspicion of Ghanaian politicians.  Yet, it was also a proposition 
that would undermine the experiment of diarchy, with the British side of the administration 
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purposefully deceiving their Ghanaian counterparts in the interest of security paradigms that 
were conceived under the colonial state.   
 After the Accra Riots, the Government of the Gold Coast achieved the remarkable feat of 
envisioning and creating an intelligence organization that encompassed the whole of the colony.  
Within a matter of months, Special Branch had not only organized its officers, it had already 
begun building a network of human sources that penetrated the major nationalist parties and 
revealed the interests of leading politicians.  And yet, these early successes overshadowed the 
fact that Police intelligence had been created to answer the fears of a colonial state.  As long as 
the Gold Coast remained a territory within the British Empire, directed by colonial officials for 
the supposed good of its African subjects, Special Branch’s was perfectly suited to safeguard the 
state.  Yet, as the nature of government in the Gold Coast was incrementally but radically altered 
towards self-rule and independence, Special Branch struggled vainly to protect a state that no 
longer existed. 
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Chapter Three: The Role of Special Branch during Self-
Rule, 1951-1954 
On February 11th, 1951, the Gold Coast held its first general election under universal 
suffrage, the first of its kind in all of Africa.  These elections were the first step in the Gold 
Coast’s transition from British colony to independent state, pursued along a course of 
incremental, constitutional reforms.  The elections provided the colony a representative 
parliament, largely comprised of African delegates, and an executive council that would assist 
the governor in directing government affairs.  The council’s members included three European 
ministers (charged with Justice, Finance, Defence and External Affairs) while the remaining 
eight seats were filled by elected assemblymen, African politicians who had succeeded by 
popular majority in the legislative elections.   It was a purposefully hybrid system, designed to 
retain colonial authority while African assemblymen and political parties were tutored in the 
affairs of state and could learn for themselves how to pursue democratic reform from within, 
rather than without, the administration.  Despite all the ways the 1951 elections preserved 
European authority, it gave the people of the Gold Coast an ‘Africanised’ government eager to 
pursue self-rule and independence.    1
Like the security innovations made between 1948 and 1951, the Legislative Elections 
were the culmination of political reforms sparked by the Accra Riots and Watson Commission.  
Yet despite their common impetus, the Gold Coast’s intelligence network was severely disrupted 
by the elections and their consequences.  For three years, every effort to improve the colony’s 
security had focused on the threat of African nationalism.  Police Special Branch had studied the 
UGCC, the CPP, and its leaders.  The British Security Service had assisted Special Branch by 
monitoring anti-colonial and communist activists in London interested in West Africa.  The Gold 
Coast’s intelligence network, in short, had been designed to limit the influence of African 
politicians on the security of the state.  Yet on February 11th, 1951, these same men became 
members of government in the Gold Coast and were empowered to direct its course.  The most 
dramatic example of this reversal was Kwame Nkrumah.  Before the election, Nkrumah was 
serving a prison sentence at Fort James for mobilizing a Positive Action campaign.  In his 
absence, the CPP had mobilized to win a resounding victory in the legislative elections, partly by 
working in rural constituencies neglected by their opponents and by catering their political 
platforms to the demands of municipal voters.  The CPP’s victory was so resounding that within 
twenty-fours hours of receiving the electoral results, Governor Arden-Clarke both released 
Nkrumah from detention and invited him to become the highest ranking African in government 
as the Minister of Government Business.  Mirroring the language of British Parliamentary 
politics, Arden-Clarke invited Nkrumah to organize a new government.  The Legislative 
Elections had taken the single greatest concern for the colony’s intelligence services and made 
him the popular figurehead of state.  Political reform in the Gold Coast had caught up to its 
security in the most dramatic way possible. 
 For a more detailed description of the 1951 elections, see Austin, 103-152.1
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The legislative elections were intended to transform the African nationalist movement 
into an orderly enterprise that would cooperate with the British government.  In the same 
instance, it also transformed government to meet the popular demands for democratic reform.  
Despite these clear shifts, the administration failed to anticipate how representative government 
would necessitate alterations to intelligence work in the colony.  This was perhaps because the 
officials responsible for such matters did not believe that security concerns in the Gold Coast 
remained unaltered.  Police Special Branch still saw Nkrumah as a irrational demigod who 
belonged in prison rather than the Executive Council.  They also continued to contend that 
African nationalism was but a shoddy trojan horse for communist subversion.  Even though the 
more-tempered members of the administrator questioned these characterizations, the governor 
and his advisors still considered nationalist politics to be the most volatile matter in the colony 
demanding Special Branch’s attention.    
Though not immediately obvious to the larger administration there was an important 
divergence between their own and Special Branch’s view on nationalist politics.  Both accepted 
that nationalist politics represented an important issue that the government required every 
assistance to successfully navigate, yet for many leaders in the administration, including 
Governor Arden-Clarke and the permanent secretary for the Minister of Defense, this was simply 
a matter of remaining informed.  Special Branch however continued to see investigation of 
nationalist politics as the means of removing Kwame Nkrumah, the CPP, and other nationalist 
figures from office.  They continued to see these men as criminals and were committed to 
leverage police intelligence to shift the larger government’s trust in these men and indeed the 
entire project of self-rule. 
These conflicting views combined with the changed political realities of diarchy 
presented four difficult questions for the administration to answer in the following years. First, 
could the administration rely on Special Branch to produce accurate intelligence assessments 
when its officers were opposed to the process of self-rule?  Second, should the administration 
continue to support surveillance of African politicians, despite the potential political backlash?  
Third, how should the administration respond if it learned that elected members of government 
were engaged in criminal activity?  Fourth and finally, how should the administration protect 
ongoing intelligence work while still training African leaders to manage the security concerns of 
the Gold Coast?  These four questions revealed the divergent views on security work and the 
political future of the colony held by the administration, the police, and metropolitan officials.  
More fundamentally, the three years between 1951 and 1954 showed that the Gold Coast had 
produced a security system that was incapable of processing political change. 
Special Branch’s Tone 
 Before February 1951, there was surprisingly little discussion on how the legislative 
elections would impact security work in the Gold Coast.  There were more pressing issues to 
address, not the least of which was holding the elections themselves.   This was a critical 2
oversight to Special Branch who viewed the proposition of Africans in government, particularly 
Nkrumah and other members of the CPP leadership, as reckless and dangerous.  For three years 
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Special Branch had followed Nkrumah with every conviction that he was either a charlatan, a 
communist stooge, or both.  It was unacceptable to them that this man, even with overwhelming 
popular support, should be permitted any authority in the Gold Coast.  Yet the mechanisms of 
state did not afford Special Branch the opportunity to express these misgivings, nor was the 
administration concerned with the opinion of the police on matters of political reform.  The 
administration saw representative government chiefly as a necessary reform for a modern 
African society.  Special Branch, on the other hand, viewed these reforms as a threat to the 
security of the colony.   Without the opportunity to reconcile these divergent view, Special 
Branch became increasingly hostile to the administration for what they perceived as their 
ignorance and inaction.  This hostility slowly bled into Special Branch’s monthly intelligence 
summaries, at first without any notice from the administration in Accra but eventually raising the 
concerns of the Colonial Office and Security Service in London. 
Special Branch’s first response to representative government appeared their monthly 
intelligence summary for February 1951, the first report dealing with the legislative elections.  
Without comment or explanation, Special Branch simply added the following caution to the 
header of this and every subsequent report: “This is a TOP SECRET document from which no 
extract may be made without reference to this office”.   This was a not a new policy.  Special 3
Branch reports had always been classified Top Secret and it was accepted practice to for officials 
to forebear from repeating or publicizing any intelligence material without the expressed 
approval of Special Branch.  These policies had protected the reports, and the sources on which 
they were based, since 1948.  The reminder of these reports’ security classification was not in 
response to any recent oversights in protocol.  Instead, this was Special Branch’s first signal to 
the administration of their concerns.  Africans now filled ministerial posts, and regardless of the 
rest of the administration’s views, the police would not accept that representative ministers 
should have access to Special Branch intelligence. The administration did not realize the 
significance of this header or that it signaled Special Branch’s misgivings with the state, but 
Special Branch would quickly make more obvious gestures signaling their dissatisfaction with 
representative government in the Gold Coast.  This was done chiefly through the tone of their 
reporting. 
Special Branch’s new tone relied chiefly on magnifying their disdain for African 
politicians. Admittedly, before 1951, Special Branch had frequently adopted a condescending 
tone when speaking of nationalist parties and their leaders.  For example, one biographical 
profile of a UGCC leader from a 1948 security report concluded, he is “a rather pompous little 
man who lacks the moral courage ever to become a political or labour leader of any 
consequence.”   With this and countless other examples, Special Branch dismissed every African 4
politician for lack of character, will, or intelligence.  This condescension only became more 
severe after the legislative elections, particularly towards the CPP.  Ironically, Special Branch’s 
efforts to demean the CPP at times left them praising political parties in the opposition, despite 
what judgments they had raised in passed reports.  For example, in their summary of the first 
debates in the legislative assembly, Special Branch observed, “The reasoned speeches of 
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DANQUAH and his supporters - particularly that of DR. BUSIA who advanced a moderate and 
cogent argument - overshadowed the whole debate and were in marked contrast to the adolescent 
vituperations of NKRUMAH and his henchmen.”   In another extreme example from the same 5
report, Special Branch commented on CPP concessions to their supporters.  These included the 
suspension of the unpopular agricultural program of ‘cutting-out’, the release of ex-servicemen 
imprisoned for political protests, and the re-engagement of workers previously dismissed for 
participating in the Positive Action campaign of January 1950.  These initiatives had been part of 
the CPP’s political platform during the elections and were critical components of their success 
among municipal voters.  Special Branch dismissively referred to these initiatives as “the sops” 
and observed that they “had much the same effect on the C.P.P. Members as strong drink on the 
hardened drinker - exultation, reaction and a hankering for more.”   Their language casted CPP 6
leaders and their supporters as juveniles, criminals, drunkards, and ignorant goons. 
Beyond mockery and contempt, Special Branch’s description of Nkrumah and the CPP 
began to ascribe them nefarious designs. Following the election, Special Branch made repeated 
allusions between the nationalist movement in the Gold Coast and the totalitarian state of Nazi 
Germany.  This change is best evidenced in their description of Kwame Nkrumah.  The leader of 
the CPP had in the past been referred to as ‘the show boy’, mocking the charismatic nature of his 
political career.   After the elections, however, Special Branch adopted a new moniker for 
Nkrumah.  Intelligence reports began referring to the leader of the CPP as “the Fuehrer”.  Special 
Branch carried this allusion throughout their study of the entire party’s structure, relating their 
organization and objectives to the Nazi Socialist party.   One monthly intelligence summary 
contended that the defining characteristic of the CPP, absent of any political platform, was 
“almost slavish obedience to the wishes of the Fuehrer”.   Special Branch also expanded this 7
allusion beyond the CPP to describe the entire African nationalist movement.  For example one 
report summarized the month’s events by saying that  “the burgeoning of black nationalism” 
followed “the shape of the Fuehrer’s ‘Drang nach Osten’ .”   This language was provocative and 8 9
sensational, particularly for intelligence reports prepared not five years since the fall of Nazi 
Germany.   
In addition to vilifying the CPP and its leadership, Special Branch began to criticize the 
administration for their seeming indifference to the perils of the state.  The most exceptional of 
such comments comes from the Special Branch Summary for April 1951, only the third such 
report since the legislative elections.  After presenting all the intelligence material gathered 
throughout the colony, for the entire month, touching on every political matter possible, Special 
Branch made the following forecast for the future of the Gold Coast: 
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Broadly, therefore, although there is the long term possibility that the C.P.P. edifice may 
crumble and fall, the current trend is towards some form of totalitarianism or, more 
precisely, mob rule.  If the Police Force retains its impartiality and individuality no doubt 
it can withstand the worst potentialities of such a development, but if, on the other hand, 
there is excessive interference by the Executive as to whether members of the C.P.P. shall 
or shall not be prosecuted for criminal offences (of which there has been some indications 
recently), then the Force is well on the way to becoming the cat’s-paw of a dictatorship.  
No doubt the new Constitution has got to be made to work - ‘regardless’ one might 
almost say - but if the Police Force is to become a pawn in the game, it would be a bold 
man who would predict the consequences in the Force itself and in the country at large.  10
These three sentences reveal the full extent of Special Branch’s apprehensions and 
marked a turning point in the operation of intelligence work in the Gold Coast.  Before the April 
report, Special Branch had expressed blatant animosity toward the CPP and Nkrumah, and this 
was seen as a general discontent with the nationalist movement and its volatility.  But in this 
report, Special Branch revealed the depth of their unease.  They imagined that African 
nationalism would lead to a totalitarian state along the lines of Nazi Germany.  This despotic 
state would depend on a corrupted police force that protected the regime in place of public 
security.  This course, they felt, could be averted if the police were allowed to arrest and 
prosecute the criminals leading the nationalist movement, yet they saw their work frustrated by 
‘excessive interference by the Executive’.  In short, Special Branch believed the colonial 
administration was blinded by the politics of the transitional state and unable to see the collapse 
they were allowing to occur. 
 The administration had been able to ignore Special Branch’s views of African 
nationalists, their language was dramatic but their records were accurate, but it was unable to 
abide its perspective on the state and its future.  The Gold Coast was set on its course through 
self-rule towards independence, and if Special Branch were to continue reporting in this fashion, 
they would be increasingly out-of-touch with political reality.  Their reports also contradicted the 
image of the colony that the administration was attempting to convey to the Colonial Office and 
the larger British government.  The Gold Coast was Britain’s first experiment with transitional 
government in sub-Saharan Africa.  It was intended to be an experiment for how colonial rule 
could be peaceably dismantled to create a modern African state with the positive disposition to 
remain in the commonwealth.  Special Branch’s intelligence summaries suggested the 
experiment was deeply flawed and doomed to fail.  Even if officials in London were not 
persuaded by Special Branch’s pessimism, they would recognize the divergent views between the 
governor’s reports and those of his intelligence unit.  It would signal that the administration had 
lost control of the police.  Governor Arden-Clarke, in fact, originally hoped to ignore Special 
Branch’s outbursts and thereby avoid a confrontation with the police.  Yet while on leave from 
the Gold Coast and in London, officials from the Colonial Office informed the governor that 
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Special Branch’s tone had been both noticed and commented on by various officials; they 
advised him to settle the matter quickly.    11
In addition to this pressure from the Colonial Office, the Gold Coast administration began 
to recognize that Special Branch’s contempt was compromising their ability to produce accurate 
intelligence assessments.  The Permanent Secretary for the Minister for Defence and External 
Affairs, G.E. Sinclair, identified several instances over as many months where the police failed to 
explain several events in the colony regarding African politics.  By anticipating the most devious 
motives, he explained, Special Branch was overlooking the simplest and well-reasoned 
explanations for the CPP’s activities and strategies.  Special Branch’s assumptions made it 
impossible for them to see the true causes of events in the colony. As Sinclair surmised, “It 
would be just as harmful if [the summaries] were enthusiastically hopeful as it is now that they 
are cynically hostile to the current political developments.”   In short, the administration 12
realized that Special Branch’s opposition to representative government was creating political 
backlash from the Colonial Office and undermining the value of local intelligence work. 
Just as the administration was slow to recognize Special Branch’s perspective, they were 
equally unprepared to understand it cause.  Despite his previous insights, Sinclair believed that 
Special Branch’s animosity was born of ignorance regarding the constitution’s strength and the 
government’s achievements.  He reasoned that greater dialogue with the administration and time 
would eventually bring Special Branch back in line.  Minister of Police, however, had a more 
accurate assessment.  He wrote to the Permanent Secretary of the MDEA, “I am afraid that the 
tone of these reports derives much more from hostility to and unwillingness to accept the present 
regime than from any lack of knowledge.”   This argument would be confirmed to the rest of the 13
administration as they repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to correct Special Branch.  
Through the spring and summer of 1951, the Minister of Police, the Permanent Secretary, and 
even the Governor repeatedly requested that Special Branch alter their tone, informing them of 
their oversights and the progress made under the new constitution.  When Special Branch 
ignored these entreaties, the administration turned to the police chain of command and spoke 
with the Commissioner of Police.  Once again Special Branch continued in its criticism of the 
government, willfully ignoring the governor’s directives.  The administration realized that 
contempt for government was not restricted to Special Branch, but was the attitude of most 
senior police officers including the Commissioner of Police.   The concerns over Special 14
Branch’s tone had revealed a broader divide with the entire police force. 
Despite Special Branch’s persistent and insubordinate contempt for the administration, 
there was little the government could do.  It was unthinkable to release any of the officers in the 
police force or attempt to replace them.  In the post-war years, there were few British police 
officers who were suitably trained or inclined for colonial work.  Each administration was 
desperate to secure as many officers as they could, especially as urban populations expanded 
rapidly and nationalist parties became commonplace in every territory.   The Gold Coast felt 
these same strains, despite having a larger police force than most other British colonies.  
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Dismissing any number of European officers would have been crippling. The demand for Special 
Branch officers was even higher and they proved increasingly difficult to replace.  The Security 
Liaison Officer [SLO] once lamented to the Governor over the transfer of a single Special 
Branch officer to another unit in the police, noting that only a limited number of officers had the 
right “training and temperament” fit for intelligence work.   Even if suitable candidates could be 15
located to replace the contentious members of Special Branch, this move would antagonize the 
leadership of the police force, solving one problem while creating several others. 
 Unable to resolve these issue themselves, the administration turned to London and 
the larger British security network for assistance.  Their first hope was in the London 
Metropolitan Police Chief, Colonel Young.  Young was scheduled to visit several colonies, 
including the Gold Coast, and provide detailed reports on their police forces so they might be 
improved to meet the demands of modern states.  He was due to visit the Gold Coast in the fall 
of 1951 and the administration collected representative samples from Special Branch summaries 
to demonstrate their concerns to him shortly after his arrival.   The administration hoped that 16
Colonel Young, as a fellow police officer, would be able to persuade the Gold Coast police to 
alter their view while also being removed enough from local contexts to see the validity of the 
administration’s concern.  The administration was sorely disappointed.  In his final report, 
though vague on specific details regarding Special Branch, Colonel Young praised the unit and 
defended them against unnamed critics.  His brief statement of support ended, “the Special 
Branch of the Gold Coast whose work and organization I have carefully examined is, like the 
Special Branch in the United Kingdom, a loyal, efficient and essential organisation.”   In the 17
end, MI5 was responsible for solving the administration’s intelligence problem. 
In October 1951, the Head of MI5’s ‘overseas section’, Sir John Shaw, made an 
extraordinary visit to the Gold Coast.  His trip coincided with the meeting of the Central Security 
Committee , or CENSEC.  CENSEC been organized under the supervision of the SLO in 1948.  
Its purpose was to coordinate efforts between the British military, the Gold Coast police, and the 
colonial administration on matters of security.  For example, during their meeting for October 
1951, they discussed the general affairs in the colony, a crate of military rifles that had “gone 
astray”, and the present supplies of tear gas, barbed wire, and wireless sets.  In short, CENSEC 
dealt with far-reaching and mundane security matters.  But in the same meeting, CENSEC 
proposed and approved a bureaucratic solution to the Special Branch problem.  They discussed 
the formation of a Local Intelligence Committee (LIC).  Governor Arden-Clarke introduced the 
idea by observing that government “should be provided with a regular appreciation of the current 
political situation.  This should be prepared and submitted by a committee which should consist 
of persons best qualified to assess intelligence.”   These persons included the Permanent 18
Secretary of the MDEA, the SLO, the officer in charge of Special Branch, a member of the 
Special Air Service, and a General Staff Officer in the British Army.  Shaw explained to the 
members of CENSEC how a committee would provide a more accurate analysis in place a sole 
officer or department with the same responsibility.  This new system would not require Special 
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Branch to prepare monthly intelligence report.  The officer in charge of Special Branch would 
instead report directly to the LIC which would make the final assessment of the raw intelligence 
the police provided.  19
Although the issues with Special Branch were not mentioned during the CENSEC 
meeting, the formation of the LIC was undoubtedly a response to the tone of their reports and 
their stubborn opposition to the administration over the last several months.  The formation of 
the LIC would ensure that all future intelligence reports coming from the Gold Coast gave a 
balanced perspective on political affairs in the colony.  Special Branch would still have a role in 
drafting monthly intelligence assessments, but instead of being able to express their views 
without comment from the administration, the officer in charge of Special Branch would be 
required to argue their perspective with the other members of the LIC.  With representatives of 
the MDEA, the military, and the SLO, the LIC was bound to produce tempered reports with 
greater objectivity through the demands of achieving consensus.  This complicated and slowed 
intelligence work in the colony by separating the responsibilities for collection, analysis, and 
assessment between Special Branch and the LIC, but it would provide better intelligence material 
and avoid an unprofitable confrontation between the administration and the police.  The purpose 
of this sudden change did not go unrecognized in the Colonial Office.  On receiving the first 
intelligence report from the LIC, one official observed that this change to intelligence reporting 
in the Gold Coast was “an occasion for dispensing with the tendentious Special Branch 
Summaries.”  20
Special Branch’s concerns and contempt with the transitional state is emblematic of the 
unexpected strains created by political change in the Gold Coast.  Before 1951, the government 
had been unable to recognize Special Branch’s particular suspicion of the nationalist movement.  
In some respect, those suspicion likely served the administration when the UGCC and the CPP 
were outside government.  But with the introduction of the Legislative Assembly and the 
opening of ministerial posts for its African leadership, Special Branch was incapable of 
providing accurate assessment due to its pessimism.  The formation of the LIC provided more 
objective intelligence material but unfortunately did little to address the underlying suspicions 
within Special Branch that had fomented the conflict in the first instance.  This would impact the 
administration’s relations with Special Branch until independence, negatively affecting security 
work in unusual ways.  This episode also reveals how the political demands of the transitional 
state augmented the intelligence apparatus in the colony.  More important than the creation of the 
LIC, the conflict with Special Branch had drawn the administration closer to security resources 
in the metropole.  The Security Service, through the SLO and the head of the OS section, had 
provided a convenient and effective solution to the administration’s security concerns.  The 
following years would prove the complications of the administration’s rift with Special Branch 
and their increased reliance on the Security Service.  
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Source CHEST 
After the formation of the LIC, the rift between Special Branch and the administration 
would quickly create unexpected complications in security work and political matters in the Gold 
Coast.  By far the most unusual complication rested on the use of letter intercepts.  Since 
February 1949, Special Branch had intercepted all post for Kwame Nkrumah and other 
nationalist leaders.  This work was supported by the Security Service who first provided Special 
Branch with Nkrumah’s personal and secret p.o. box address, ironically obtained through their 
own intercepts on Nkrumah’s associates in London.   Mimicking Security Service protocol, 21
letter intercepts in the Gold Coast were codenamed Source CHEST and became a closely-
guarded secret. 
By any estimation, CHEST was a modest operation.  Special Branch worked through two 
post office workers in Accra to monitor all correspondences arriving for selected nationalist 
leaders.  Post directed to any of their public or private P.O. boxes was opened and copied.  These 
letters were then be sealed and delivered to avoid detection.  Though a simple process, letter 
intercepts provided the administration the most valuable intelligence on the nationalist 
movement and its leaders.  Nearly every other source that Special Branch operated was an open 
source - public statements, party minutes, printed speeches - material that Nkrumah and other 
nationalist leaders knew would become public knowledge, or at the very least, was known by a 
number individuals.  But letter intercepts represented a closed source.  Nkrumah, Botsio, Renner, 
and unknown others did not know that the government was reading their correspondences.  
These letters captured these men at their most private, and for that reason, Special Branch was 
confident CHEST provided the most accurate portrait of nationalist leaders’ thoughts and 
objectives.   
Beyond the intelligence that CHEST provided on individuals in the Gold Coast, letter 
intercepts also revealed the connections that African leaders cultivated within and without the 
colony.  These letters documented who these men relied on for guidance and instruction in their 
nationalist projects.  For example, Nkrumah was an old friend of George Padmore, a Trinidadian 
writer, anti-colonial activist, and public member of the Communist Party.  Throughout his career, 
Nkrumah sought Padmore’s advice on political affairs in the Gold Coast and even asked for his 
assistance in drafting a new constitution for the transitional state in 1952.   Similarly, 22
Nkrumah’s friend and fellow CPP leader, Kojo Botsio frequently received communist literature 
and corresponded with individuals in East Germany.  These connections disturbed British 
officials and Source CHEST was the only reliable way to measure their influence on affairs in 
the Gold Coast and the larger empire.  In short, nothing equaled the utility of Source CHEST in 
answering both local and metropolitan security concerns in the Gold Coast. 
Under the transitional government, however, letter intercepts were an increasingly 
dangerous intelligence resource.  The representative government was a fragile coalition of 
African nationalists.  In the recent past, these groups and their leaders had directed 
confrontational campaigns against the British administration and echoed their rallying cry of 
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“Self-Government Now!”  The concessions embodied by the legislative elections were designed 
to temper and redirect these nationalist demands into a constitutional and guided process of 
increasing self-rule and independence.  Yet the administration rightly feared that the experiment 
of representative government could fail and that its failure would ignite impassioned and 
impatient demands for immediate independence.  In this context, Source CHEST had the 
potential for precipitating that failure.  If discovered, the censorship of African correspondences 
could destroy trust between the Governor and the representative ministers.  At any cost, it could 
not be discovered. 
The administration’s first scare with Source CHEST came in June 1951.  Kojo Botsio, the 
Minister of Education and Social Welfare, had received a number of letters from Berlin that had 
been “inexpertly opened” by an unknown party before their arrival in Accra.  When these letters 
were delivered to Botsio, he immediately suspected the Gold Coast Police and the administration 
provided a hasty, though entirely false, assurance that the minister’s mail was not being censored 
in the colony.  Suspecting that another division in British intelligence was responsible, the SLO 
for West Africa, W.H.A. Rich, wrote the Director-General of the Security Service for his 
assistance.  Rich requested the Director-General to identify the responsible agency and “advise 
them to stop examining a Gold Coast Minister’s mail”, thereby helping the Gold Coast “to avoid 
an embarrassing situation.”  The Director-General was unable to offer any substantive assistance.  
At the time, Berlin had already become a battleground of Cold War boundaries and been divided 
into four zones administered by the Americans, the British, the French, and the Soviets.  It was 
unclear which zone Botsio’s letters had originated from and possible that British intelligence had 
no responsibility for the amateur censorship.  The Director-General did observe, however, that if 
these letters had originated from the Soviet Zone, the administration could take this opportunity 
to inform Botsio that, “this is only what he can expect if he elects to keep in touch with 
individuals in territory under communist control.”   In a moment of unbelievable irony, Source 23
CHEST had narrowly avoided detection and yet the Director-General recommended criticizing 
Soviet security for this same type of intelligence work!  Intelligence Officers could not maintain 
this hypocrisy for long as censorship in the Gold Coast would be revealed only a few weeks later. 
In August 1951, party scouts for CPP caught police officers censoring mail for Nkrumah 
and party headquarters, perhaps because the Minister of Government Business doubted the 
explanation for Botsio’s letters.   Thanks to Nkrumah’s personal press, the Accra Evening News, 24
this discovery was quickly publicized and criticized.  The matter prompted immediate 
intervention from Governor Arden-Clarke, who called a meeting of the colony’s Executive 
Council and arranged for a private discussion with Nkrumah.  Once again, intelligence work in 
the colony had precipitated a political problem for Arden-Clarke to resolve, and whereas he was 
slow to respond to Special Branch’s reporting, he wasted no time to correct the problems 
associated with Source CHEST.  The Gold Coast Executive Council decided to no longer grant 
Home Officer Warrants that would enable continued censorship and the Governor made a 
“personal undertaking” to Nkrumah that mail intercepts would cease.   Amazingly, these efforts 25
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succeeded and the discovery of Source CHEST did not result in political scandal of any kind.    
Arden-Clarke had dispelled Nkrumah’s suspicions and his word was seemingly sufficient to 
restore goodwill between the CPP and the administration. 
Yet, despite the governor’s ‘personal undertaking’, MI5 records prove that censorship 
continued in the Gold Coast for several more years.  One other scholar, Calder Walton in Empire 
of Secrets, examined this quandary and arrived at the conclusion that Arden-Clarke deceived 
Nkrumah while directing Police Special Branch to continue censoring his correspondence.  
Walton argues this is evidence of Governor Arden-Clarke’s “Machiavellian side”, as he 
deceptively won Nkrumah’s confidence while using Special Branch to study his affairs, 
concerns, and private thoughts.  It is a claim that dramatically recasts the history of 
decolonization in the Gold Coast.  Unfortunately, it is likely incorrect.  The truth of Source 
CHEST is stranger still and speaks to the Governor’s strained relationship with Special Branch 
rather than with Kwame Nkrumah.  
The explanation for the continued use of letter intercepts lies in communications between 
the SLO and other members of the Security Service.  MI5 was aware of both Nkrumah’s 
discovery of Source CHEST and informed of the Governor’s personal undertaking to suspend 
censorship in the Gold Coast.   Nearly a year later to the day however, the SLO passed on 26
intelligence that Nkrumah was still corresponding with George Padmore in London.   Padmore 27
was undoubtedly a target of MI5 investigation and surveillance, and though his security file has 
yet to be declassified, there is sufficient evidence in Nkrumah’s files alone to prove that MI5 
censored Padmore’s mail and closely followed his movements.  He was, after all, a professed 
communist who had studied in Russia and was devoted to spending his later-years in support of 
anti-colonial movements throughout British Africa.  The SLO’s intelligence was therefore a 
valuable assistance to the Security Service.  But there was only one possible way for the SLO to 
have this intelligence - Special Branch was still intercepting Nkrumah’s mail.  This required 
clarification that the Security Service sought from the SLO during his next visit to MI5 
headquarters the following month.  The SLO explained that the source for their intelligence was 
“a local source SWIFT operated unofficially by Special Branch, against the written orders of the 
Governor, who receives the product in a form which he is not obliged to recognise as the fruits of 
disobedience to his own orders.”   Though no explanation is given in the file, Source CHEST 28
was renamed Source SWIFT and operated as if it had never been discovered.  This was a clever 
cover as MI5 used the same codename to refer to their censorship of Padmore’s mail.  This note, 
by itself, can be interpreted to mean the Governor was ultimately responsible for Special 
Branch’s continued censorship of Nkrumah’s mail.  Arden-Clarke had simply prepared official 
orders that exonerated his involvement and privately instructed the police to obscure their source 
in official documents, even those addressed to himself.   For example, in this particular case, 
Special Branch had explained their intelligence on Nkrumah’s continued contact with Padmore 
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to the administration in Accra by inventing a human source.  Their report to the Governor 
claimed that they had received the intelligence from “one of NKRUMAH’s closest associates”, 
adding that he “is a man in whom we have complete confidence.”   If the governor truly was 29
responsible, this was a remarkable example of obfuscation, misdirection, and invention.  Yet this 
thesis falls apart under the additional records of MI5’s review of this intelligence and its source. 
Special Branch’s discovery and the SLO’s explanation were later reviewed by Sir John 
Shaw, the head of MI5’s ‘OS’ Section.   It appear that during his visit to the Gold Coast to 
organize the LIC (in correction of Special Branch’s cynical reports), he also commented on the 
practicality of censorship in the colony as the the affair with Botsio’s letters from Berlin and 
Nkrumah’s discovery coincided with his trip.  On discovering Special Branch’s continued use of 
Source CHEST as Source SWIFT, Shaw wrote the following: 
Personally I think that SB were mad to operate [Source SWIFT] ‘against direct orders of 
Governor’.  Keenness on one’s job is a virtue, but excessive keenness, amounting to 
foolhardiness, is not.  When I was in the Gold Coast 14 months ago I strongly advised the 
Police to discontinue this practice then, in view of the legal position and the fact that the 
use of this source had already been discovered by local politicians.  I was not thinking 
only of local repercussions, either.  All in all, the game did not seem to be worth the 
candle.  30
If Governor Arden-Clarke was responsible for Source SWIFT, Shaw’s response would be 
peculiar for its sole emphasis on the Gold Coast Police.  Again, he notes that “SB were mad” to 
operate this source, and reiterates that he advised the Police to discontinue it.  There is no 
mention of the Governor, the Minister for Defence and External Affairs, or any other member of 
the administration.  Shaw’s note suggests that the police alone were responsible for Source 
SWIFT, committing themselves to another act of willful and illegal insubordination. 
The SLO for West Africa, P.M. Kirby Green, provides additional evidence that Special 
Branch censored mail without the knowledge of the Governor.  Two months after he had first 
shared Special Branch’s intelligence on Nkrumah and Padmore’s continuing correspondence, 
Kirby-Green provided further explanation for this intelligence directly to the Director-General of 
the Security Service.  Whereas others members of MI5 could comment only on the implications 
of this source and the manner it was presented, Kirby-Green was in the unique position of being 
able to explain the cause for Special Branch’s reckless disregard of the Governor’s order.  As 
MI5’s local representative, the SLO operated in a middle point between the administration, 
Police Special Branch, and the Security Service in London.  Perhaps given his position outside 
the administration or as a fellow intelligence officer, Special Branch had been forthcoming with 
the SLO regarding their motives.  His note to the Director-General explained that Special Branch 
was persuaded to take the “undoubted risk” of continuing to censor Nkrumah’s mail because the 
Minister of Government Business was still suspect and he surrounded himself with subversive 
councillors.  Without Source CHEST, they argued, British intelligence would be blind to this 
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situation.  For example, shortly after Source CHEST had been discovered by the CPP, the 
Security Service had surmised from their own letter intercepts in London that Padmore and 
Nkrumah had begun to communicate less frequently.  The Security Service had surmised that 
Nkrumah no longer identified with Padmore’s radical idealism, now faced with the practical 
concerns of managing affairs in the Gold Coast and remaining in power.  In MI5’s report, they 
supposed that Nkrumah “finds Padmore’s rigid political guidance not only inapposite, but 
irritating.”   Special Branch, however, disagreed with MI5’s conclusions.  They supposed that 31
Padmore’s influence on Nkrumah was as strong as ever; the Security Service had simply failed to 
detect their continued correspondence because Padmore had taken greater precaution with his 
mail.  Special Branch believed that censorship in the colony would be the only way to detect 
these communications and monitor what they supposed to be the most dangerous influence on 
Gold Coast politics.  Kirby-Green further explained that Special Branch felt compelled to 
continue Source CHEST because they feared the Governor, lacking the proper intelligence, 
“might be misled by the overt statements and actions of NKRUMAH”.  Supporting Special 
Branch in their decision, Kirby-Green concluded, “we have no reason to believe that 
NKRUMAH means what he says to His Excellency [the Governor] or in the Assembly, again 
indeed we know that he does not.”  32
These records make plain that Special Branch continued the illegal censorship of 
Nkrumah’s mail without the knowledge or support of the Governor.  When placed beside the 
events that caused the formation of the LIC, Special Branch’s actions are even clearer.  From the 
first months of transitional government in 1951, Special Branch set itself at odds with the 
administration.  Eventually, this led to a reorganization of security work that distanced Special 
Branch from intelligence analysis and reporting.  This had been an organizational solution that 
did nothing to address Special Branch’s concerns and further distanced the Police from the rest 
of the administration. It was during this same time that Source CHEST was discovered and the 
governor discontinued censorship.  To Special Branch, the affair with Source CHEST must have 
appeared as another example of the administration compromising the security of the colony for 
political expediency.  This is why the police directly ignored the governor’s order and continued 
an illegal intelligence operation. 
These events also raise unsettled questions regarding the British Security Service.  The 
SLO in Accra and the Security Service were both aware of Special Branch’s illegal operation of 
Source CHEST by the summer of 1952, nearly a year after the Governor’s personal undertaking 
to Nkrumah that censorship had ceased.  Yet Special Branch continued to collect intelligence in 
this manner and the Security Service was complicit in the deception to hide the original source.  
For example, in May 1953, Special Branch used Source SWIFT to acquire further intelligence on 
Nkrumah’s relationship with George Padmore.  Kirby-Green reported these findings to MI5 with 
their conclusion that Nkrumah had broken from Padmore and no longer sought his advice.  H. 
Loftus Brown of the ‘OS’ section responded to the SLO, noting that MI5’s surveillance of 
Padmore’s mail revealed an entirely different story.  The disagreement between these intelligence 
officers is unremarkable, but it is surprising that Special Branch continued to operate this source 
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without intervention from the SLO or the Security Service.  Rather than inform the governor, 
MI5’s representative in Accra quietly received, analyzed, and reported intelligence from an 
illegal and officially non-existent source.   The Head of ‘OS’ Section, Sir Shaw, had advised the 33
police against this source, appreciating the larger political context.  He concluded that the result 
of its discovery on local and potential metropolitan affairs made ‘the game not worth the candle’.  
Yet when Special Branch disagreed with Shaw’s counsel, the Security Service did not intervene. 
 The matter of Source CHEST reveals the disjointed nature of the Gold Coast’s 
intelligence network.  As originally envisioned, the coordination between MI5 and Police Special 
Branch was intended to prepare timely and valuable intelligence for the administration as it 
navigated the pressures of nationalist politics in the colony.  Instead, the political outlooks of the 
Police and the administration divided this work, leaving the Security Service in an awkward 
position.  In principle, they agreed with government’s decision that Source CHEST was too 
dangerous to pursue, but in practice, the value of this intelligence outweighed their misgivings.  
In the end, this resulted in an intelligence network where the administration was actively being 
deceived by its own officers and its advisors from the Security Service.  This deception resulted 
in the administration having access to sensitive intelligence that served their interest in Nkrumah 
and nationalist politics in the colony.  However, this came at the cost of the administration’s 
authority to govern.  The Security Service allowed Special Branch to dictate what policies were 
in the best interest of the colony.  Source SWIFT would not be the last time the Security Service 
failed the administration.   
The Curzon Affair 
Like the Gold Coast administration, the Security Service would realize that the advent of 
representative government would result in unexpected complications to intelligence work, 
particularly regarding Kwame Nkrumah.  The legislative elections had both freed Nkrumah from 
prison and made him the highest ranking elected officer in the Gold Coast government.  This 
increased Whitehall’s interest in the Minister of Government Business and it partly fell to MI5 to 
determine exactly what kind of man was leading the new government.  But because of his 
election, studying Nkrumah was not a simple security matter.  There were political dimensions 
that the Security Service was unable to recognize and would later struggle to address.  These 
struggles would not result any serious threat to the process of self-rule in the Gold Coast but 
would once again limit the colonial administration’s ability to direct affairs in the colony. 
MI5’s first struggle with the Gold Coast’s new political context arrived  in the summer of 
1951.  Lincoln University, Nkrumah’s alma mater, had awarded the Minister of Government 
Business an honorary degree and invited him to visit the campus in Pennsylvania.  Nkrumah 
accepted the invitation and the Secretary of State for the Colonies swiftly scheduled a two-week 
tour in the United States and the United Kingdom for Nkrumah and his chief political ally, Kojo 
Botsio, currently serving as the Minister of Education and Social Welfare.  The Secretary of state 
designed this tour to provide British and American policy-makers the opportunity to meet the 
men who would likely guide the Gold Coast to independence.  He also hoped to preempt similar 
invitations, expected by the Security Service, from “communist penetrated organizations” who 
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were equally interest to to meet and congratulate the leaders of the African nationalist movement 
after their electoral victory.   For the Security Service, Nkrumah’s trip was an opportunity to 34
reassess Nkrumah’s political ideology when British officials were most keenly concerned with it.  
Nkrumah’s association with the British Communist Party were well-documented, as was the 
socialist rhetoric he mobilized as a critic of the Gold Coast administration.  Yet, it was unclear to 
officials in London how imprisonment, leadership of a national party, and ascendancy in the new 
government had affected Nkrumah’s political aims.  No doubt Nkrumah’s behavior on the tour, 
properly followed by the Security Service directly, would provide answers to Whitehall’s 
questions; Nkrumah’s actions in the colony had certainly not provided any answers. 
Since his release from prison, Nkrumah had expressed conflicting indications of his 
political leanings.  Together, these contradictory signs made it impossible to determine exactly 
what kind of state Nkrumah envisioned for an independent Gold Coast, a position that 
exasperated intelligence officers locally and abroad.  On the one hand, in a printed message to 
the members of the Legislative Assembly, Nkrumah had paraphrased an extract from ‘A History 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’, a doctrinal handbook that had been commissioned 
by Stalin in 1935.  Nkrumah had also renewed his passport since his release from prison, making 
particular effort to ensure it was valid for all countries in Europe including the U.S.S.R.  On the 
other hand, Nkrumah at times tempered his communist associations and ideology.  After his 
release from prison, he had clarified to the local press that he was a Marxist Socialist, not a 
communist.  And during his first few days in the U.K. for the tour, he was quoted saying, “if the 
Western Democracies are prepared to give us what we want we shall not have to go elsewhere 
for it.”  These conflicting signs raised difficult questions for officials and intelligence officers 35
alike.  Was Nkrumah secretly an ally to the communist cause?  Was Nkrumah truly open to 
Western support and influence?  Was Nkrumah simply an opportunist, open to whichever side 
courted his attention the most ardently?  Commenting on ‘Nkrumah’s mind’ on the eve of the 
tour, the Director-General had concluded that “it is possible that he may be guided only by 
ambition, but the information now available is not sufficient to justify any forecast of his 
political evolution.”   This was a problem that MI5 aimed to solve as quickly as possible.   36
If the Security Service had any consolation in their uncertainty, it was the knowledge that 
that Nkrumah’s communist mentors were equally mystified by his political evolution.  Chief of 
these was the British Communist Party [BCP].  The BCP had been intimately involved with 
Nkrumah’s days in London before his return to the Gold Coast in 1947.  The party had given him 
personal instruction for his nationalist aspirations in colonial Africa while and financially 
supported his first political endeavors as an organizer of the West African National Secretariat.  
In some respects, the BCP had seen Nkrumah as one of their African pupils, expecting him to 
guide the Gold Coast out from imperialist exploitation and into the international fellowship of 
communist states.  His elevation to Minister of Government Business would have been the first 
clear sign of their hopes, if not for the absence of communist conviction in Nkrumah’s words and 
actions.  While the Security Service feared at Nkrumah’s passing allusions to communist 
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thought, the BCP feared the same statements demonstrated a dangerous flirtation with Western 
capitalism and imperialism.  
Like MI5, Nkrumah’s supporters in the BCP saw the tour as an opportunity to reassess 
Nkrumah’s position.  This hope pervaded the BCP’s African Sub Committee, who postponed 
their regular meetings to attend Nkrumah’s public speaking engagements and “if possible 
contribute to the discussion in a way that will show that collaboration with Imperialism leads to 
slavery and not to freedom.”   But Nkrumah also had his critics in the BCP.  These suspected 37
that Nkrumah had already sold over to the British and the Americans for the promise of financial 
assistance in Ghana’s future national projects, concluding that Nkrumah was only “a muddle-
headed chap”.   While the Security Service was privy to the BCP’s uncertainty and frustration, 38
this intelligence did not answer their own questions and only heightened their surveillance of 
Botsio and Nkrumah during the tour.  If Nkrumah had any troubling contact with communist 
elements, MI5 prepared to uncover them during the tour. 
Partly from this interest and also due to a tip from the Secret Intelligence Service, MI5 
began investigating a diamond dealer named Vaclav Curzon.  In April of 1951, Curzon had come 
to the attention of British intelligence by making discrete inquiries to locate a geological expert 
who could assist him in identifying ore samples from the Gold Coast.  Curzon had unknowingly 
confessed to an MI6 informant that he was operating as a technical adviser to the ‘newly 
appointed Prime Minister of the Gold Cast’ - Kwame Nkrumah.  When questioned why he did 
not use the geological facilities operated by the government in the Gold Coast, Curzon explained 
that he wanted to avoid the attention of British authorities.   Subsequent inquiries had shown 39
that Curzon was originally from Czechoslovakia but had become a naturalized British subject 
after WWII.  He had some past  business dealing in West Africa and currently held held mining 
rights to diamond fields in the Gold Coast.  In addition to his inquiries, Curzon’s Czech origins 
further raised MI5’s suspicions.  Czechoslovakia had fallen under communist rule in 1948 and 
the Security Service feared that Czech agents served as emissaries of Soviet intelligence 
throughout the African empire.  The Security Service was intent on discovering exactly what 
kind of association Nkrumah and Curzon shared and the tour promised them such an opportunity.  
Nkrumah had arranged to meet Curzon in London at the beginning of the tour.  MI5 knew both 
the date and location of the meeting and requested to use audio surveillance equipment, 
euphemistically referred to as ‘chairs’, but “the Foreign Office had not felt able to cooperate over 
this type of furniture at that place.”   Despite this setback, MI5 was able to surveil the meeting 40
and learn all that they hoped.  Curzon and Nkrumah would not prove to be communist 
subverters, but the intelligence MI5 did collect, though less threatening, would prove equally 
troublesome. 
Curzon was simply an illegal diamond seller and Nkrumah was his partner.  MI5 
discovered that the two men operated a diamond buying operation in the Gold Coast.  They 
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purchased stolen diamonds from African farmers who trespassed onto privately-owned diamond 
fields in Oda and the region between Nsuta and Takoradi. With his own mining rights in the Gold 
Coast, Curzon could collect, export, and sell these diamonds without raising suspicion.  The two 
men had collaborated once before, during Nkrumah’s brief tenure with the West African National 
Secretariat in London.  This scheme never materialized, but it appears that Curzon approached 
Nkrumah shortly after his release from prison in February 1951 with his latest scheme, and their 
latest collaboration had proved more fruitful. In the four months before Nkrumah’s tour, the two 
men had successfully traded five to six thousand carats of stolen diamonds from the Gold Coast.  
Most were small stones, measuring 1/20 carat, and of poor quality, but they would have netted a 
significant profit.  Their diamond interests had been the cause for their meeting in London. 
Nkrumah had brought with him a small quantity of diamonds so he could have them appraised in 
both the United Kingdom and the United States.  Nkrumah wondered if the diamonds might 
prove more profitable if sold abroad and was willing to expand the operation to the United States 
if profitable enough.  In brief, the Security Service had discovered that Nkrumah was not only 
involved in illegal diamond buying but was also using his first foreign trip as a representative of 
government to investigate expanding his criminal activities internationally.     41
Though not the revelation they had feared, the Security Service needed to determine why 
exactly Nkrumah had pursued this course and if these diamonds were finding their way to Iron 
Curtain countries.  Once again, their investigations revealed that Nkrumah did not have any 
secret communist ties.  “Nkrumah’s interest in diamonds,” they wrote, “is bound up with his 
plans to make the Gold Coast economically independent, and he wants to break the hold of de 
BEERS and the Banks on the diamond trade in order to secure the profits for the benefit of the 
Gold Coast.”   The Security Service also concluded that Nkrumah intended to “build up capital 42
with which to obtain the help of American industry, and partly to ‘buy’ American politicians, 
who can assist him with official economic aid.”   Simply, Nkrumah engaged in illegal diamond 43
buying as an act of anti-imperialist defiance and to curry political favour that would serve the 
independent state he intended to lead.  With no indication that the Minister of Government 
Business was using the same means to secure Soviet aid or that he continued to engage in such 
activities after June 1951, MI5 chose to take no action on this intelligence.  It was criminal 
activity but a far cry from a threat to the security of the realm.  Strangely though, the Security 
Service did not share this intelligence with its officer in Accra or the Gold Coast administration.  
While the motives for that decision are unclear, its consequences are plainly evident. 
MI5’s decision (or oversight) not to share Nkrumah’s I.D.B. activities created a political 
problem for the administration of the Gold Coast.  When it was first discovered in June 1951, 
this intelligence represented politically sensitive material of the highest order.  At the time of the 
tour, Nkrumah was the leading African politician in the colony and the figurehead of transitional 
government.  This information could have severely damaged Nkrumah’s position if made public.  
His critics in the opposition would have used it to challenge his leadership while critical 
elements in government, i.e. the police, would have attempted to use it as grounds to remove the 
Minister of Government Business from office.  This intelligence also had the potential to reshape 
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the administration’s relationship with Nkrumah.  Even if only known to Governor Arden-Clarke, 
the administration would have been far more cautious when working with and supporting 
Nkrumah.  But by the time MI5 informed its officer in Accra of Nkrumah’s activities in January 
1952, this intelligence had become even more dangerous.   
Six months after the tour, Nkrumah had been promoted to the position of Prime Minister.  
This had not been the administration’s original plan.  The first year of transitional government 
had proved difficult, not only integrating the new African ministers and the Legislative Assembly 
but also ensuring that the growing pains of the new state did not derail the transitional process.  
In September 1951, Nkrumah and the CPP had been under significant criticism from the 
opposition. They claimed that the CPP had abandoned the aim of ‘Self-Government Now’ due to 
the personal privileges that they enjoyed under the present government.   To quell this criticism, 44
Nkrumah had challenged every member of the Legislative Assembly to walk out from their 
offices if they had no confidence that the present government would not lead to self-rule and 
independence.  Nkrumah promised that he, the other representatives ministers, and the CPP 
would join them if they took his challenge.   It was only a bluff, and a successful one, but 
Nkrumah had gambled the state to deal with the opposition.   It was a moment that proved how 45
fragile the new state was and how that fragility was beyond the protection of the European 
administration.  Not long after, the CPP had begun questioning why Nkrumah was only afforded 
the title of Minister of Government Business and ranked below the ex-officio, European 
ministers in executive authority.  The CPP contended that Nkrumah was the leading official in 
the majority party and under the UK parliamentary system (that the present constitution 
modeled), he should be recognized as the Prime Minister and be second only to the governor.  
This sparked a political crisis for the administration, with both governors from the Gold Coast 
and Nigeria flying to London to discuss the matter with the Secretary of State and the cabinet.  
Following an emergency meeting, it was decided to honour the CPP’s request and protect the 
transitional government from potential agitation.   46
This dramatic shift for Nkrumah made the intelligence on his I.D.B. activities all the 
more damming.  Beyond any other point, Nkrumah had come to represent the transitional state.  
His criminal activity reflected on the entire administration.  Additionally, the government’s 
decision to elevate Nkrumah to Prime Minister effectively represented an endorsement from the 
highest offices in Accra and London; the administration had publicly, if not willingly, supported 
Nkrumah’s place at the head of government.  This meant that Nkrumah’s indiscretion with 
diamond buying could damage the administration and the entire transitional process.  The 
leadership of the police force had already expressed their discontent with the administration, 
believing the Governor to be guilty of grossest negligence in his duty to protect the peace and 
prosperity of the Gold Coast because of misplaced political aims.  It was easy to imagine how 
this intelligence would vindicate their fears and renew their criticisms.  By uncovering 
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Nkrumah’s criminal activities, the Security Service had produced a political quandary.  Failing to 
appreciate its political context, MI5 had allowed matters worsen.  Yet they still did not take this 
information to the Governor.  Instead, the matter was left to the SLO for the Gold Coast, P.M. 
Kirby Green. 
P.M. Kirby-Green first learned of Nkrumah’s diamond dealings in January of 1952.  He 
had investigated Nkrumah’s contacts with foreign businessmen, including Curzon, and inquired 
if the London office had any relevant information on these relationships.  The Security Service’s 
reply presented all the details of Nkrumah’s illegal diamond operation, to the extent that they had 
been reported six months earlier, including the areas of operation, Curzon’s role, and Nkrumah’s 
use of these diamonds to pursue his political objectives.  There was no new intelligence to report, 
yet the Director-General recognized that recent changes in the affairs of the Gold Coast 
demanded a decision - simply, did anyone need to know anything about it?  “You will 
appreciate,” the brief from MI5 headquarters concluded, “that this matter is one not properly to 
be dealt with by us.  It has criminal and/or political implications which, on the face of them, are 
not only of great potential delicacy but also are not really the business of the Security Service.”   47
MI5’s only suggestion to the SLO was to privately inform the Governor of these matters, with a 
special request that the Governor forbear sharing this information with the Gold Coast Police.  
Given Sir Shaw’s assistance with settling the problems with Special Branch’s ‘tone’ a few 
months earlier, MI5 was well informed of the possible repercussions of involving the Gold Coast 
Police.  Yet, it was left to Kirby-Green to decide what action, if any, should be taken. 
Remarkably, Kirby-Green decided not to inform the governor immediately, waiting 
several months after Nkrumah’s appointment to the office of Prime Minister.  In a telegram to the 
Director-General, explaining this decision, Kirby-Green revealed the myriad of ways that the 
Security Service was unprepared for the political complications of colonial intelligence work.  
Kirby-Green’s first defended his decision through the difficult position that the governor faced 
with Nkrumah and the CPP leadership.  He explained, “The fact is that Sir Charles [Arden-
Clarke] is gambling for very high stakes to keep NKRUMAH on the present lines and it looks 
now as if he may well succeed . . . In view of these matters of major political import, I felt 
unwilling to intrude with what is by comparison a very minor incident”.  Kirby-Green also felt 
that the criminal component of this intelligence was not a simple conclusion either.  “I am by no 
means sure,” he wrote, “that [this report], if true, could be termed morally criminal for an 
avowed Nationalist leader, even though the methods may be illegal at the moment.  The objects 
stated in [this report] seem on the contrary to be commendable for an African Nationalist who 
puts the welfare of the Gold Coast above that of H.M.G.”  Furthermore, Nkrumah and Curzon’s 
enterprise was comparatively insignificant against the total number of diamonds exported by 
Africans in the Gold Coast.  The SLO’s latest estimate held that African prospectors were 
responsible for exporting two-hundred thousand carats each month.  If Curzon and Nkrumah had 
only managed five to six thousand carats in five months, they were only adding half-a-percent to 
the trade.  Finally, Kirby-Green revealed what was perhaps the most import cause for his 
reticence.  He wrote, “I am not suggesting that H.E. [the Governor] should not be informed but I 
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would rather not do it myself at this stage, as above all, I do not want him to link me with the 
Police in his mind as one who is obsessed with the idea that NKRUMAH is no more than a 
cheap crook to be hunted.”   Special Branch opposition to representative government had 48
created a political rift, where even the SLO was anxious to share any intelligence that could be 
used against the Prime Minister. 
Kirby-Green held to his arguments and postponed informing the governor until a month 
later.  Governor Arden-Clarke agreed with the Security Service that the matter was closed, unless 
he added, Curzon continued to deal with “high political personages” in the colony.   It is unclear 49
if Nkrumah continued to engage in illicit diamond buying after 1951.  There is evidence that MI6 
reopened the investigation in the summer of 1952 because of unstated sources, but Security 
Service papers presently available are unavailable to reveal what came, if anything, of their 
inquiries. 
In the larger skein of Ghanaian history, Nkrumah’s potentially brief involvement in illicit 
diamond buying is unsurprising and unrevolutionary.  Kirby-Green himself noted that his actions 
were perfectly in-line with the attitudes of a professed nationalist who put African welfare before 
the laws of HMG (although the SLO did not air the possibility that Nkrumah’s motives might 
have rested on personal gain instead of idealism).  But reflected against the colonial 
administration’s efforts to expand their intelligence resources to the demands of the 
representative government, this episodes reveals the complications that constitutional transitions 
created and the limitations to the support that imperial intelligence provided to local 
administrators.  What is so remarkable about this episode is the frequency at which the 
administration was overlooked by the Security Service.  In addition to collecting and producing 
this intelligence, MI5 effectively decided the administration’s response by withholding this 
information.  On the part of the London office, this was likely an oversight because the 
intelligence itself lacked a security component.  The Security Service had been unable to 
appreciate how the political context in the Gold Coast might affect the value of this intelligence, 
perhaps shifting the administration’s support for Nkrumah.  On the part of the SLO, the matter is 
stranger still.  Kirby-Green actively opposed sharing this intelligence with the governor for fear 
of compromising his relationship with Arden-Clarke. The SLO feared that he would appear too 
much like the Police Special Branch in their repeated attempts to question the transitional 
government and label Nkrumah as a political agitator, unrestrained demigod, and unscrupulous 
criminal.  Special Branch had not only damaged their relationship with the administration but 
also made a critical outlook on African nationalism unacceptable in Gold Coast intelligence.  In 
brief, this affair demonstrates how the intelligence network between London and Accra was 
unprepared to circulate politically sensitive material.  It also questions if this network was truly 
intended to serve the interest of the colony or the metropole. 
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Chapter Four: Intelligence Work and Independence 
 In his landmark study of Ghanaian politics, Dennis Austin described the 1954 Legislative 
Elections as a “narrow gate” through which the country uncomfortably passed into the final years 
preceding independence.  That narrowness was the result of the several ways the second 
parliamentary elections challenged both colonial officials and nationalist parties to progress the 
experiment of self-rule.  This is perhaps most evident in the makeup of the assembly itself.  
While the first Legislative Assembly had provided the Gold Coast it’s first African-led 
legislative, the majority of its members had not been directly elected by their constituents.  Most 
had been nominated by territorial councils of traditional authorities, by foreign firms invested in 
the colony’s natural resources, or by Governor Arden-Clarke himself.  These had been provisions 
for a colonial system, charged with taking a tentative step towards self-rule.  By 1954, these 
provisions had all been withdrawn.  The 104 members second Legislative Elections would all 
owe their seats to the simple majority of their constituents.  These members were welcomed to 
fill ministerial posts that had been previously held by colonial officials, assuming nearly 
complete control of the operation of the state.  The only vestige of colonial rule was the 
continued presence of Governor Arden-Clarke, charged with the sole responsibility of working 
alongside Prime Minister Nkrumah until the expectedly short realization of independence, at 
which time he would pass the final responsibilities to the First Republic of Ghana.  1
 To some extent, the 1951 elections had simply served as a referendum on colonial rule.  
To vote for any candidate was an open support for the prospect of self-rule and the gradual series 
of reforms suggested by the colonial government.  While parties competed for votes and the 
prestige of organizing the Gold Coast’s first African government, these were modest contests 
compared to the unmitigated chaos precipitated by 1954.  These votes would decide which 
individuals and parties would guide the colonial state into Ghana’s First Republic, and with the 
abandonment of legislators nominated by traditional councils, each party had to transform itself 
from a nationalist party with limited regional representation into a national organization that 
aimed to represent the whole of the Ghanaian state.  These changes would have their own 
growing pains, particularly as rivals competed not only to secure local support in individual 
districts but also the official nomination from within their party.  These were fierce debates that 
produced equal conflict within and between the nationalist parties in 1954.  Despite these 
changes, in addition to the formation of new powerful regional parties like the Northern People’s 
Party, there was little that could unseat Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party 
from power.  The CPP secured 72 of the available seats, safely beyond two-thirds of the new 
assembly, their closest challenger being the NPP who won 15 seats and a cohort of independent 
candidates (“rebel candidates” to Kwame Nkrumah) who took an additional eleven.  The 1954 
Elections had settled beyond doubt that Nkrumah and the CPP would guide the country into 
independence. 
 Beyond the demands of organizing and directing a legislative contest of this scale in the 
Gold Coast, 1954 also marked the tipping point in the administration’s commitment to 
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dismantling the colonial state.  Under the new legislative assembly, Governor Arden-Clarke 
would only continue to manage the state’s affairs in matters of defense and foreign policy.  All 
other posts, formerly held by ex-officio colonial administrators, were passed to Ghanian 
ministers.  For the sake of this study, this meant that police intelligence remained isolated from 
African members of government, but the hope among Arden-Clarke and other liberal officials 
was that this would be a temporary situation.  Eventually, the responsibility for managing the 
police intelligence would pass to Ghanaian officials, and the sooner that transition occurred, the 
more training they could receive in these complex matters.  But this transition could not be 
finished quickly.  As this study has repeatedly shown, police intelligence consistently proved a 
delicate matter with the potential of upending the affairs of state.  Much of the worst had already 
passed but particularly here at the end of British rule, when the inevitability of independence was 
certain, police intelligence still had its own unique dangers.  It no longer threatened to undermine 
the experiment of self-rule, but it did have the potential of destroying any goodwill the United 
Kingdom hoped to build with the future Ghanaian state and of scuttling Britain’s designs for 
ongoing security. 
 In 1956, Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd pithily surmised the concerns that 
officials in Accra were balancing after the legislative elections.  Speaking of transitioning Special 
Branch operations to local members of government, he wrote, “the ultimate objective is to create 
a professional service, able to stand on its own feet when self-government is attained in meeting 
the intelligence needs of the territory and with which the United Kingdom Security Service can 
continue to liaison on the normal Commonwealth pattern. [emphasis mine]” .  As officials in 2
Accra would realize in 1954, with others throughout the empire to swiftly follow, police 
intelligence had outgrown its original purpose in defending the colonial state.  These resources 
had to be adapted to meet the future demands of independent governments and the groundwork 
had to be additionally laid for a Commonwealth intelligence network that would bind the United 
Kingdom to its former colonies.  Especially given the continued uncertainties of the Cold War, 
the UK required its empire-wide intelligence resources to maintain its previous global position, 
an objective not dissimilar from continued investments in African economies or treaties designed 
to provide preferential access to strategic resources pursued by Britain and France in coming 
decades.  Special Branch was now part of a post-colonial security vision one which raises 
uncertain questions about the fate of national security in Ghana, the most immediate being - can 
an effective independent domestic intelligence security organization be crafted from a colonial 
institution?  And second, can the transition from a colonial to national security regime be 
meaningfully achieved alongside a post-colonial objective of developing a commonwealth 
intelligence network.  In other words, would the future of Ghana’s domestic intelligence 
apparatus be compromised both by the legacies of the colonial state and by the preparations for 
the security of Great Britain in the post-colonial world? 
 This chapter is the concluding study of police intelligence in the Gold Coast.  It operates 
within the clear limits created by the the 1954 legislative elections and 6th March, 1957.  Within 
this time frame, it considers how British and Ghanaian officials understood the purpose of the 
local police intelligence for the future of independent Ghana and the post-colonial world of the 
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United Kingdom.  It examines how Special Branch was transformed and if it was truly prepared 
to become an effective, independent institution in the First Republic of Ghana.  These were 
issues that sparked frequent debates between Whitehall, Government House in Accra, the 
Security Service, the Special Branch itself.  These debates and their resolution reveal the ultimate 
priorities and meaning of Gold Coast’s nine-year experiment with police intelligence. 
Africanizing Intelligence Work 
 As Lennox-Boyd had described, the objectives after the 1954 Elections were to create a 
professional intelligence service that could both stand on its own and liaise with the British 
Security Service after independence.  Broadly speaking, these two objectives required 
‘Africanizing’ Special Branch and police intelligence, a term local and metropolitan officials 
used to describe the inclusion of Ghanaian personnel at every stage of government intelligence 
work.  This process had two chief targets.  First, representative ministers had to be transformed 
into intelligence consumers, with both the experience to process intelligence material and the 
knowledge of how to direct Special Branch operations.  The second target was Special Branch 
itself.  Since its reorganization in 1948, Special Branch had almost entirely consisted of 
European personnel.  None were expected to remain in the Gold Coast for long past 1954, let 
alone continue working for the Ghanaian Republic after independence.  The continued operation 
of Special Branch required that Ghanaian police officers be immediately trained in intelligence 
work and given as much time as possible to work within the unit before inevitable reassignments 
and retirements drained its institutional memory.  Though critical, neither of these transitions 
entirely succeeded due to unanticipated complications arising from local and metropolitan 
interests.   In many ways, the Ghanian state inherited an intelligence network trapped in its 
colonial origins that it was further unprepared to operate. 
 Between the two task described above, introducing Ghanian ministers to intelligence 
work assumed the obvious priority.  Governor Arden-Clarke clearly stated this at a meeting of 
the Local Intelligence Committee in May 1953.  The meeting’s purpose had been to review 
Special Branch’s budget and the expected costs of preparing the unit for independence.  To cap 
this discussion, Arden-Clarke argued that all these details indicated first that representative 
ministers needed to begin receiving LIC notes - how else could they be expected to authorize any 
increase in police expenditure for intelligence work if they were completely unaware of it?  The 
governor also reminded the LIC that the eventual purpose of self-rule was to prepare Ghanian 
ministers to assume full control of the government; despite the security concerns with their 
politics and associates, this aim could not be achieved if representative ministers continued to be 
excluded from intelligence and security matters.   This proposal produced expected reticence 3
from Special Branch and the Security Liaison Officer [SLO] who both anticipated this new 
policy would compromise secret intelligence information, but the Governor received 
overwhelming support from authorities in London.  The Colonial Secretary called it an 
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“imaginative experiment” and wished the Governor the greatest luck with his “bold and shrewd” 
initiative.  4
 Before implementing this plan, Governor Arden-Clarke also presented his plan to Prime 
Minister Kwame Nkrumah.  The Colonial Secretary had provided his unwavering support but he 
was likely unaware of the distressing frequency with which cabinet matters leaked in the Gold 
Coast.  If the cabinet could not be expected to exercise discretion with rudimentary government 
business, what could they expect if they were introduced to secret intelligence information?  
Nkrumah supported the Governor’s apprehensions and agreed it was “unwise” to share 
intelligence matters with the entire cabinet at that time.  Instead, the two decided that only the 
Prime Minister’s office would begin receiving reports from the LIC and that following the 
ratification of the new constitution in 1954, three more representative ministers, constituting an 
Advisory Committee on Defense and External Affairs, would be included as well.  It was a 
limited implementation of the Governor’s plan, yet by including Nkrumah in these deliberations, 
Arden-Clarke demonstrated the sincerity of his commitment to expanding security matters 
beyond the confines of the colonial administration.  5
 Despite the Governor’s caution, even this limited plan was plagued with problems and 
failures.  Within weeks after receiving LIC notes, Nkrumah requested that he be removed from 
their regular distribution list.  Nkrumah would not explain his reasons to the Governor, saying 
that “it is only because of  his [the Governor’s] insistence that he continues to receive them.”  
Arden-Clarke surmised that Nkrumah’s reticence stemmed from “his dislike of facing unpleasant 
facts which do not accord with the wishful thinking in which he is prone to indulge.”   This is a 6
plausible explanation, particular if the LIC’s reporting presented sobering predictions for the 
Gold Coast’s finances or the state of it’s politics.  There is another possible explanation for the 7
Prime Minister’s reticence.  After implementing the Governor’s orders, the LIC took peculiar 
precautions when sharing their notes with the Prime Minister’s office.  Instead of simply 
delivering the reports to the Prime Minister’s office as was done with other officials on the 
regular distribution list, a member of the LIC personally delivered a copy of the weekly report to 
Nkrumah.  This officer would then “stand over” the Prime Minister as he read the report and 
promptly remove it when he was finished.  This copy would not leave the committee member’s 
sight and most especially, it would never be left in Nkrumah’s possession unattended.   This 8
protocol directly countered Governor Arden-Clarke’s original intention.  Whereas he had 
included Nkrumah in discussions of document security and affirmed his trust in him by 
recommending he begin receiving the weekly intelligence summaries, the LIC’s precautions 
suggested that the rest of the government’s intelligence network  viewed Nkrumah as a potential 
compromise to that system.  Even from the office of the Prime Minister, Nkrumah was forcefully 
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reminded that officers in the government bore deep suspicions toward him and felt he could not 
be trusted with the state. 
 Of the peculiar affairs described so far regarding intelligence work and self-rule in the 
Gold Coast, this particular instance deserves further attention for the potential consequences it 
had for the future Ghanaian state.  Since his return to the Gold Coast in 1947, Nkrumah had been 
immediately placed at the center of security and intelligence operations within British West 
Africa.  His departure from the U.K. had been monitored by the Security Service and his arrival 
in the Gold Coast had sparked widespread fears of an eminent, communist plot against colonial 
rule.  In the years that followed 1948, Nkrumah was repeatedly made aware of the position he 
occupied and the special animosity the police force carried toward him.  By the governor’s own 
admission, Special Branch had surveilled his correspondences as an elected representative of the 
Ghanaian state.  These intrusions undoubtedly raised Nkrumah’s concerns in Special Branch but 
before 1953, there had been an institutional divide separating the police from the larger 
bureaucracy of government.  In countless instances, Governor Arden-Clarke affirmed his trust in 
Nkrumah and the administration’s commitment to support his leadership towards an independent 
Ghanian state.  Yet, Nkrumah’s first encounters with the larger apparatus of government 
intelligence, with the officials responsible for analyzing intelligence and subsequently shaping 
government policy, had revealed these suspicions went much higher than the police.  The LIC’s 
decision to singularly and blatantly monitor Nkrumah’s access to intelligence material signaled 
that the entire system of government intelligence was a political affair.  Indeed, if Arden-Clarke’s 
original purpose had been to train representative ministers in the operation of intelligence work, 
it had only succeeded in planting a seed of paranoia for Prime Minister Nkrumah.  It had taught 
him that despite his office at head of the state, members of government could restrict and 
manipulate his access to intelligence.  While the LIC pursued this policy in the interest of 
protecting their intelligence material, Nkrumah was not given the liberty of that explanation and 
might naturally have suspected their ‘precautions’ were only all too similar to the police’s 
continued antagonism towards his office and nationalist aspirations.  
 These suspicions unfortunately impacted more than the delivery of Nkrumah’s weekly 
reports.  Upon receiving the governor’s request to include Nkrumah on the distribution list for 
the Weekly Intelligence Report [WIR], various members of the LIC suggested that there was 
some information that would prove too sensitive even for Prime Minister at that time.  They 
proposed that such information be removed from the WIR and submitted separately to the 
Governor as a Special Intelligence Report.  This would not be a regular occurrence they decided, 
only used “as and when necessary”.  The governor accepted this proposal, aware that he was 
already severely challenging Special Branch and the SLO by including Nkrumah in such matters.   
After this meeting, though, other recipients of the WIR requested that they too would receive 
copies of these special reports.  Quickly, the entirety of the original distribution list of the WIR 
were recipients of the WIR and their special addenda, allowing the LIC to remove all material 
that could reasonably be qualified as “intelligence”.  The recalcitrant members of the LIC had 
found a way to honor the letter of the Governor’s initiative, to distribute the WIR to the Prime 
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Minister’s office, but had entirely transgressed its spirit by making ensuring it had no intelligence 
material whatsoever.  9
 Before this time, the LIC had consistently supported the Governor’s vision for security 
and intelligence matters in the Gold Coast.  In fact, the LIC had been created especially so the 
Governor could mediate Special Branch’s snide criticism of nationalist politicians and the 
experiment of self-rule.  This divergence in 1953 owed to the fact that the LIC’s chairman, the 
Minister of Defense and External Affairs, Norton Jones, was absent from the Gold Coast at the 
time of this new policy.  The Commissioner of Police and the SLO appear to have used this 
opportunity to push through the new policy, trusting that neither chairman’s acting representative 
nor the governor would recognize the implications of this new system or its dangers.  It would 
only be a limited victory as on his return to the Gold Coast, Jones immediately sought the 
governor’s authority to discontinue special intelligence reports and for all copies, saving those at 
Government House, to be destroyed.   If Nkrumah chanced upon one of these special reports, 10
Jones feared tea administration would face another political crisis with the Prime Minister 
questioning the governor’s sincerity to include representative ministers in security matters.  
Likewise, the LIC’s special intelligence reports had the potential to mislead metropolitan 
officials on local affairs.  As officials at the Colonial Office in London had received some of 
these short-lived reports, Arden-Clarke was later warned them not to “assume that I am 
necessarily always in general agreement with a report . . . [they] are apt to get things out of 
perspective and sometimes paint an exaggerated picture”.   Much like the events that had 11
originally created the LIC, the Chairman’s brief absence from the Gold Coast had allowed 
various conservative elements in the Government’s intelligence apparatus to subvert the official 
policy of the administration and create a contradictory portrait of self-rule in the Gold Coast. 
 This affair expectantly lead to an institutional confrontation between the minister of 
Defense and External Affairs, the Commissioner of Police, and the SLO.  At a brief meeting with 
the SLO, P.M. Kirby Green, Jones asked him to explain the pitiful state of the WIR and the cause 
for their complete lack of intelligence material.  Jones obliquely observed to the SLO “that the 
contents of the W.I.R. would indicate to a reasonable man that either the Special Branch Officers 
were producing almost worthless information and, in consequence, did not justify the public 
expenditure of large funds, or that the real information was not being disclosed.”   He likewise 12
many similar suggestions to the Commissioner of Police.  Both were affronted by Jones’ 
insinuations and defended that their efforts had been a necessary precaution to the unreasonable 
situation created by the Governor.  The SLO was particularly bitter in his complaint, arguing that 
the Governor’s desire to share WIR with Nkrumah had placed the LIC in an impossible position.  
In the SLO’s view, the LIC reports were designed so that the Governor, fully appraised of matters 
in the colony, could ensure the security of the state.  However the WIR could not fulfill this 
original, primary purpose and additionally educate the Prime Minister regarding the importance 
of regular intelligence reporting.  It was impossible, the SLO argued, for the LIC to prepare an 
effective intelligence report for the governor that was sufficiently secured against the risks 
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presented by Prime Minister Nkrumah.  Two separate reports was the only means of 
accomplishing both tasks. Taking more forceful ground, the Kirby-Green also mobilized his 
position within the British Security Service to badger his point further.  He wrote, “It is also my 
duty to inform you that I am responsible to my Director-General for the protection of all sources 
of secret intelligence operated by and under the control of the Security Service, and in this 
connection is is also my duty to point out that the Prime Minister is not considered at this stage 
to be a person to whom these secrets can be disclosed.”   The Commissioner of Police similarly 13
defended their actions, stating that it was inevitable that Nkrumah would abuse secret 
intelligence sources, if not in the protection of his allies then in pursuit of his own political 
ends.    14
 To the chagrin of the governor and the Chairman of the LIC, the anxieties of the SLO and 
the Commissioner of Police were not without merit.  Within weeks of sharing security reports 
with the Prime Minister’s office, Nkrumah had purposefully compromised government 
intelligence material.  It was originally believed that a collection of secret papers had been stolen 
from the Prime Minister’s office.  Naturally, some assumed that Nkrumah had given the papers 
to someone, rather than the more innocent but equally damming explanation that they had been 
left in a “stealable condition”.   In September, Nkrumah confessed that he had in fact knowingly 15
copied an extract from an intelligence report and shared it with an individual under investigation.  
He assured the permanent secretary of the MDEA that he would not make a similar oversight in 
the future, though the rest of the LIC likely were unconvinced by Nkrumah’s promise.   Under 16
these circumstances, the LIC was poised to clash repeatedly throughout the following months, 
debating whether to reinstate special intelligence reports or whether the governor should 
withhold the WIR from the Prime Minister in specific instances.   
 As these debates continued over the summer of 1953, both sides developed two 
contradictory discourses for understanding the present situation and their own propositions.  For 
the Police and the SLO, the dispute rested in a matter of policy and security views.  They argued 
that Governor and Minister of Defense were approaching the matter from a policy view, which 
subsequently left them blind to the real concerns that were reaching Special Branch through its 
intelligence sources.  On the other hand, the MDEA understood the situation as between the short 
and long term security interests of the Gold Coast.  They saw the SLO and Special Branch’s 
qualms as a short-sighted commitment to colonial security matters, overlooking the potentially 
disastrous consequences for Britain’s future interests in West Africa and the stability of the 
Ghanaian state.  In a memo from within the MDEA, an unknown secretary articulated these 
points clearly.  He observed that the Prime Minister, along with all of the Representative 
Ministers, generally dismissed British fears in the “Communist danger”.  He did not disagree 
with Special Branch that there were disconcerting contacts between communist elements abroad 
and local organizations but was concerned that refusing to share the underlying intelligence that 
demonstrated those connections would leave Ghanian ministers indifferent to a tangible threat.  
This memo also noted their qualms over withholding information from the prime minister went 
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far beyond the calculation of politics.   This secretary pointed out that legally, the Commissioner 
and SLO held no ground for withholding intelligence from Prime Minister as an executive 
officer of the state.  He summarized his arguments, writing “if the Prime Minister is really a 
Prime Minister he is entitled to see reports like this, and to withhold such information from him 
is not only dangerous in the long-term Commonwealth interest but indeed dishonest.”   17
 As had happened three years earlier before the organization of the LIC , the 
administration found itself divided on security matters and those divisions arose from personal 
opinions of Kwame Nkrumah, nationalist politics, and the trajectory of self-rule.  In 1951, those 
divisions had not been fundamentally addressed or corrected and they were again not be 
addressed here.  After the setbacks of introducing intelligence material to representative 
ministers, Governor Arden-Clarke sought a compromise that would satisfy the concerns of the 
SLO and Special Branch while allowing a limited application of his original initiative to survive.  
The structure of weekly reports supplemented with secret addendum was not in itself a 
permanent solution yet it provided the foundation for the resulting compromise suggested by the 
governor.  At a meeting of the colony’s CENSEC [central security council], Arden-Clarke 
proposed that the LIC discontinue its regular, weekly reports entirely.  The LIC would still meet 
and confer weekly but their preliminary assessments would no longer be written.  Instead, the 
chairman of the LIC would offer an oral report directly to the Governor following the meeting.  
What information he deemed necessary, Arden-Clarke would in turn relay to the Prime Minister.  
Finally, at the close of the month, the LIC would produce a written Monthly Intelligence Report 
for distribution among the same list of local and metropolitan officials who had previously 
received intelligence notes.  This included Prime Minister Nkrumah.  The Governor reasoned 
this delay between written reports would allow the LIC to record and report valuable intelligence 
material for the Prime Minister, and other representative ministers in the future, without 
unnecessarily threatening Special Branch’s sources.  The police could procure additional sources 
to corroborate individual details from their weekly meetings so that if any of these monthly 
reports were compromised, it would be harder to identify individual sources.  The proposal was 
accepted and this revised reporting structure remained in place until the end of British rule.  18
 In all of the Government’s debates over this revised reporting structure, this is no account 
of how Prime Minister Nkrumah was appraised of these changes or what explanation, if any, he 
was given for them.  Nkrumah certainly would have noticed the diminishing content of the 
weekly intelligence reports in the short time that he received them.  Likewise, he also would 
have noticed the sudden end to the weekly intelligence papers while the Ministry of Defense and 
the governor debated the longterm consequences of the Special Intelligence Reports.  When 
finally introduced to the monthly reporting structure, it would not have been unreasonable for 
Nkrumah to rightly assume that he had been the cause of these sudden and erratic changes.  They 
evidenced that members of the government did not fully trust him and that even in his office as 
Prime Minister, those opposed to his political views or leadership could withhold intelligence 
without his knowledge.  Governor Arden-Clarke’s original intent had been to introduce 
representative ministers to intelligence matters and train them in its utility, but it’s lasting impact 
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would be to undermine the necessary and mutual confidence that needed to exist between the 
Prime Minister and his intelligence agencies.  British officials in the Gold Coast and the London 
would not realize how poorly these efforts had backfired until the first years of Nkrumah’s rule 
in independent Ghana, though they were already in evidence in the finally months of British rule. 
 In December of 1956, Nkrumah submitted an unusual proposal regarding intelligence and 
security matters in the Gold Coast and their future operation in independent Ghana.  In the 
previous year, he had been introduced to the SLO and the Security Service’s proposed plan for 
continued security liaison between the UK and Ghana.  That plan had included recommendations 
that Ghana retain Special Branch as its domestic intelligence agency and all other intelligence 
structures such as the LIC.  The SLO also advised that the Ghanaian state should forbear from 
the expensive venture to develop its own external intelligence agency; whatever intelligence the 
new state might need on foreign affairs, he assured, the Security Service could be depended on to 
provide.   Nkrumah’s entirely rejected this plan.   He wished instead bring the ‘the Secret 19
Service’, meaning all intelligence resources in the country, directly under the control of the 
Prime Minister’s office.  This would involve removing Special Branch from the larger police 
force and making it an executive agency which he would direct.  The Prime Minister would also 
assume the chairmanship of the LIC, giving him direct access to all intelligence provided by the 
SLO and giving him a direct hand in shaping intelligence assessments.  These changes would be 
attended by a significant increase in Special Branch’s which Nkrumah wished to increase from 
£10,000 to £50,000 per year.   If it proved too difficult or disruptive to alter these agencies, 20
Nkrumah was also prepared to create a new intelligence organization.  In short, Nkrumah wanted 
to personally control every aspect of intelligence work and ensure that the new Ghanaian state 
relied on intelligence work far more than its colonial predecessor. 
 For British officials, Nkrumah’s plans were unacceptable for the ways it compromised the 
existing system and Britain’s expectations for security liaison after independence.  Immediately, 
the Commissioner of the Police, the LIC, and the SLO set to work dissuading Nkrumah from this 
proposal, primarily by identifying the several pitfalls of this new intelligence structure.  Most 
concerning for these officials was Nkrumah’s desire to bring intelligence collection and 
assessment directly under his control.  This change would weaken the Police Force and create a 
dangerous possibility that intelligence material was unwittingly altered to fit the Prime Minister’s 
expectations.  With the distance that currently existed between the executive and intelligence 
assessment, they argued, the LIC was free to consider the full implications of collected material 
and arrive at potentially unpopular conclusions.  With the prime minister as the head of the LIC 
however, they feared that “there would be a greater - and very dangerous - tendency to only 
provide information estimated as being palatable to the Prime Minister, and to suppress or ignore 
information which it was considered to be unwelcome.”   They also observed that these new 21
duties for intelligence operations and assessment would overwhelm his office, causing his entire 
portfolio to suffer.  Finally, and most importantly, they argued that distance between the Prime 
Minister, his intelligence officials, provided necessary political protection.  If the Prime Minister 
brought Special Branch or a new intelligence agency under his office, opposition members 
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would have ample cause to accuse Government of creating and using ‘political spies’.   None of 22
these officials acknowledged the irony that Special branch for the last nine years had operated 
exactly as a ‘political spies’ and had only avoided such claims from nationalist critics by 
ensuring that Special Branch’s work, if not its existence, remained outside public knowledge.   
 These several suggestions from the LIC and its membership focused on the efficacy and 
ramifications of Nkrumah’s plan but they failed to recognize the central fear that motivated them.  
As the Governor pointed out to the LIC, Nkrumah was not chiefly concerned with the efficacy of 
intelligence work or even the nature of intelligence liaison with Great Britain after independence.  
Arden-Clarke explained that “the P.M. requires assurances that he will have access to all the 
information at present available to the Governor, when the responsibility for internal security 
passes to him as head of the government of Ghana.”    Nkrumah’s revised plan for intelligence 23
work was the result of the years which he had been placed at the distant end of the state’s 
intelligence structures.  Since 1953, he had nominally been a recipient of the government’s 
intelligence material but he had witnessed repeatedly how that information been withheld from 
him in various ways.  The reduction of the WIR and their discontinuance entirely, demonstrated 
to Nkrumah how easily he and his office could be dismissed by Special Branch and the LIC.  His 
proposals were simply assurances to ensure that such a situation could not be continued after 
independence.  Unable to entirely assuage these fears, given that they were responsible for them, 
colonial officials agreed to implement an aspect of Nkrumah’s proposal - for the final months of 
British Rule, Nkrumah served as the chairman of the LIC replacing the Minister of Interior who 
had been slated for the position.  Nkrumah would not directly control all intelligence matters but 
he would oversee all assessment.  24
 Since 1953, Governor Arden-Clarke had attempted to introduce representative ministers 
to intelligence work, ensuring they understood the role of intelligence in government policy-
making and how to direct an institution such as Special Branch.  Although not recognized at the 
time, these attempts were an unmitigated failure.  Arden-Clarke’s caution and the suspicions of 
the LIC resulted in Nkrumah alone gaining any substantive experience in intelligence matters 
while the rest of Government remained ignorant of Special Branch.  Even a year after the second 
Legislative Elections of 1954, a representative minister asked a colonial official if he knew 
anything of the “police intelligence service”.  He did not even know Special Branch’s name, let 
alone their exact duties.  In this case, the British official decided to preserve that uncertainty by 
pretending he knew nothing on the matter.   Special Branch had been treated too long a s secret 25
of colonial officials that should be deliberately withheld from Ghanaian both within and without 
government.  In addition to filing to address the general ignorance surrounding Police 
Intelligence, Governor Arden-Clarke’s efforts served to inspire suspicion instead of providing 
real experience with intelligence and security matters.  Nkrumah approached independence with 
the conviction that intelligence was inherently a political tool, a tool he himself would have to 
manage to prevent to potential rivals in government from using against him.  The evidence of 
those fears was born out by his plan in 1956 and his actions after under Ghana’s First Republic. 
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 In a cabinet meeting of the independent government in June 1958, Nkrumah began 
implementing the original plan he proposed to British officials in 1957.  The meetings of this 
minute read that Nkrumah “had observed in the other African Independent States, the Special 
Branch of the Police dealing with internal security should be attached directly to the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet so that the Government would be continuously informed of what was 
going on in the country.  He stated that he would, on the following day, meet the Commissioner 
of Police and the Minister of the Interior to discuss the matter.”  In the months that followed, 
Special Branch was attached to the Prime Minister’s office and Nkrumah fulfilled his other aim 
of creating a secondary security service that operated entirely under his direction.  Taken on their 
own, these actions could be seen as evidence of Nkrumah’s autocratic tendencies, contributing to 
debates that Nkrumah had originally and purposefully envisioned an independent Ghanaian state 
to serve as the extension of his own personal authority.   Placed alongside the history of his 
experiences with Special Branch as critic of government and his ‘training’ in security matters as 
Prime Minister, it is natural that Nkrumah would take these precautions, have repeatedly 
witnessed how intelligence institutions did not effectively operate in the interests of national 
security alone.  In nearly every situation, Nkrumah had encountered government intelligence as a 
political tool that the state mobilized against its critics and against factions within the 
administration it did not trust.  Nkrumah abuse of intelligence and security resources as the 
Prime Minister and President of independent Ghana only replicated practices he had witnessed 
under colonial rule and were trained to expect as necessary.  
‘Africanising’ Special Branch 
 After 1954, one of the colonial government’s immediate priorities for security matters 
was to ensure that Special Branch itself was sufficiently “Africanised” to ensure its work would 
continue after independence.  This was an entirely new demand for Special Branch, more so than 
countless other bureaucracies in the colonial administration.  When first organized in 1948, 
Special Branch consisted of seven Police Superintendents and three secretaries.  In the case of 
the secretaries, the Commissioner of Police specifically noted that these three should be female 
and European.  Such racial distinction was unnecessary with the police officers; at the time 
Ghanaian officers hardly achieved the rank of superintendent.  It was not a deliberate racial bar 
but effectively meant that the foundation of intelligence would be accomplished by British 
officers.  Given the precaution surrounding police intelligence, inventories and yearly reviews of 
the Police Force did not include specific details about the Special Branch, making it impossible 
to perfectly trace the identity and makeup of most of its officers, except for limited records from 
1953 moving forward.  These records establish that intelligence work, from Special Branch and 
the SLO were consistently restricted to European personnel or African personnel were frequently 
limited. 
 The most glaring example of the racial restrictions in Police Intelligence work comes 
from the office of MI5’s SLO.  In 1953, the Accra Evening News ran an article asking the 
Minister of Defense and External Affairs to name the Security Service officer stationed at 
Gifford Camp, Accra’s military base and to explain why his staff consisted entirely of Europeans.  
Leveling a more particular charge, the article also asked the minister to account for “the causes 
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of the frequent dismissals of poor illiterate messengers since the office was established”.  The 
articles clear concern was that Government had been committed to a program of Africanization 
for several years and yet this particular office, managed by the Security Service, seemed 
remarkably resistant to employing Africans.  It is unclear if the Government respond to this 
article yet the SLO for West Africa, Kirby-Green, nevertheless provided the minister an 
description of his staff and directions on how he might respond to the article.  Kirby-Green’s 
(attempted) defense of these charges began by noting that his office had employed five Africans 
as office orderlies, two having left at their request, one at his discharge from the army, one 
discharged for incompetence, and the final still employed by the SLO.  He continued “the duties 
of these men are extremely light, being to sweep and generally keep clean our very small office 
accommodation - a task that normally takes about hour.  For the rest they tend and keep tidy the 
small garden surrounding the office and take letters to the Post Office.”  He concluded, “the 
S.L.O. has always looked after their welfare, granted the inevitable loans, and generally looked 
after them and with the one exception they have all tended to become office mascots!”   As far 26
as the Security Service was concerned, intelligence operation in the Gold Coast did not require 
Africa officers to execute their duties and they maintained the same patronizing and paternalistic 
perspectives that had ended MI5’s efforts in West Africa after the Second World War (see chapter 
two). 
 Although Special Branch had begun with the presumption that only Europeans should be 
engaged with executing this work, the unit made some efforts to recruit and train Ghanaian 
personnel as intelligence officers in the year following 1948.  This fact is established by a review 
of Special Branch executed by A.M. McDonald, an MI5 officer attached to the colonial office as 
a Security Intelligence Adviser, in 1954.  This review was made with deliberate attention to the 
colony’s needs during the final years of colonial rule and the expectant requirements of the 
independent state.  Personnel were expectantly the focal point of such estimations.  McDonald’s 
report reveals that Special Branch’s organization had shrunk from seven officers in 1948 to only  
five officers in 1955.  British police officers, particularly those trained intelligence work, were in 
high demand across the empire as other anti-colonial crises resulted in numerous Special 
Branches being formed or expanded.  Likewise, that decline owed to the Gold Coast’s progress 
towards independence.  Few British officers welcomed the prospect of working for an 
independent African government and in turn, there was uncertainty if the new state would even 
welcome their experience.  All the better to secure a lateral promotion to another territory rather 
than risk the uncertain prospects of a European police officer in an independent African nation.  
Perhaps from these loses of British officers, Special Branch’s five officers included three 
Ghanaians.  McDonald met with one of these officers and was impressed by “his obvious good 
calibre and general ability”.  Despite this development, McDonald perceived a unit in decline.  
Police intelligence was weakening both from its loss of officers but the general deficiencies in 
the larger police force - as the force itself was diminished, Special Branch lost their dedicated 
source for general information across the colony.  In 1955, Special Branch’s police contacts for 
the whole of the Gold Coast only consisted of four inspectors, nine sergeants, ten corporals, and 
forty-one constables.  There were obvious gaps in Special Branch’s coverage in the colony.  Of 
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the Gold Coast’s seven regions, Special Branch lacked officers in the central province and 
northern territories, in each case relying on only a handful of constables and sergeants to identify 
and relay relevant material.  Special Branch had always held an extraordinary concern in 
political intelligence, which was overwhelmingly based in Accra and Kumasi, but as a colony-
wide organization or in preparation for becoming a national intelligence operation, they fell far 
short and there was little hope of correcting that.  As McDonald observed, “during the present 
transition period personnel and administrative problems are such that its Ould be of little utility 
to embark on any extensive re-organisation.”   Special Branch and police intelligence was to be 27
left as it was while the administration worked to slow its attrition through the recruitment of 
more African officers. 
 The colonial administration in Accra would discover in the years to follow that there were 
extraordinary barriers to recruiting additional African officers to Special Branch.  There were 
undoubtedly enough interested candidates looking for employment in the Police Force, but 
Special Branch had always had particular requirements for officers bearing the correct 
“temperament” or sufficient “calibre” to qualify for intelligence work.  Additionally, the Gold 
Coast lacked the capabilities to train intelligence officers on their own, at least to sufficient 
degree that the LIC and the larger administration administration considered them capable.  For 
example, of the three African officers in Special Branch at the time of McDonald’s report, the 
Security Intelligence Adviser appraised them as “working satisfactorily”.   The chairman of the 28
LIC was deeply concerned with even this lukewarm approval.  Speaking of all five of Special 
Branch’s officers, the chairman considered that only one of these (a British officer) had “any real 
aptitude for S.B. work and I do not consider that he has the experience or ability which would 
enable him to take effective charge of the branch . . . it will be a sad state if one of the five has to 
take charge.”   Since 1948, authorities in the Gold Coast had relied on programs in London to 29
train the skilled officers they needed, especially for Special Branch work.  But from 1953 
onwards, when British officers were retiring in mass or accepting lateral recruitments to other 
colonies, the Gold Coast had been unable to secure Special Branch training for its African 
officers. 
 Much like the unofficial color bar that had existed for Special Branch officers at the unit’s 
creation in 1948, police intelligence training programs in London likewise blocked African 
recruits.  Intelligence training programs were directed by the British Security Service which 
required that potential applicants should be limited to the Officer in Charge of the Branch or an 
officer standing at least at the rank of Assistant Superintendent.  Even as late of 1956, the Gold 
Coast did not have Ghanaian officers at this rank despite the constant bleed of British officers.  
Governor Arden-Clarke was concerned by this problem reflected the narrow way that the 
Security Service still understood Special Branch units and matters of colonial security.  These 
restrictions accommodated territories still firmly placed in the maintenance of colonial rule but 
were out-of-step with the demands of a colony such as the Gold Coast where independence was 
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both certain and eminent.  In January 1956, Arden-Clarke nominated three British officers for 
MI5’s next special Branch training, but added “I am unable to nominate an African officer on this 
occasion as there is no such officer of sufficient seniority, but I assume there is no objective in 
principle to the acceptance of suitability qualified African officers for this course on this or any 
future occasion.”   As Arden-Clarke was to discover, the Security Service did indeed object in 30
principle to training African officers for intelligence work, though not for the reasons the 
Governor of any official in the Gold Coast would expect. 
 At the same time that Arden-Clarke had regretted his inability to nominate an African 
officer for U.K. training course in Special Branch work, the Security Service was preparing an 
alternative training program that might answer the needs of the Gold Coast police force.  In 
addition to their London-based training programs, the Security Service also fielded a number of 
training officers who were expected to travel throughout the empire, running local courses on a 
variety of security and policing issues.  This was an especially attractive solution for 
administrations that frequently balked at the costs of these training programs.  Even when the 
Security Service waived fees for these programs, colonial administrations were still responsible 
to pay for travel, room, and board for their officers.  This had in fact resulted in the practice of 
frequently selecting officers for these programs if they already happened to be on leave at the 
same time, a solution that rarely provided the most appropriate or apt candidates.   The prospect 31
of a traveling training officer offered similar training to a potential wider field of local officers 
for a fraction of the cost attending metropolitan program. In place of two or three officers, a 
traveling training officer could instruct entire divisions, adapting multiple trainings for a variety 
of units and officers.  Arden-Clarke was expectedly intrigued by this proposition and requested 
that an MI5 training officer visit the Gold Coast. 
  The Security Service ultimately rejected the Gold Coasts’ request.  In a letter to the 
Commissioner of Police in the Gold Coast, A.M. McDonald explained that the Security Service 
was unable to provide a local training program since their traveling officer had fallen ill.  He 
further explained that the Security Service’s was skeptical if these local programs, especially in 
African colonies, were sufficiently effective to justify the time and effort involved.  McDonald 
wrote, “I am doubtful whether the type of course which we run is really suitable for Inspectors 
and NCO’s [African officers].  Experience in Nigeria and elsewhere has shown that it is very 
difficult for a training officer who does not know the calibre of the African to put across the 
lectures in a form which they can assimilate.”  McDonald also doubted “whether it would be an 
economic proposition from the Colony’s point of view to send out an officer solely for the 
purpose of training Africans ASP’s [Assistant Superintendent Police officers] for a week as the 
Colony would have to pay air passages and allowances although the Security Service continue to 
pay salary.”   More than anything else, McDonald’s reply conveys the shocking ignorance of the 32
Security Service to the affairs of the Gold Coast and the pressing needs by its swiftly 
approaching in dependence.  With independence little more than a year away, the government 
could no longer maintain the luxury of presuming only British officers required training in 
Special Branch work or that investment in its African personnel was somehow ineffective or 
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unproductive.  Quite the opposite, as Arden-Clarke had repeatedly affirmed, training British 
officers would yield small returns for the Gold Coast Police Force.  British officers, especially 
those experience in Special Branch, were far more likely to leave the force for an appointment in 
another administration.  Only by training Ghanian officers could the government ensure it had a 
consistent base of personnel and training to keep Special Branch operating.   
 Without support from the Security Service, the Gold Coast’s last hope for ‘Africanising’ 
its Special Branch rested on an ambitious initiative to develop a regional police training college 
for all of British West Africa.  This scheme was developed by General Sir Gerald Templer who 
had earned considerable clout in colonial security matters after serving as High Commissioner in 
Malay in 1952 to 1954, applying his extensive military experience towards breaking the 
insurgency campaign of Malaysian communists.  In 1955, he completed a report colonial police 
forces across the empire and arrived at the obvious conclusions that they were often woefully 
unprepared and untrained, especially according to the standards he had required in meeting the 
Malaysian crisis.  He recommended correcting this problem by developing regional police 
training colleges in the Caribbean, West Africa, East Africa, and “the Far East” respectively.  
These colleges would presumably facilitate training for more local officers by defraying costs 
and in turn allow for such training to be tailored to local contexts.  Regional police colleges 
would also facilitate the personal and institutional connections across administrations that would 
facilitate regional mobilizations against extreme crisis in individual territories.  In the case of 
West Africa, where independence was looming for both the Gold Coast and Nigeria, a police 
training college could strengthen ties between future commonwealth countries and their 
continued liaison with the UK on local security matters.  Templer recommended that West 
Africa’s college be built in Nigeria and estimated its initial costs to run to £71,000 with annual 
recurring costs of £9,4000.  Special Branch training was particularly noted in Templer’s report, 
constituting a fifth of the regional college’s annual budget.  The Colonial Office in London did 
not account for the fact that this college could likely not be launched before independence, but 
the administration in Accra and and Lagos pursued Templer’s suggestion in the hopes that these 
colleges could eventually assist independent Ghana and Nigeria to overcome the deficiencies in 
local police forces they had inherited from colonial rule.  They were overly optimistic. 
 Within a year of Templer’s report, the idea of a police training college in Nigeria for 
Britain’s former colonies in West Africa had been summarily dismissed.  Both the Nigerian and 
Ghanaian governments had their own discomforts with the proposal that made cooperation on 
such a project impossible to effect.  The Nigerian government did not reject the proposal outright 
but communicated to the Colonial Office that they were incapable of committing to such a large 
project in the immediate future.  This hesitancy was the result of both costs and Nigeria’s own 
unique constitutional debates.  Templer’s original estimate of £71,000 was challenged by 
Nigeria’s Public Works department who concluded that even if the college were constructed at a 
site with existing access to water and electricity, it would require an initial investment of 
£200,000.  It was also unclear if Nigeria’s future as a federal state could successfully manage a 
single police training college.  Upcoming constitutional conferences were set to debate, among 
other issues, ’regionalizing’ the Nigerian police force.  It was unclear if any would decide to 
utilize a national training college or if the location of college would motivate animosity between 
the three regional administrations.  The decision to abandon the project from the Ghanaian side 
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fell entirely to Nkrumah.  Keenly aware of the deficiencies in the force, Nkrumah still rejected 
the proposal for the potential compromise it could create to Ghana’s future policing needs.  He 
could hardly recommending funding and supporting a training college outside the borders of 
Ghana, despite whatever assurances colonial officials could secure from the Nigerian federation.  
Unless the training college could be relocated to Ghana, Nkrumah would not support the project.  
Once dismissed, no other plans were prepared for Ghana or Nigeria’s training needs before their 
independence.  33
 In his 1956 circular despatch, Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd had committed 
every colonial administration to prepare its police and Special Branch units for the eventual 
realization of independence.  As discussed earlier, he remind British officials that the “the 
ultimate objective is to create a professional service, able to stand on its own feet when self-
government is attained in meeting the intelligence needs of the territory and with which the 
United Kingdom Security Service can continue to liaison on the normal Commonwealth 
pattern.”   At the time, Ghana’s independence was less than a year away and yet beyond 34
Governor Arden-Clarke, there was a consistent indifference to this project.  A few months earlier, 
an officer in the Governor’s office had in fact written that, “the question of the provision of an 
adequate number of Special Branch officers capable of maintaining an efficient intelligence 
organization after independence is not of such immediate urgency”.  Instead, he and others felt 
the government’s first priority was to ensure accurate intelligence for British officials during the 
final year of the transition period.   The purpose of Special Branch was to remain as it had first 35
been envisioned - a tool of the colonial state.  Governor Arden-Clarke attempted to shift that 
expectation but the reticent of officials in the Gold Coast and especially of the Security Service’s 
metropolitan officials ensured that Special Branch approached independence with only three 
Ghanaian officers, men who would serve as a bridge between the unit’s colonial legacies and the 
operation of police intelligence under the first republic of Ghana. 
“Weeding Special Branch” 
 The government’s several efforts to prepare Special Branch for independence, as 
discussed above, all failed. The unit remained unprepared to operate as a national security force 
and Ghanaian government officials remained ignorant of the unit’s practices or purpose.  Yet not 
all of Britain’s security initiatives in the Gold Coast during these years failed.  Alongside the 
professed goals of Africanising police intelligence, officials in Accra and London were also 
concerned with the fate of the colony’s catalog of security papers.  The combined records of 
Special Branch, the LIC, and the SLO represented a veritable trove of intelligence papers.  Like 
any intelligence operation, the value of Special Branch reporting had been enriched both by its 
ability to cultivate additional sources and the growing archive of information that they carefully 
catalogued.  In other words, Special Branch’s utility as an intelligence organization directly 
increased with its ability to contextualize present affairs over information they had previously 
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acquired.  As valuable as these records were, arguably as essential as they were to future 
intelligence work in the Gold Coast, British officials collectively agreed that they could not be 
allowed to pass to the Ghanaian state. 
 The Gold Coast’s security archive possessed an expansive range of material that could 
compromise the U.K. strategic interests, both within and without West Africa, in a variety of 
ways.  At the simplest levels, much of Special Branch’s reports threatened to strain political 
relationships between HMG and the Ghanaian republic, especially while Kwame Nkrumah and 
the CPP remained in power.  As discussed in chapter three, Special Branch’s initial analytic 
frame for Nkrumah was “the Fuehrer”.  When not comparing the onset of Black nationalism to 
the formation of German fascism, they often resorted to snide invectives, describing Nkrumah as 
“the show boy” and even as a “tub-thumping demagogue”.  Other nationalist leaders were treated 
by Special Branch in like manner, their several entreaties in Special Branch reports casting them 
as charlatans, imbeciles, or or petty power-mongers.  If passed to the Ghanaian government, only 
so much of this material could be explained as the personal prejudice of individual Special 
Branch officers before precipitating a diplomatic crisis.  This was not the worst threat of this 
archive however.  The truly damaging material was evidence of Special Branch’s continued (and 
illegal) use of postal censorship, even after Governor Arden-Clarke’s official suspension of the 
policy.  Disconcertingly, the Security Service and Special Branch would have been equally 
committed to ensuring that both British and Ghanaian officials remain ignorant of this fact (see 
chapter four).  Just as colonial officials had obscured Special Branch operations during self-rule, 
the U.K. could not allow the Ghanaian government to understand the full extent of intelligence 
efforts in the terminal years of British rule. 
 Alongside these diplomatic considerations, Security records in the Gold Coast also 
threatened Britains global strategic interests beyond West Africa.  During the nine years of the 
Gold Coast’s experiment with self-rule, local officials had been frequently involved with 
metropolitan security matters through the contributions of the SLO.  The SLO’s own records 
dealt with Britain’s intelligence liaison with French colonial officials, the identity of several MI5 
officers, and detailed some of the operational procedures (including cyphers) of Britain’s larger 
intelligence apparatus.  None of this material could be left for Communist elements to acquire 
and by 1957, these fears were still alive in the Gold Coast.  British intelligence officers and 
policymakers had tempered their initial fears that Nkrumah was a communist provocateur.  They 
had arrived at a far less disconcerting conclusion that Nkrumah’s politics were centered only on 
his personal advancement.  He could not be accurately labeled an ideological communist, 
capitalist, socialist, or any other variation of current political thought.  They argued instead that 
his guiding political philosophy was the interest of Nkrumah, and he would adopt whatever 
ideological stance facilitated his self-interest.  In the words of one MI5 officer, “Nkumah may 
have found himself driven off his ideological course by the compulsion of party politics, and 
may experience increasing difficulty in reconciling his preconceived theories with the tactical 
maneuvers necessary to keep himself in officer.”   Yet many of Nkrumah’s associates, including 36
George Padmore and Kojo Botsio, were still viewed as communist threats.  In the case of Botsio, 
Security Service officials were perpetually concerned with his potential identification as a 
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communist but were unable to provide definitive proof one way or another.  Botsio was thus a 
perpetual anxiety born of uncertainty.  The SLO, P.M. Kirby Green, wrote the Director-General 
of the Security Service regarding this matter, hoping to answer if suspicions toward Botsio 
should influence how the Gold Coast ‘Africanised’ its intelligence apparatus.  After pages of 
details and analysis, Kirby-Green concluded, “the fact remains that despite all that I have written 
in this rather over-long letter, I am personally unable to make up my mind, though I am left with 
strong suspicions based on no adequate foundation.”   This middling conclusion left the larger 37
Security Service believing that the Ghanaian Republic was potentially headed towards a 
communist intervention originating from its deputy Prime Minster and such an intervention 
could allow Soviet officials unmitigated access to whatever records or resources British officials 
failed to remove from the Gold Coast. 
 The process of destroying and removing security records from the Gold Coast, with the 
obvious detriment to future security matters, was formally conceived in October 1955.  During 
his review of the Gold Coast Special Branch, A.M. McDonald recommended that, “Special 
Branch records will have to be ‘weeded’ before achievement of full self-government”.  If his 
choice of analogy was too unclear, McDonald further clarified this was not a simple 
reorganization of files but that “many files will inevitably have to be destroyed.”   As future 38
records would indicate, not simply “many files” but perhaps the entire archive of security papers 
in the Gold Coast would be removed or destroyed by 1957. 
 The process of ‘weeding’ security records in the Gold Coast seems to have begun 
sometime after January 1956.  At the time, an officer in the Governor’s office began planning 
this project with the Commissioner of Police, first with the organization of a committee to both 
identify which records should be destroyed and to ensure that these records were appropriately 
disposed of throughout the colony.   This would prove no easy task.   Intelligence records were 39
primarily held at two locations in Accra, at Police HQ and the SLO’s offices at Giffard Camp.  
These collections would be simple enough to review, remove or destroy, yet Special Branch and 
the LIC’s regular reports had followed a wide distribution throughout the colony.  Regional 
officers, military officials, and the Governor’s Office regularly received intelligence documents 
that could have been accidentally stored amongst other records.  Intelligence papers, including 
Special Branch assessments and LIC reports, were never intended for constant storage in 
regional offices.  All such reports distributed outside Special Branch, the LIC, and the SLO’s 
office were appended with tear-off dockets, reminding regional officers that such reports should 
be destroyed shortly after their reception and the dockets returned to security officials in Accra to 
verify such procedures had been followed.  In the case of LIC reports, the Minister of Defense 
recommended that regional offices regularly review and purge their holdings every three months.   
This “weeding” committee was expected to detect any departures from this policy. 
 Aside from McDonald’s recommendation and the later plan for a specialized committee, 
there is no other mention of the destruction of security papers in the Gold Coast.  That is perhaps 
an indication of the success this program.  Further evidence of this program’s success is the fact 
that in only one instance have any Special Branch or intelligence papers from the colonial period 
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been located in Ghana.  These records were located by Richard Rathbone in 1966 at the former 
offices of the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti in Kumasi.  They consisted chiefly of Special 
Branch papers from the lat 1940’s and though they bore the destruction procedures and tear-off 
dockets of later reports, the policies had clearly been overlooked in this instance.  The effort to 
erase intelligence and security matters from Ghana’s colonial archives had nearly proved a 
complete success.  
 During A.M. McDonald’s review of the Gold Coast Special Branch, one of the unit’s 
three African officers asked the Security Intelligence Adviser a pointed question regarding the 
future of police intelligence.  He asked, “what safeguards were to provided to ensure that a future 
Gold Coast Government would not use Special Branch as a political weapon.”  McDonald may 
not have provided an answer then, but bleakly replied in his repot, “there can, of course, be no 
effective safeguard.”    40
 Between 1954 and 1957, every security policy in the gold Coast had been pursued in light 
of the colony’s rapid acceleration towards independence and in expectation of the future 
Ghanaian state.  These policies were intended to create a professional intelligence service for the 
Republic of Ghana, yet has been shown here, none of these efforts succeeded.  The leadership of 
the Ghanaian state approached independence largely ignorant of Special Branch, its purpose, or 
the standards by which it should be managed.  As the force progressively lost its British officers, 
only nominal efforts were made to recruit and train additional Ghanian officers.  Police 
intelligence in the Gold Coast was allowed to atrophy as the security of the colonial 
administration also diminished. 
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Conclusion 
 On the 24th of February, 1966 the First Republic of Ghana was overthrown in a coup 
d’état organized by its police and military.  The officers responsible, calling themselves, the 
National Liberation Council, claimed their actions had been required in order to remove Kwame 
Nkrumah’s increasingly authoritarian government from power, to halt the economic decline 
created by his socialist projects, and to ensure the return of a more democratic state in Ghana.  
The coup was unabashedly a violent referendum against the leadership of Nkrumah, a point the 
NLC publicly declared at the outset of the coup.  After seizing control of Radio Ghana, Colonel 
E.K. Kotoka announced to the country: “Fellow citizens, I have come to inform you that the 
military, with the cooperation of the police, have taken over the Government.  The myth 
surrounding Kwame Nkrumah has been broken.”   The NLC had not only overthrown the 1
government but also assumed the challenge of envisioning a Ghanaian state without Nkrumah. 
 The eight men leading the NLC encompassed the leading military and police officers in 
the Ghanaian government, though three deserve particular attention here: J.E.O Nunoo, 
Commissioner of Police, administration; A. K. Deku, Commissioner of Police, C.I.D.; and 
J.W.K. Harlley, Inspector-General of Police and Vice-Chairman of the N.L.C.  These three were 
the senior police members of the NLC and nine years earlier, they had bee the only Ghanian 
officers of the Gold Coast Police Special Branch at independence.  They were, in all likelihood, 
the only Special Branch officers to transition from the colonial state to the Republic of Ghana, 
responsible for rebuilding police intelligence after the personnel losses and document destruction 
that were discussed in the last chapter.  They were, in other words, responsible for deciding what 
practices the independent Special Branch unit would continue from its colonial predecessor.  
Given their trajectory from Special Branch to leaders of Ghana’s first coup, a coup personally 
directed against Nkrumah, it is difficult not to assume that they had perpetuated some of its 
particular enmities. 
 Two years after the coup, Nkrumah wrote of these three and contended that their 
affiliation in Special Branch directly explained their participation in the 1966 coup to remove 
him from office.  Writing in Dark Days in Ghana, one of his last books and dedicated to 
defending the accomplishments of his presidency, Nkrumah contended that Special Branch bore 
particularly blame for the coup itself and the threat of military rule that hung over Ghana.  He 
wrote that Special Branch had been specifically organized in 1949 as a direct counter to his own 
political influence and that it had trained its officers to view him “as a dangerous man whose 
political views and activities threatened all that was stable and respectable in British eyes.”  
Nkrumah also accused Special Branch of undermining his presidency long before the coup itself.  
He noted that there had been six assassination attempts made on his life while in office, ranging 
from shootings to bomb attacks, and that in each instance Special Branch had been complicit in 
these treasonous acts.  Nkrumah claimed that they had either ignored these several plots, 
withheld intelligence regarding them, or actively assisted the would-be assassins.   The coup had 2
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simply been the overt demonstration of their multi-year campaign to destroy his presidency and, 
in Nkrumah’s view, compromise the future of African nationalism for the interest of 
neocolonialist forces. 
 With his charges and suspicions in Special Branch stated so clearly, Nkrumah also used 
to Dark Days in Ghana to explain why he had allowed the unit to continue to exist in his 
government despite the threat it represented.  Given its dangerous legacy and the unit’s dubious 
history, how could he have chosen to trust these men and this institution?  Nkrumah wrote: 
 Were it not for the continued criminal conspiracy by the opposition then I might have 
taken the risk of abolishing the Special Branch at an earlier stage.  After all, it was not 
even part of the old colonial set-up and had only been instituted to deal with me and the 
C.P.P. in 1949.  If I had done so, however, all security would have to be entrusted to the 
Party and while I did use it as a major source of information as to what was taking place 
in the country, once again it would have been equally dangerous to have relied 
exclusively on it.  3
Nkrumah’s explanation provides a number of revelations beyond the matter of Special Branch, 
showing his perception of the opposition, his party, and the dangers of government intelligence 
generally.  While raising a number of additional questions, it makes clear that intelligence work 
had been a fundamental aspect of government under Nkrumah and an uncertain role in its end.  
Both the coup itself and Nkrumah’s later reflections suggest that the matters considered here, 
regarding the role of police intelligence in the terminal years of British rule, carry far beyond 
1957 and independence.  It will be a matter of future research to answer what role government 
intelligence played in the First Republic of Ghana, but it would seem critical that these questions 
operate within colonial legacies that have been explored here. 
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